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LEARNING FROM THE ENEMY: IDENTITY, CONFLICT, AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

ABSTRACT
Conflict provides an opportunity to learn. However, conflict also activates
identity and dysfunctional learning processes that protect identity. Neither the
learning nor the identity literatures provide an explanation for how some
organizations overcome that challenge and learn; and relatively little research
has considered the connection between identity, conflict and organizational
learning.
This thesis attempts to fill this gap through a qualitative research study that
examines the relationships between identity, conflict, and organizational learning,
using a comprehensive practice based model of inter-organizational learning.
The specific research questions guiding this study are: What is the role of
identity in organizational learning between organizations in conflict? And: How
does an organization learn from another organization with which it is in conflict?
I use a case study design to examine a single exceptional case in the
context of an extreme inter-organizational conflict. Qualitative data were collected
through archival research, semi-structured interviews, and on-site observations.
My findings provide a rich basis for analysis and theorizing, and provide
evidence in support of my proposed model of inter-organizational learning. This
study suggests that inter-organizational conflict is a situation where individual to
individual learning can ultimately influence the learning that occurs in their
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respective organizations. Conflict stimulates individuals from each organization to
interact over an issue. Their interpretations of the issue and their responses to
each other are affected by their social and role identities and by their respective
organizational identities. It is the actions of individuals and the social processes
and practices through which they interact that either facilitates or constrains interorganizational learning.
This dissertation contributes to academic research by highlighting the
importance of the relationships between identity, conflict and learning; by
exploring the role played by the practices associated with identity in shaping
individual behaviour and organizational learning; and by demonstrating the
implications of different sources of conflict on inter-organizational learning.
Finally, my process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a
more socialized theoretical background for understanding and addressing the
challenges of learning between “enemies”.

Key words: Inter-organizational learning, conflict, identity, practice-based view
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Motivation
The growing use of cross-sector partnering, multi-party initiatives and the
rise of activism by shareholders and stakeholders have increased the need for
firms to consider and integrate diverse perspectives (Hart & Sharma, 2004;
Rothman & Friedman, 2001). More than ever it is critical that firms “anticipate and
respond to impending threats, conduct experiments, engage in continuing
innovation” (Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. xvii). Nevertheless in practice few firms
readily embrace the learning opportunities inherent in the conflict that confronts
them, and managers appear skeptical about the power of conflict to invigorate
problem solving (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Tjosvold, 2008). The
role of conflict in learning has been given scant attention in research as well,
despite Argyris and Schon‟s (1978) early recognition that conflict provides an
opportunity to learn.
Research to date has revealed a seeming paradox in the relationship
between conflict and learning. This paradox could be characterized as the reality
of conflict versus the promise of conflict. The promise of conflict is that learning
can result when individuals explore the reasoning behind their conflicting
positions and the meaning these positions have for them (Argyris & Schon, 1978;
Bush & Folger, 1994; Rothman & Friedman, 2001). Conflict is also a key part of
creating shared understandings and interpretations; a mechanism through which
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learning occurs at the collective, group and/or organization level (Crossan, H.
Lane, & White, 1999; Senge, 1990).
Conflict's promise for organizational learning is based on the information
processing view of individual and group dynamics, as are earlier explanations of
organizational learning (e.g. Huber, 1991). In this perspective the generation and
implementation of varied or original ideas is the result of negotiations over scarce
resources or the reconciliation of differences in knowledge. However, research
has shown that no matter what its origin, conflict tends to quickly shift to identity
differences, particularly if it persists (Mooney, Holahan, & Amason, 2007). This is
the more pessimistic view and one that is supported by much evidence. That is,
the conflict created by a diversity of perspectives produces divisions and tensions
and negative performance outcomes in general. This view is the social identity
perspective and explains the inter-personal and inter-group defensiveness
triggered by difference (Mannix & Neale, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Conflict that is rooted in identity has been shown to be dysfunctional with
regard to learning (A. Brown & Starkey, 2000). Often individuals‟ ability to learn is
blocked by defensive reasoning (Argyris, 1991; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000).
Moreover individuals‟ multiple identities and the identities that they attribute to
their organizations can inhibit learning (Nag, K. G. Corley, & D. A. Gioia, 2007).
Research has shown that individuals will support activities that are consistent
with their organization‟s identity, they will stereotype themselves and others, and
they will work to maintain coherence between their activities and their identity, as
well as their organization‟s identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton & Dukerich,
1991; Nag et al., 2007). While these theories describe how conflict inhibits
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learning they do not explain how individuals and organizations might overcome
the constraints imposed by identity, thus enabling them to address differences in
knowledge and understanding, even while the identity based conflict persists.
In this dissertation, I explore the conditions that enable organizations and
their managers to overcome the multi-level constraints imposed on learning by
their social, role, and organization identities. I focus on the impact of identity
because research and practice has shown that all conflicts are at least in part
rooted in the identities of the individuals, groups, or organizations involved (De
Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). While conflict may originate from resource scarcity,
knowledge differences, or identity differences, all are usually present in any
situation (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). Additionally, in situations of pervasive and
escalating conflict, issues of identity tend to predominate over other concerns
(Fiol, M. Pratt, & O‟Connor, 2009; Lederach, 1995; Mooney et al., 2007). I
contend that the impact of identity on beliefs and behaviours must be understood
before either identity-based conflict or knowledge-based conflict can be
effectively addressed. Therefore, I explore the conditions and practices that
support a shift in attention away from identity and ideological differences to the
potentially more productive knowledge-based and/or resource-based aspects of a
conflict.
The key concepts used in this dissertation are:
Inter-organizational learning - the consequence of an organization‟s direct
interaction with other organizations. It is both a process and an outcome and
involves cognitive and behavioural change at multiple levels of the organization.
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Social identity – is an individual‟s self-categorization as a member of a group as
well as the value and emotional significance that the individual places on that
membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Role identity - refers to the meanings and behaviours that people attach to the
multiple roles they typically play, such as occupations and/or professions (Stryker
& P. Burke, 2000).
Organizational identity – comprises both institutionalized notions of identity which
constrain and shape individuals‟ interpretations and collective meanings that are
formed as individuals reach mutual understanding and shared interpretations (D.
Gioia, Shultz, & K. Corley, 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).
Conflict- entails incompatible activities such that one party‟s actions interfere,
obstruct, or in some way get in the way of another‟s action (Deutsch, 1949;
1973). In this dissertation “enemies” are organizations with incompatible
activities.

1.2 Research Questions
Based on the motivation and background outlined, in this dissertation I
consider the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What is the role of identity in organizational
learning between organizations in conflict?
I begin to answer this question by first establishing that inter-organizational
learning outcomes are possible in the context of conflict. Having established that
inter-organizational learning is possible, I then examine the practices through
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which this learning was accomplished and the conditions that were present; in
particular the individual and organization identities and their attendant
behaviours. I draw a link between identities, behaviour (practice), and learning
outcomes. Drawing on previous research, I look at actions taken by individuals
and groups with regard to a specific conflict to understand identity activation
against learning opportunities.
Research Question 2: How does an organization learn from another
organization with which it is in conflict?
In order to explore the processes that support inter-organizational learning, I
consider different actions at the moments of engagement between the
organizations and how that action manifests back across the individual and
organizational levels over time. I examine behaviours at the nexus of interorganizational learning, conflict and identity. I then determine, from the data, the
processes through which the identities and inter-organizational learning are
connected.
In the next section I introduce the theoretical grounding for this study.

1.3 Theoretical Grounding
Inter-organizational learning in conflict is a case where individual to
individual learning can ultimately influence each individual‟s respective
organization. The basic building block of learning is stimulus - response, with the
conflict acting as the stimulus. Individuals from different organizations become
associated with a conflict and it is the conflict that activates their identities. The
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individual and respective organizational identities that are activated strongly
influence what the individuals attend to and also their interpretation of it. Their
individual interpretation of the conflict, the other individuals involved, and the
situation in turn influences their response (i.e. their feedback) to others both
outside and within their organizations. As noted above, there has been limited
theorizing on the connection between identity and organizational learning and it is
equivocal, suggesting that identity‟s impact on the process of organizational
learning can be negative (A. Brown & Starkey, 2000) or positive (K. Corley & D.
Gioia, 2003) depending on the context and conditions.
My focus on behavior derives from my intention to understand the range of
conditions associated with inter-organizational learning. Empirical studies are
dominated by the assumption that inter-organizational learning is positive and
that it manifests as changes in knowledge bases (i.e., patent counts) or as
mastering a specific competence or technology (e.g. Argote, Ingram, J. Levine, &
Moreland, 2000). In this research I consider how individuals and organizations
learn from and with each other and about the context within which they are
operating and how identity influences inter-organizational learning in that context.
To address Research Question 1, I develop premises which support a
model describing the relationships between the concepts of identity, learning, and
conflict. I propose that the extent to which individuals experiment with new
behaviours is a function of the interaction of their individual social and role
identities and their respective organizations‟ identities. Previous research has
shown that under certain conditions individuals will experiment with new
behaviours, without changing their beliefs (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). Building on
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this research I suggest that depending on their “repertoire” of identities and the
stability of their organizational identity, individuals may be able to tap into the
behaviours associated with a common social or role identity. This common
identity provides a common language and set of behaviours with which to
approach the conflict.
Likewise, the likelihood that individuals will experiment with new behaviours
depends on the emphasis of their organization‟s identity and their level of
identification with it. For example, individuals that identify with an organization
that defines itself by deutero-learning processes, such as discovery (Schon,
1986), are more likely to experiment, regardless of their individual beliefs.
If these individuals persist in this changed behaviour they may be able to
suspend their belief systems and explore new interpretations. This shift in
interpretation facilitates dialogue within and between organizations and raises the
possibility of the integration of new information (Bohm, 1996; Crossan et al.,
1999). Depending on the congruence of this new information with their current
identities, as well as on their own and their organization‟s practices, they may
then be prompted to examine their existing beliefs, including their individual or
their organization‟s identity (Rothman & Friedman, 2001). I put forward that interorganizational learning occurs at the intersection of identity (who we are) and
practice (what we do).
Whereas Research Question 1 is developed through theoretical grounding
and framed by specific premises, Research Question 2 is opened for exploration
within the structure of this dissertation. Given the dearth of research examining
the social processes of inter-organizational learning between conflicting
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organizations I allowed the data to speak for itself. In the next section I describe
the research design that supported this approach.

1.4 Research Design
The research was conducted using a case study methodology to compile
and compare themes in a single industry, salmon farming in British Columbia,
Canada, which has been plagued by conflict since its inception. The case study
method is most appropriate for research that asks “how” and “why” research
questions and that is conducted by accessing people who can recall the
important events with relative accuracy (Yin, 2009). Also this method is well
suited to an in-depth analysis of complex phenomena via multiple sources of
data, as described below. Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct
sharpens construct definition, validity, and measurability. Finally, comparison with
confirming and contradicting literature helps to build internal validity.
This methodology enabled me to capture both the relationships between
identity, conflict and learning (through semi-structured interviews) and the
dynamics of those relationships over time (through repeated interviews with the
same individuals or organizations, archival documents, newspaper articles, and
observations).
I analyzed data from semi-structured interviews with 47 people, 1077
newspaper articles, several hundred pages of archival documents, and numerous
hours of direct observation. I further triangulated data by including multiple
sources, such as company spokespeople, environmentalists, government
officials, industry association representatives, academics, members of First
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Nations, and other community members. The data collection process occurred in
two phases. The first phase involved updating an existing data base that I had
been instrumental in compiling. After an initial analysis of that data, I focused my
second phase of data gathering on the negotiation and implementation of a
specific learning initiative between the largest company in the industry and a
coalition of environment groups.
I analyzed the data using NVivo to identify relevant contextual factors, the
major constructs and learning outcomes. Following the trajectory of the learning
activities and outcomes, I categorized the relationship between the major
constructs and the processes underpinning the repeated interactions of the focal
organizations.
My prior experiences and beliefs undoubtedly shaped this research (Willig,
2001). Accordingly, I present a statement of reflexivity to allow readers to
“explore the ways in which a researcher‟s involvement with a particular study
influences, acts upon and informs such research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999,
p. 228). I am a life-long resident of Ontario in central Canada. I come to this
research and to the conflict surrounding the salmon farming industry in British
Columbia with no prior involvement or affiliations with either the industry or the
environmental movement. I began this research without an opinion on the extent
of salmon farming‟s impact and now, after 5 years of studying the situation, I
have no clearer alignment on that question than when I started. It is a complex
question that concerns me both as a Canadian, as a researcher, and as an
advisor to organizations. I am an accredited mediator, with more than 20 years
management consulting experience and I have facilitated conflict-laden
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interactions within and between a variety of individuals, groups, and
organizations. Recently I helped to manage the post-merger integration of two
financial services companies, concurrent with completing a Master of Arts in
Organizational Conflict at Royal Roads University in British Columbia. This
experience ignited my interest in the conditions and processes that underlie
mutually positive individual and inter-organizational connections, and especially
around contentious issues. It also exposed me, for the first time, to the extent of
the conflict around salmon farming, and to the range of views and perspectives
present in the context. Finally, as a result of my experience and education, I find
it difficult to view conflict resolution and learning as independent processes. Thus
in collecting and analyzing the data contained in the study, I am undoubtedly
biased toward learning as a positive outcome. I would like readers to be aware of
my perspective when assessing my research and findings.

1.5 Thesis Contribution
The main contribution of this study is in highlighting the relationship between
conflict, identity and learning. This case showed the importance of identity in
shifting behaviour and the role of conflict and learning processes in shifting
aspects of identity. Examining these concepts together provides insight into the
conditions under which inter-organizational learning is more likely to occur.
This research demonstrates the role played by social, role, and
organizational identity in shaping individual actions in response to conflict and in
doing so demonstrates the importance of behaviour to learning in such situations.
My findings suggest that unless we understand how individual and organizational
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identities are connected to behaviour it is hard to understand their impact on
learning. In the case of conflicted relationships the behaviours or activities
associated with common identities may hold the key to sustained behavioural
change which may generate cognitive change and learning.
My process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a
more socialized theoretical background for understanding the challenges of interorganizational learning. It highlights the importance of considering all of the
components of learning and suggests that it is the nexus of practitioners,
practice, and praxis that delivers inter-organizational learning.
Finally, this work contributes to the understanding of the implications of
different sources of conflict to inter-organizational interaction. This work revealed
that a shift in emphasis from identity based conflict to the socio-cognitive aspects
of a conflict, instigated mutual problem solving behaviour, even while the
underlying conflict of interest persisted. This research underscores the
importance of understanding that at some level all conflicts are identity based,
and the need to understand how organizations come to work together despite,
and in the presence of, their identity differences.
This dissertation also contributes to management practice by alerting
managers and organizational leaders to the possibilities inherent in conflict and in
interaction with diverse organizations. If organizations are more attuned to social
trends and sensitivities, managers may be alerted to risks and opportunities they
might not otherwise have spotted, and organizational capabilities will likely
increase. In addition, this work raises managerial awareness of the implications
of their organization‟s characteristics (i.e. its identity) on its ability to learn from
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other organizations. This is especially relevant to organizations involved in
partnering, joint ventures, or mergers. Finally, this research provides guidelines
on ways to consider and integrate disparate perspectives and to staff interorganizational learning initiatives.

1.6 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized in seven chapters.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the phenomenon of interest and the
research questions.
In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literatures on learning, identity, and
conflict, in order to provide theoretical background for my study.
In Chapter 3, I position my research in the practice based view and develop
premises in support of a model that explains the relationship between conflict,
individual and organizational identities, and inter-organizational learning.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this study, including the
rationale for a case based design, the data collection methods and the analytical
procedures.
Chapter 5 presents the analysis and interpretation of my findings and their
relationship to the premises and model.
In Chapter 6, I present a discussion of my findings in the context of current
research.
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by providing academic and
practitioner implications of the findings, discussing the limitations of this study,
and suggesting directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LEARNING, IDENTITY, AND CONFLICT
Inter-organizational learning is strongly influenced by the context within
which it occurs yet learning is the process by which individuals and organizations
both adapt to and alter their context. Learning and adaptation occurs in spite of
the constraints provided by the respective organization‟s institutionalized learning
(i.e. practices, procedures, and routines) and the individuals involved. Conflict is
necessary to prompt learning yet conflict frequently inhibits learning by triggering
defensive responses at all levels. In this section I review the relevant literature
on inter-organizational learning, identity, and conflict. For each of these fields I
first provide an overview of the relevant literature, I then summarize how that
particular stream of research has addressed the other two phenomena and in the
final section I summarize and integrate prior theory (See Figure 2-1: Learning
from Enemy: The Theoretical Context).

Conflict

Learning

Identity

Figure 2-1: Learning from Enemy: The Theoretical Context
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2.1 Inter-Organizational Learning
2.1.1 Organizational Learning as the Basis of Inter-Organizational Learning
Current understanding of inter-organizational learning builds on the rich
body of literature on organizational learning. Organizational learning is an
established field of study that has been reviewed at regular intervals over the
past several decades (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004; Crossan, H. Lane, White, &
Djurfeldt, 1995; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Nicolini,
2000; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Leavitt & March, 1988). Earlier
work, (e.g. Huber, 1991) took an information processing perspective of
organizational learning, depicting the conflict created by a diversity of views as
very important to learning. Later research considered the social processes
involved and raised questions, still relatively unexplored, about the impact of
conflict on learning (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). While these reviews illustrated
the long standing ambivalence of organizational learning scholarship toward
conflict they also identified some common threads.
Organizational learning, broadly defined as organizational development and
change, is a multi-level phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000) containing
four related processes – intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing,
which occur at the individual, group and organizational levels (Crossan et al.,
1999). The processes of intuiting and interpreting are augmented by the actionbased processes of information seeking and experimenting at the individual and
group level (Zietsma, Winn, Branzei, & Vertinsky, 2002). Organizational learning
depends on the interaction of both the content and the context (J. Brown &
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Duguid, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991) and it refers to both the process of learning
and the products of the learning process. Generally the learning literature
emphasizes learning as a mechanism through which organizations can enhance
performance (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985) despite
recognition that learning may be “equally about how to negotiate current
relationships” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000, p. 13).
There is also general agreement that organizations learn through individuals
and that individual learning is a fundamental building block of organizational
learning (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). However an organization‟s learning may
be more or less than the sum of individual learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978;
Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Starbuck & Whalen,
2008). Individuals and the social processes, through which they interact, both
within and outside their own organization, either facilitate or constrain
organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999). This is because the
institutionalized learning of their respective organizations, including the
established practice, procedures and routines, constrain how individuals and
groups interpret and integrate feedback.
2.1.2 Inter-Organizational Learning Defined
As with organizational learning, inter-organizational learning can be thought
of as both a process and the products of that process. Inter-organizational
learning is typically described as the process through which a group or
organization exchanges, receives, and is influenced by the competence and
technical knowledge of others (Van Wijk & M. Lyles, 2008). It depends both on

16
the respective resources and capacities and the inter-organizational dynamics of
the organizations involved, as well as the nature of the knowledge being
exchanged or created (Easterby-Smith, M. Lyles, & Tsang, 2008). Reciprocal
learning is a form of inter-organizational learning and it refers to the blending of
knowledge and skills by organizations to jointly develop new knowledge,
capabilities and products, i.e. create new knowledge (Lubatkin, Florin, & P. Lane,
2001).
Drawing on Crossan et al. (1999) and Van Wijk and Lyles (2008) this
dissertation adopts a comprehensive definition of inter-organizational learning.
Inter-organizational learning is the consequence of a focal organization‟s direct
interaction with other organizations. It is both process and result and involves
cognitive and behavioural change at multiple levels of the organization. The
learning of the focal organization may be the result of transfer, sharing or
acquisition of knowledge from other organizations or from the co-creation of new
knowledge. This definition is appropriate for this study because it stresses both
the cognitive and behavioural aspects of learning, highlights interaction (i.e.,
practices) between organizations, emphasizes the multi-level nature of interorganizational learning, and draws attention to the two manifestations of interorganizational learning (process and product).
Vicarious learning has been excluded from consideration as it refers to
learning from second hand experience or mimicking other organizations (Huber,
1991) and I will only consider it to highlight aspects of inter-organizational
learning that results from interaction. In addition, I do not draw on studies
focusing explicitly on knowledge transfer (e.g. Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996;
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Tsai, 2001) knowledge sharing (e.g. Tsai, 2002), knowledge flows (e.g. Schulz,
2001), or knowledge acquisition (e.g. M. Lyles & Salk, 1996) as those literatures
tend to focus on learning a competence or technology and less on the
behavioural aspects of inter-organizational learning.
2.1.3 The Relationship Between Cognition and Behaviour in Learning
Fiol and Lyles (1985, p. 806) stated that “it is essential to note the difference
between cognition and behaviour, for not only do they represent two different
phenomena, but also one is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the other”.
They distinguish between changes in cognition and changes in behaviour and
suggest that they may occur independently at the organizational level. In this
dissertation organizational learning is the collective cognitions and behaviours of
the individuals in the group or organization and it is represented by such things
as an organization‟s procedures, structure, practices, and strategy.
Cognitive theorists describe individuals as being able to perceive, analyze,
plan and choose. These descriptions align with perceptions of individuals as
autonomous conscious beings that make choices and influence their
environments, i.e., exercise agency. Cognitive theories can explain how people
(and organizations) suddenly act in novel ways. Cognitive theorists have focused
on processes that are not directly observable such as memory, information
storage, attention, interpretation and rehearsal (Mazur, 1990). In this view
interpretation is a key process which is strongly influenced by an individual‟s
multiple identities which activate various cognitive structures that facilitate
interpretation (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Stryker & P. Burke, 2000).
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Behavioural theories of learning explain as much behaviour as possible
without allowing for conscious thought. In the behavioural view learning arises
from reactions to performance feedback. Because individuals‟ environments
generate such feedback, behavioural theories say that the environment strongly
influences what is learned. Behaviouralist theories describe three main types of
learning: classical, operant, and latent. Classical conditioning looks at the
relationship between various stimuli and changes to automatic or spontaneous
responses (e.g. Pavlov, 2010 /1927). Operant conditioning looks at the
relationship between various stimuli and changes in deliberate responses, given
various rewards and punishments (e.g. Reynolds, 1975). Latent learning
suggests that rather than simply learning automatic responses triggered by
environmental stimuli, individuals can learn facts about the world that they can
subsequently use in a flexible manner, demonstrating the link between agency
and response (e.g. Tolman & Honzik, 1930).
In cognitive theories the effectiveness of learning in pursuit of a goal hinges
on individuals‟ perceptions. As a result, cognitive theories offer little help in
explaining how individuals can alter their responses and improve their
performance when they encounter differing interpretations of the environment, as
is probably the case in a situation of conflict. Behavioural learning theories
attempt to explain how effective learning can occur in spite of individuals‟
perceptual errors and biases (i.e., in response to feedback) (Starbuck & Whalen,
2008). This suggests that an examination of the behavioural aspect of learning
may be key to understanding inter-organizational learning around conflict laden
issues that may involve misunderstandings by one or all parties.
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Inkpen and Crossan (1995) draw on both the cognitive and behavioural
theories of learning to describe the various learning states experienced by an
individual and draw on Fiol and Lyles (1985) to extend this framework to the
organizational level (see Figure 2-2: The Relationship between Cognition and
Behaviour). When there is no cognitive or behavioural change there is no
learning; and conversely, when both change there is integrated learning. They
suggest that behavioural change without cognitive change and visa versa sets up
a transitional state because of the tension created when an individual‟s behaviour
or cognition is not supported by corresponding changes in their cognition and
behaviour, respectively. This tension results in “cognitive dissonance” and its
reduction is a “basic process in humans” (Festinger, 1957, p. 4). Individuals will
always work to align their behaviour and their beliefs (Festinger, 1957).

Figure 2-2: The Relationship between Cognition and Behaviour1

1

Inkpen, A. & Crossan, M. (1995). Believing is seeing: Joint ventures and organizational learning.
Journal of Management Studies. 32:5 p. 599
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For example, if a behavioural change is forced it will likely resolve itself into
no learning as individuals will continue to interpret stimuli through their current
beliefs. However, if learning is experimental, individuals may suspend their belief
systems to try a new behaviour and as a result be open to new interpretations of
the outcomes. This behavioural change framework suggests that behavioural
change presents the possibility of integrated learning depending on the
conditions and the way outcomes are interpreted.
Despite these early distinctions between the cognitive and behavioural
aspects of organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985;
Inkpen & Crossan, 1995), our understanding of the conditions necessary for
behavioural change to transition to organizational learning remains relatively
under developed (Starbuck & Whalen, 2008). By exploring practices that occur
when organizations engage with each other, this dissertation highlights the
importance of behaviour change in inter-organizational learning irrespective of
cognitive structures such as conflict, that otherwise constrain learning.
2.1.4 The Challenge of Inter-Organizational Learning
Inter-organizational learning offers the potential for much higher and more
relevant learning than organizational learning. However research has shown this
type of learning is challenging (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004). Conveying knowledge
between organizations is more complex because of the multifaceted nature of the
boundaries, culture, identities, and processes involved. Additionally, a given firm
does not have equal capacity to learn from all other firms. Lane and Lubatkin
(1998) found that a firm learned more from its partner when they had similar
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knowledge bases, organizational structures and dominant logics. Conversely, the
firm may simply not have the knowledge base to identify the learning opportunity,
to usefully absorb and apply the others‟ knowledge, or even recognize its value in
their own context (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In addition, a firm‟s learning from a
partner depends on its prior experience with that partner as well as its experience
with other partners (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). In contrast, Inkpen & Crossan
(1995) observed that even when firms have all of this as well as explicit learning
objectives they may be unable to create the appropriate mechanisms and
systems to transfer knowledge from the joint venture to the parent. They found
that while individual managers involved in the joint venture were often positive
about their learning experiences, integration of the learning experience at the
parent firm level was problematic, thus limiting the institutionalized learning. They
concluded that the institutionalized learning associated with an unwillingness to
cast off past practices can limit the effectiveness of inter-organization learning
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). This raises the question of how, from a cognitive
viewpoint, firms overcome institutionalized learning to change practices; or from
the behavoural viewpoint, change practices to alter institutionalized learning.
Most of the empirical research on inter-organizational learning has focused
on strategic alliances and joint ventures where partner selection is based on
learning prospects and their commercial impact (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004) or on
research collaborations where collective action is required to solve a joint
problem or repel a common threat (i.e. Corey, 1997). This work has tended to
frame cooperation and competition as opposite ends of a continuum and conflict,
if considered at all, is typically resource based such as conflicts of interests or
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scarcity of resources. Learning is generally found to be contingent on some level
of conflict resolution, which may be characterized as developing trust (Dhanaraj,
M. Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; e.g. Inkpen & Currall, 2004) or learning to
manage the relationship (e.g. B. Anand & Khanna, 2000). In a unique departure
from these prior findings, Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles & Tihanyi, (2008)
reveal that learning can occur even while conflict persists. While not the main
emphasis in their study, the presence of both high levels of conflict and high
levels of learning is an exceptional finding. This dissertation directly addresses
questions about the processes by which that might occur.
In addition, there is a broad assumption in the extant research that
increased knowledge sharing and inter-organizational learning contribute to an
organization‟s performance or innovativeness. Thus if firms understand the
knowledge transfer process and the variables that affect it, the firm‟s capabilities
can be enhanced (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). More recent conceptualizations
of learning do not assume improved organizational performance. My research will
explore the full range of behavioural and cognitive learning outcomes, whether
they contribute to improved performance or not, as well as the processes by
which inter-organizational learning occurs.
2.1.5 Individual and Organizational Learning and Identity
Identity influences individual and organizational learning via the powerful
hold it can have on both individual and organizational cognition and behaviour.
Theories of individual cognition tell us that people interpret the world through a
process of sensemaking that is supported by their individual interpretations and
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strongly influenced by their past experience, social and role identities, and
organizational context (K. Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Organizational
identity usually endures for some time and it provides a context in the form of
systems, structures and procedures and for feedback on events and experiences
(Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Nag et al., 2007). This context
may facilitate or impair the organization‟s ability to respond to its environment.
The language and the dominant logic that forms the institutionalized learning, and
consequently the identity of an organization, may present a significant obstacle to
the introduction of new ideas (Crossan et al., 1999; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, &
Kleysen, 2005). Dutton and Dukerich‟s (1991) study of the New York Port
Authority provides a vivid illustration of the power of identity in the form of
institutionalized learning to impact interpretations positively and negatively. Until
aspects of the institutionalized logic that underpin an organization‟s identity can
be set aside, even temporarily, new insights or intuitions are unlikely (Crossan et
al., 1999).
Theories of identity provide a rationale both for the way that individuals
make sense of and respond to the stimuli they encounter. The learning literature
has long recognized the importance of the context within which individuals
function and from which they extract data to the interpretive process (Cook &
Yanow, 1996; Crossan et al., 1999). Yet direct links to identity are relatively
recent and tend to support the conclusion that identity influences group learning
primarily by protecting the existing identity, thereby inhibiting or distorting learning
(Antonacopoulou, 2006; Argote, A. A., 2009; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000; K. Corley
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& D. Gioia, 2003; Hong & O, 2009; Kane, Argote, & J. M. Levine, 2005; Nag et
al., 2007; Rodrigues & Child, 2003; Schwenk, 2002).
One of the most prominent links between individual and group learning and
identity has been through the notions of situated learning and communities of
practice (J. Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991). They describe how
individuals learn to function in a community, acquiring the community‟s point of
view and language. Shared understanding is reached through continuing
conversation and shared practice. Thus, individual learning relies on the social
interactions between different levels of community members and learning and
socialization into the group are intertwined. Learning is understood in terms of
communities being formed or joined and individual identities being altered. This
stream of literature draws attention to behaviours (practice) involved in altering
individual identity and creating collective meaning. In contrast, recent research
has acknowledged the inter-group dynamics between communities, and has
begun to explore the ways that situated learning can negatively impact
organizational learning and performance (Hong & O, 2009; e.g. Macpherson &
Clark, 2009). In this research I consider the inter-group dynamics between
organizations in order to reconcile the equivocal findings around identity, and
moreover identify the practices and conditions that might inhibit or promote interorganizational learning.
2.1.6

Individual and Organizational Learning and Conflict
Research to date has revealed a seeming paradox in the relationship

between conflict and learning, perhaps best captured by the notion of the promise
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versus the reality of conflict. On one hand, Argyris and Schoen (1978) maintain
that conflict is necessary for learning; that it provides an opportunity to learn.
They and others have suggested that transformative or double loop learning is a
response to conflict in which individuals explore the reasoning behind their
positions and the meaning these positions have for them (Argyris & Schon, 1978;
Bush & Folger, 1994; Rothman & Friedman, 2001).
Conflict has been identified as a key part of group and organizational
learning as well. Conflict contributes to higher level learning and in doing so is
particularly relevant to strategic management because it is this level of learning
that impacts long term survival (Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985). It has been shown to
be instrumental in creating shared understandings, a key process through which
group and ultimately organizational learning occurs (Crossan et al., 1999; Senge,
1990). Although Crossan and her colleagues (1999) acknowledge that mutual
adjustment and negotiated actions are required for coherent collective action to
emerge they do not address the potentially dysfunctional aspects of conflict
inherent in the process, with the attendant risk of failure. Quite the contrary, they
employ the bucolic image of a flock of birds to illustrate the process of groups
arriving at shared meaning. In this study, I examine the actual practices of
individuals and groups to describe the processes by which mutual adjustment
occurs.
Researchers also have argued that conflict works against learning. Often
individuals‟ ability to learn is blocked by dysfunctional learning processes such as
defensive reasoning (Argyris, 1991; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000; Lawrence et al.,
2005). Dysfunctional learning processes can be triggered by threats to
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individuals‟ social or role identities as well as to the identities that they attribute to
their organizations (Nag et al., 2007). Individuals tend to support activities that
are consistent with their organization‟s identity, they will stereotype themselves
and others, and they will work to maintain coherence between their activities and
the organization‟s identity (Antonacopoulou, 2006; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; K.
Corley & D. Gioia, 2003; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). While these theories describe
how conflict inhibits learning they do not explain how sometimes individuals and
firms overcome those constraints and learn from each other, even while conflict
persists. So while the “promise” of conflict in organizational learning has been
acknowledged by some (although by no means all) organizational learning
scholars the more pessimistic view of conflict has received limited attention. This
dissertation addresses Easterby-Smith et al.‟s (2000) assertion that “the time is
ripe to start addressing learning … in light of the inherent conflicts between
…goals, interests … agendas” (p. 13) and explores the conditions that enable
organizations to overcome these multi-level constraints and learn from each
other.

2.2 Identity
“Identity is a self-referential description that provides answers to the
question “who am I?” or “who are we?” (Ashforth, Harrison, & K. Corley, 2008, p.
327). In the previous section I described how identity has been characterized in
the organizational learning literature. In this section I draw on the extant identity
literature, and specifically the literature on social identity and role identity at the
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individual level, and at the collective or organizational level, organizational
identity.
2.2.1 Identity Defined at the Individual Level
Social identity is understood to be an individual‟s self-categorization as a
member of a group as well as the value and emotional significance that the
individual places on that membership (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). While
people may think of themselves as independent individuals and define
themselves based on personal characteristics or preferences (i.e. their personal
identity) there are many situations where people primarily define themselves and
others in terms of their group memberships (Tajfel, 1978). Personal identities are
unique to individuals and differentiate between individuals (often within their ingroup) whereas social identities are shared by members and differentiate groups
from one another. Social identity explains and links individuals‟ identity, intergroup relations, and group processes in social settings (Stets & P. J. Burke,
2000). Social identity is an important conceptualization of identity for
understanding inter-group conflict (Ashforth et al., 2008; De Dreu & Gelfand,
2008) therefore social identity along with role identity, and not personal identity,
will be considered in this research.
Social identities reside in collectives such as groups, teams or
organizations, and social identity theories provide insight into group processes
and inter-group dynamics. Identity theory, which comprises structural identity
theory and identity control theory, defines identity as those “parts of a self
composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically
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play” (Stryker & P. Burke, 2000, p. 284). In this view role identities reside in
socially defined roles such as jobs, functions, responsibilities, professions etc.
(Ashforth et al., 2008). Role identity theory seeks to explain the role related
behaviour of individuals (Stryker & P. Burke, 2000).
Some identities have more importance and prominence than others and are
organized into a hierarchy via an individual‟s self (Ashforth et al., 2008; Mead,
1934; Stryker, 1968). Mead (1934), whose work serves as the foundation for
several recent studies (e.g. Hatch & Schultz, 2002), defined the self as the
“whole” person, encompassing an individual‟s multiple identities and as an
integrative structure ordering and binding their various identities together. Stryker
(1968) proposed that the self orders these discrete identities into a hierarchy of
salience. The more important a particular identity is to an individual, the more
likely the person will attempt to affirm that identity through his or her actions (P.
Burke, 1980; P. Burke & Reitzes, 1991). Therefore, an individual‟s behaviour is
usually the manifestation of the identities positioned higher in their salience
hierarchy. The self integrates existing identities and provides a link between
social structures such as roles, expectations, and positions, and individual
actions. It is this link between social structures, identities and action that
motivates and is explored more fully in this dissertation.
2.2.2 Identity Defined at the Organizational Level
Whereas individual level theories of identity tie an individual‟s self- concept
to a social group or to a role, organizational identity considers how individuals
understand and categorize the organization to which they belong (Albert &
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Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; K. G. Corley, Harquail, M. G. Pratt, Glynn,
& Hatch, 2006; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Building on psychological
theories of identity, Albert and Whetten (1985) observed how organizational
identities emerge from comparisons with other entities, and how the perceived
similarity or difference supports members‟ self-categorizations of their
organization. They defined organizational identity as those aspects of the
organization that members self-referentially claimed as providing its “central
character, distinctiveness and temporal continuity” (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p.
265). Recently Whetten (2006, p. 220) has specified the concept as “the central
and enduring attributes of an organization that distinguish it from other
organizations.” These represent a set of stable and enduring self descriptions
that change with great difficulty (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Whetten, 2006; Whetten
& Mackey, 2002).
Organizational identity also involves meaning at the collective level, which
may be tacit or explicit, taken for granted, or conscious and deliberate (K. Corley
& D. Gioia, 2003). Some identity beliefs are central while others are peripheral
and many authors have argued that organizations can have multiple identities
(Fiol, 1991; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; M. G. Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; M. Pratt &
Foreman, 2000).
There have been two main approaches to the construct of organizational
identity: a social constructionist and an institutional perspective (Elstak, 2008;
Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Social constructionists argue that organizational
members collectively build a shared understanding of their organization through
their interaction (e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000). Institutionalists argue that identity is a
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set of stable and enduring self descriptions of an organization that exists
irrespective of the individual members and that changes only with great difficulty
(Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Whetten, 2006; Whetten &
Mackey, 2002). The differences between these perspectives are significant when
considering the impact of organizational identity on learning. The social
constructionists by definition acknowledge the possibility, even the inevitability of
learning, while the institutionalists reject the notion that changes to identity can be
accomplished without great effort. I will describe each perspective in turn.
Some scholars (e.g. Whetten, 2006) view organizational identity as an
attribute of the organization that can only be determined by the organization‟s
commitments, obligations and actions. In this view organizational identity exists in
a set of explicit statements of what the organization is and what it represents,
termed institutional claims. These institutional claims provide consistent and
legitimate narratives that influence members‟ perceptions of the organization‟s
central, enduring and distinctive features and allows them to construct a
consistent collective sense of self (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). From the social
actor or institutional perspective, organizational identity is defined as a set of
emotionally laden, stable and enduring self descriptions that change only rarely
and with great difficulty (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Whetten, 2006; Whetten &
Mackey, 2002).
Conversely other scholars take a more social constructivist view examining
how members‟ beliefs about what is central and distinctive about their
organization may evolve in the face of internal and external stimuli (K. G. Corley
et al., 2006; K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al.,
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1994; D. Gioia & J. Thomas, 1996). In this view attention is focused on the
“collective understandings of the features presumed to be central and relatively
permanent and that distinguish the organization” (D. Gioia et al., 2000, p. 64).
Organizational identity is the product of the tension between collective, shared
cognition on one hand and socially constructed individual cognitions on the other
(D. Gioia, 1998; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005). This view de-emphasizes endurance
and considers how strategic responses to environmental changes may be driven
by organizational leaders promoting a new narrative (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004).
In this dissertation I consider organizational identity as both providing the
institutional constraints that shape members‟ interpretations and as being shaped
by members reaching mutual understanding and shared interpretations (D. Gioia
et al., 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). I contend that the institutionalized notions
of organizational identity are also collective, in the same fashion that laws and
governments represent collective meaning. These identities do change, albeit at
a much slower pace and via different processes than organizational level
collective meanings (Elstak, 2008; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Ravasi &
Schultz, 2006). Consequently, in this study I define organizational identity as
comprising both institutional claims and collective understandings.
There are a number of concepts that, while closely related to organizational
identity, are separate and distinct constructs. Most significantly, as noted above,
organizational identity is self-referential. Corporate identity and organizational
image, in contrast, involve the projection of identity related notions to external
audiences (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; D. Gioia et al., 2000). Likewise, reputation
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is often defined as how external audiences view the organization (Fombrun,
1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).
Organizational identity is closely tied to organizational culture because
identity provides a set of skills and a way of using and evaluating those skills that
produce characteristic ways of doing things (Cook & Yanow, 1996; Nelson &
Winter, 1982). Hatch and Schultz (2002) suggest that identity is the
interrelationship between culture and image, where identity expresses cultural
understandings at the same time as it mirrors images which outsiders attribute to
the organization (K. G. Corley et al., 2006). Similarly organizational identity is
different from organizational values, although it can encompass values that are
important to the organization when those values are part of what is believed to be
central, distinctive and continuous about the organization.
2.2.3 Identity and Learning
Identities are cognitive maps that facilitate making sense of a situation and
structuring the unknown (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Schwenk, 2002; Stryker & P.
Burke, 2000; K. E. Weick, 1979). Integrating, according to most prior literature,
requires that individuals and groups first overcome the barriers to learning
inherent in different identities and find an acceptable overarching goal that
integrates efforts and provides direction to the learning process (A. Brown &
Starkey, 2000; Hong & O, 2009; Nag et al., 2007; Rodrigues & Child, 2003; M.
Sherif & C. Sherif, 1956). By looking at inter-organizational learning between
“enemies” this dissertation considers whether integration is possible in the
absence of an overarching shared goal.
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As discussed above, identity provides the context, be it the industry,
profession, or the community, within which learning takes place and is in turn
altered by the process of learning. Organizational resources, especially
knowledge, skills, and expertise, are likely to be influenced by the basic
assumptions that organization members use to define “who we are” as an
organization (Kogut & Zander, 1996). For instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991)
found that members‟ sense of the organization‟s identity was associated with a
set of routines or standard procedures. When activated by conflict over a specific
issue, these routines were identified as “typical” of the organization. Corley and
Gioia (2004) found that changes in organizational identity corresponded with
behavioural changes among the organization‟s members, especially those in
leadership positions.
This connection between identity and behavioural expectations, as well as
behaviour change, has been described using the concept of scripts (Abelson,
1981; Barley & Tolbert, 1997; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Scripts are a subset of
knowledge structures or schemas and are primarily concerned with
understanding behaviour in routine situations at the individual (Abelson, 1981)
and organizational level (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Whereas a schema is a
generalized cognitive framework that serves as a guide to interpret information,
actions, and expectations (e.g. Daft & K. Weick, 1984) a script is a schema that
describes behaviours appropriate for a particular context or situation (D. Gioia &
P. Poole, 1984). Scripts represent shared, agreed cultural and social knowledge.
Barley and Tolbert describe scripts as the behavioural regularities which are
“observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a
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particular setting” (1997, p. 98). Individuals perpetuate existing behavioural
expectations such as those attached to a role identity through their actions
because they have internalized those expectations as guiding principles of action
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1979; Jarzabkowski, 2008).
An individual‟s identities are linked to scripts in that a role or affiliation with a
group can be considered a special case of a script (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). A
role or a social identity can be thought of as a higher level script governing
situation specific behaviour. Given that scripts are individual cognitive structures,
they may differ in some aspects from typical social and role expectations
reflecting that individual‟s unique interpretation. An individual will activate their
salient identity or the identity they believe is required in a given situation and that
in turn will activate a script. To paraphrase March & Heath (1994), the
appropriate script in one‟s repertoire would answer the question: “what should a
person like me [identity] do in a situation like this [relevant script]”. When
individuals encounter novel situations they may consciously enact new
behaviours. In doing so they develop new scripts or alter existing scripts, i.e.
experiment. Conversely, individuals may continue with the practices and
behaviours they attach to their salient identity and in so doing block learning or
distort the knowledge (Nag et al., 2007).
Organizational identities are also linked to scripts. Barney et al (1998)
suggest that once a firm determines “who they are” it is very easy to determine
what they “must do” (p. 113). Barney and his colleagues (1998) also suggest that
a firm can begin with a clear action or behaviour and develop “who they are” out
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of that action. A “theory of we are” or an organizational identity is interdependent
with, and requires a corresponding “theory of action” or script.
For example, Koch Industries of Wichita, Kansas, identifies itself as a
“discovery company”, not as the institutionalized organizational identities of oil
and gas company or resource company (Barney et al., 1998); and this identity
has “a profound impact on behavior inside Koch” (p. 109). Employees are
expected to always be “discovering” new ways to add value to the firm, new
businesses to leverage existing skills, and new or improved practices. Similarly,
an organization that identifies itself as a “learning” organization will facilitate the
enactment of behaviours in support of exploration and experimentation.
At both levels scripted behaviours are often performed unconsciously,
although active cognition is involved during the process of script development
and when encountering unusual, novel or unconventional situations (D. Gioia &
P. Poole, 1984). A generic script may be developed that is appropriate to a
category of situations such as strategy retreats or responding to media criticism
(D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). When an individual or organization encounters a
new situation that shares some common elements with previous experience they
compare it to their existing scripts. Information that “generally” matches a script
signals that active thought and analysis is not necessary and the script can be
enacted (D. Gioia, 1992). This often occurs without any adjustment for
differences in information about the current situation that may be important, as
illustrated by Gioia‟s description of Ford‟s reaction to the Pinto fires (1992).
The aggregation of scripts associated with each of an individual‟s discrete
identities represents their behavioural repertoire. An individual will activate their
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salient identity or the identity they believe is required in a given situation and that
in turn will activate a script. When individuals encounter novel situations they may
employ a generic script within that repertoire, or they may consciously enact new
behaviours. This suggests that by choosing to enact new behaviours individuals
develop new or alter existing cognitive scripts which in turn may shift their
interpretation of their identities.
Organizations develop their scripts through a variety of direct experiences
and observations including interacting with regulators or through rewards and
reinforcement such as market share increases. Indirect means of script
development at the organizational level might come for example, from portrayal in
the media or from a social movement‟s description of appropriate organizational
behaviour in a given situation. Modeling provides another means of script
development for organizations (D. Gioia & Manz, 1985; D. Gioia & P. Poole,
1984). Observing the positive experience of a role model provides an indication
of the right behavioural script for certain situations. As is the case with
individuals, changes in behavioural scripts may modify cognitive scripts and
ultimately organizations‟ institutionalized learning. Extant research typically
depicts organizational identity as existing in the minds of organization members
with limited attention given to its behavioural expressions (D. Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991; Nag et al., 2007). In this research I consider the implications of the
behavioural expressions of identity on learning.
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2.2.4 Identity and Conflict
Conflict resulting from external pressure increases the likelihood that
organization members will explicitly reflect on organizational identity issues
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; D. Gioia et al., 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).
Research on identity suggests that negative feedback from the environment
“destabilizes” organizational members‟ self-perceptions (e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000;
Hatch & Schultz, 2002) and a serious discrepancy between external expectations
and internal beliefs may induce organizational members to reevaluate their
understandings (Albert & Whetten, 1985; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984; D. Gioia et
al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Organizational identity typically becomes an
issue when an organization faces difficult decisions such as a change in strategic
direction (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006) or is faced with resolving an
unfamiliar or unique challenge (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Ravasi & Schultz,
2006). It is at these difficult junctures that organization members often ask “Who
are we?”, “What kind of business are we in?” or “What do we want to be?” (Albert
& Whetten, 1985, p. 265).
Identities are cognitive maps that facilitate making sense of a situation and
structuring the unknown (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Stryker & P. Burke, 2000; K.
E. Weick, 1979; 1995). Conflict provokes strong emotions and strong emotions
appear to be key to initiating both identity change and cognitive and behavioural
change. It is conflict that evokes the strong emotions (K. Weick et al., 2005)
necessary to instigate a change in individual cognitive maps but it is the presence
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of a range of identities that enable individuals to explore the new information
surfaced in the conflict (Rothman & Friedman, 2001).
However, conflict may trigger responses, such as defensive routines and an
over reliance on generic scripts, that inhibit individuals‟ and organizations‟ ability
to engage in the mindful behaviour associated with new script development (Fiol
et al., 2009; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Factors that, in a situation of conflict,
would tend to work against a mindful approach and toward the use of generic
scripts, include priming, information complexity, and the need to preserve a
positive self-concept (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). The opposing perceptions of
the conflict laden issue and conflicting views of the purpose of their interaction
would prime individuals and organizations for script selection bias. In order to
simplify and manage the high level of complexity of the information surrounding
conflict laden issues, individuals and organizations will tend to rely on generic
scripts that may or may not be appropriate. Finally, an individual‟s and
organization‟s need to preserve and protect a positive self image (identity) might
lead individuals and organizations to take inappropriate action. Given that these
factors will direct individuals and organizations towards the relatively automatic
use of generic scripts (which will tend to reinforce existing identities and conflicts)
another mechanism is required to activate new cognitive and behavioural scripts.

2.3 Conflict
The study of conflict, regardless of whether it is undertaken in psychology,
sociology, economics, political science, organizational behaviour, strategic
management or communications, focuses on how individuals and groups
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manage their interdependence with one another (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008).
Conflict is ubiquitous within and between organizations, leading some to
conclude that organizations without conflict simply do not exist (e.g. Pondy,
1967). However, in research, conflict has often been considered in isolation
rather than in connection with other organizational phenomena, such as
organizational learning. Conflict is a multi-level phenomenon and although
extensive research has been done at various levels, consideration of the cross
level influences of conflict is relatively recent. In this study I consider how conflict
impacts organizational learning across levels.
2.3.1 Conflict Defined
Traditionally conflict has been defined as opposing interests involving
scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration of goal achievement (e.g.
Pondy, 1967). For example, De Dreu and Gelfand (2008, p. 6), building on
Pondy‟s (1967) theme of opposing interests, defined conflict as a “process that
begins when an individual or group perceives differences and opposition between
oneself and another individual or group about interests and resources, beliefs,
values or practices that matter to them”. Defining conflict as opposing interests‟
sets up the assumption that conflict is competitive, ignoring that parties with
compatible goals often have conflict. Also the notion of conflict as opposing
interests is confounded with the construct of competition which is often defined as
incompatible goals. The broader business literature, in particular, has tended to
equate conflict not only with differences but also with incompatible goals
(competition) and as a win-lose circumstance (Tjosvold, 2008).
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Deutsch (1949; 1973) defined conflict as incompatible activities; one party‟s
actions, interfere, obstruct, or in some way get in the way of another‟s action.
This view of conflict is similar to Pondy‟s (1967) description of manifest conflict,
as “conflictual behavior, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression”
(298). According to Deutsch, whether parties believe their goals are competitive
or cooperative affects their expectations, interactions and outcomes. In turn, how
they negotiate their conflicts affects whether they believe their goals are
competitive or cooperative (Tjosvold, 2008). In addition to individual‟s perceptions
of the conflict situation, Pondy (1967) identified the antecedents of conflictual
behaviour and the affective states of the individuals involved as critical to
understanding conflict processes and outcomes. Following Deutsch (1949; 1973)
and Pondy (1967) this study will highlight the behavioural aspect of conflict while
recognizing the implications of cognition on behaviour of individuals and
organizations.
2.3.2 Conflict Over Time
Well-established models of conflict behaviour suggest that conflict has two
broad phases; a differentiation phase followed by an integration phase (Deutsch,
1973; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; K. Thomas, 1976; Walton,
1969). During differentiation, the parties raise the conflict issues, clarify their
positions with regard to the issues, pursue the reasons behind those positions,
and acknowledge the severity of their differences. When further escalation seems
unproductive, an integration phase begins. In this phase parties begin to
acknowledge common ground, explore possible options, and move towards
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solution – sometimes one that meets everyone‟s needs but sometimes one that
they can just all live with (Folger, M. Poole, & Stutman, 2001). The key to
avoiding protracted escalation of the conflict is to achieve the benefits of
differentiation (highlighting differences, accepting other‟s position as legitimate,
motivation to move forward) and to make a clean transition to integration, setting
the conflict on a different course.
One of the most frequently used frameworks in assessing whether a conflict
is ready for transition is ripeness theory (I. W. Zartman, 1989; I. William Zartman
& Berman, 1982). This theory suggests that the parties to a conflict will not be
ready to transition until they mutually reach a point where they are able to
recognize 1) a hurting stalemate (i.e. the costs and /or the risks of continuing are
too large) and 2) a possibility of a way out through negotiation. While widely used
ripeness theory is limited by poorly established generalizability outside
international diplomacy, limited consideration of non-rational factors, and low
predictability (Pruitt, 2005).
Readiness theory (Pruitt, 2005) is an effort to overcome these limits by
considering each condition as a psychological state and not a necessary
condition. The hurting stalemate becomes the degree of motivation to end the
conflict and the perceived way out becomes the degree of optimism that the
conflict can be ended. Motivation can be influenced by the extent of the cost and
dysfunctionality of the conflict or by pressure from third parties. Optimism can be
influenced by perceptions about the other party‟s readiness, about the context, or
by the presence of a third party. Also the psychological state of each party is
considered separately and not as a mutual state. The two parties might both be
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“ready” but for different reasons. One party can be highly motivated but not very
optimistic while the other may be optimistic but not very motivated. The notions of
motivation and optimism add flexibility to ripeness theory, particularly in predicting
parties “readiness” to move to the integration phase.
Moving to integration requires the parties to fundamentally change their
behaviour, turning from a focus on differences to some level of cooperation.
Several conditions have been identified that facilitate this transition. First it is
important that differences have been surfaced completely and they are
understood by all parties, even if they do not agree. It is important that the parties
are balanced in terms of power such that neither can nor will be pushed into an
inferior agreement. If each party persistently strives for outcomes that are truly
meaningful to them the other party is likely to recognize the need to explore
possible options (J. Z. Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). The negative consequences of
differentiation can also motivate parties to move to integration. In many cases a
third party can be a significant help in transitioning from differentiation to
integration. Parties may trust the third party and will follow their advice where
they would not accept it from each other (Folger et al., 2001).
2.3.3 Conflict Research versus Negotiation Research
Negotiation researchers understand much about individual and group
behaviour in formal and informal negotiations however those interactions are
fundamentally different from what conflict management researchers have
examined. Negotiation researchers for the most part explore the relationship
between behaviours and the quality of settlements (Fisher & S. Brown, 1988;
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Fisher & Ury, 1981). Conflict researchers examine the relationship between
behaviours and intangible outcomes such as individual, relationship, and group
transformation (Bush & Folger, 1994; Dukes, 1993; Olekans, Putnam, &
Weingart, 2008).
A large segment of negotiation research measures the behaviour of the
parties to the conflict directly, often through experiments and simulations (S.
Wilson & Putnam, 1990). The interaction of parties is considered in the context of
"deal making" and not the emotionally charged context of long term disputes.
Indeed, negotiation researchers have tended to focus on the immediate patterns
of action-reaction as opposed to how an entire conflict episode unfolds. Whereas
most negotiation research has focused on strategy patterns and substantive
outcomes, conflict research had considered the intangible consequences of
strategy use such as the transformation of individuals, of the relationship between
parties, or of groups (e.g. Bush & Folger, 1994). Finally, conflict research looks at
the effectiveness of strategies to manage conflicts while negotiation research has
focused on the quality of a settlement.
The distinction between conflict management research and negotiation
research is important - negotiation is all about getting to the deal (i.e. what
behaviors and process got us to the best quality deal that satisfies both parties)
as opposed to a transformational perspective (i.e. what happened to the
participants cognitions and broader behaviors as a result of the process).
Therefore the conflict management literature is more relevant to this research
which is examining the processes involved in coming to some kind of mutual
understanding.
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2.3.4

Conflict Across Levels of Analysis
At the individual level in organizations conflict processes may involve

individual motivation, concern for self versus concern for others (Pruitt, 1983),
cognition, and emotional states as well as individual differences in conflict
management approaches (K. Thomas, 1976). The consequences of conflict can
be negative including individual well being and health, absenteeism, and turnover
(Spector & Bruk-Lee, 2008) and most relevant to this research they can promote
positive individual change. Conflict can enhance individual‟s development of
skills, and moderately intense conflict has been shown to increase employee
performance, individual creativity, and cognitive flexibility (Carnevale & Probst,
1998; Nemeth, 1986; Schulz-Hardt, Mojzisch, & Vogelgesang, 2008; Van de
Vliert & De Dreu, 1994).
At the group level, conflict processes relate to patterns of interaction in
managing conflict, negotiation, and small group communication (Olekans et al.,
2008). Conflicts over scarce resources between groups strengthen within group
cohesion and individual motivation to contribute to the group‟s success (Erev,
Bornstein, & Galili, 1993). Negative conflict consequences can include
aggression and escalation within and between groups (Lederach, 1995; Pruitt,
2008) and more positively group innovation, improved performance, and
increased group member satisfaction and commitment (Beersma, Conlon, &
Hollenbeck, 2008; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). Moderate levels of task related
conflict have been shown to contribute to group effectiveness (De Dreu, 2006;
Jehn, 1995) by prompting people to re-evaluate their working assumptions, to
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correct errors, and to approach decision making from multiple perspectives
(Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). Conflict has
also been shown to promote group change by improving decision making
(Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995; 1997) and to lead to redefined social identities
through the disappearance of certain group characteristics (Terry & Amiot, 2008).
At the organizational level, conflict has been studied in the context of
resource scarcity, union-management relations, and mergers and acquisitions.
Resource conflicts, such as budget deficiency or decreased slack, have been
shown to stimulate organizations to experiment and innovate in order to cope
with overload or change beyond their immediate control (N. Anderson, De Dreu,
& Nijstad, 2004; Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 1973). Active confrontation through
negotiation (union-management) promotes inter-group communication, increases
mutual understanding and results in greater acceptance of agreements and
decisions than more tacit forms of coordination (Putnam, 1993). In other studies
however active confrontation has been shown to have both negative (strikes, lock
outs) and positive (improved organizational performance) outcomes (Walton,
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, & McKersie, 1994). De Dreu and Gelfand (2008) suggest
that the relationship between engagement and outcomes is moderated by the
context within which it occurs. They propose that whether conflicts benefit or hurt
organizations depends on where, how and how intensely conflicts impact
individual, group and organization level functions. Only recently has conflict
research begun to explore the implications of context for conflict in organizations.
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2.3.5 Sources of Conflict
The source or root cause of conflict has been the focus of much prior
research, which has shown that the source of conflict has implications for its
dynamics, impact, and outcomes. This work tends to cluster around three
theoretical perspectives on sources of conflict that are apparent at all levels (e.g.
De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; K. Thomas,
1992). Resource conflicts are a result of scarce resources or mixed motive interdependencies, and have also been referred to as real conflict (e.g. M. Sherif & C.
Sherif, 1953), conflicts of interest (Deutsch, 1949; e.g. 1973), conflict over
outcomes (e.g. Pruitt, 1981), games or co-opetition (e.g. Brandenburger &
Nalebuff, 1996). Value or identity conflicts are the result of the need to develop
and maintain a positive view of one‟s self and one‟s group (Tajfel, 1978) and are
sometimes referred to as relationship (e.g. Jehn, 1995; e.g. 1997) or affective
conflicts (e.g. Amason, 1996). In contrast to controlled experiments where
resource conflicts can be separated from identity based conflicts, “such clear
distinctions cannot be made in the context of organizations where participants are
outcome inter-dependent by definition” (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008, p. 18).
Socio-cognitive conflicts arise when there are incompatible or divergent
interpretations of information. Socio-cognitive conflict is a result of a desire to
develop and maintain cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957) and to hold a
socially validated and shared understanding of the world and the tasks that need
to be done. They are sometimes referred to as cognitive (e.g. Amason, 1996)
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task (e.g. Jehn, 1995; 1997) or process (e.g. Jehn, Northcroft, & Neale, 1999)
related conflicts.
Individual, group, and organizational conflicts typically involve aspects of all
three major sources. However, regardless of the root cause of conflict between
individuals, groups, or organizations, when that conflict escalates identity conflict
tends to dominate (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Mooney et al., 2007). This is
consistent with the research on organizational identity discussed above; no
matter what the source of conflict, if it is considered serious it will activate identity.
Therefore to understand inter-organizational learning with its inherent conflict it is
necessary to understand the implications of identity conflict on behaviour and
cognition. Given this, I first examine the implications of identity on behaviour at
the individual level. I then consider the implications of identity for learning at the
collective (group, organizational) and inter-organizational levels.
2.3.6 Conflict and Identity
Prior research on the impact of differences in individual characteristics
within and between groups splits into two perspectives: information processing
and social identity (Mannix & Neale, 2005). As discussed previously, the
information processing perspective suggests that differences will lead to an
increase in opportunities for learning. The social identity perspective suggests
that differences create divisions and tensions and negative performance
outcomes (Mannix & Neale, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Conflicts rooted in
identity appear at the individual, collective, and the inter-group level. Social
identity theory shows how social categorization can lead individuals to identify at
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the individual, group, or organization level and that identification then drives
behaviour in both identity and resource based conflicts (De Dreu & Gelfand,
2008). Social identity theory also allows us to understand conflicts at any level.
While it was developed at the individual and intergroup level, and not the
organizational level, it brings to light the social psychological processes that are
inherent in individual and group interaction and the probable impact of identify on
the interaction between individuals from separate conflicting organizations.
Therefore the theoretical predictions of social identity theory can be equally
applied to conflicts between entire organizations (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008).
Conflict between groups and organizations has been shown to shape and
redefine their relative status positions, reshape social boundaries, and alter
identity through the disappearance of certain characteristics and subcultures and
their expressions, such as language (Terry & Amiot, 2008). In addition, conflict
has been shown to shape identity by explicitly or implicitly stimulating some
members of an organization to leave, usually fostering turnover in peripheral
group members more than in those seen as core (Schneider, 1987).
2.3.7 Conflict and Learning
Much work has been done at the individual and group level to understand
how people manage socio-cognitive conflicts as well as their impact on learning
and especially creative decision making. Building on developmental psychology
(e.g. J. M. Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993) and social psychology (e.g.
Festinger, 1954), socio-cognitive conflict theory addresses incompatible
understanding and interpretation of facts and figures and considers the way
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people manage these conflicts, as well as their impact on learning and creative
decision making (e.g. Amason, 1996; Brehmer, 1976; Schwenk, 2002). Sociocognitive conflict theory rests on three assumptions; first, people are motivated to
hold accurate perceptions about themselves and their world. Second, people are
boundedly rational and lack information and information processing capabilities,
and as a result different people develop different beliefs, insights and
understandings of identical objects of perception. Finally, people seek cognitive
consistency and social validation of their beliefs, insights and understandings and
divergence vis a vis others creates tension that people are compelled to resolve.
These conflicts can be resolved by persuading the other party, by changing one‟s
mind, by integrating seemingly opposing views, or by dissolving the relationship
(De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008).
Socio-cognitive conflicts can be over problems which have correct solutions
according to commonly accepted standards or they can be judgmental problems
that have no correct solution. A key source of socio-cognitive conflict within and
between organizations entails opinion, insights, and beliefs that are not
consensually shared (Brehmer, 1976; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). These emerge
out of preference or belief diversity in groups. Work on minority dissent and
devil‟s advocacy has shown that when a minority faction opposes the majority
view, group members are more likely to question their assumptions, search for
new information, and consider multiple perspectives (Amason, 1996; Jehn,
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Mannix & Neale, 2005; Schwenk, 2002).
Much less work has been undertaken, from a conflict theory perspective, on
socio-cognitive conflicts at the inter-group and organizational level of analysis,
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despite its relevance at those levels (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). For example
mergers should trigger debate among beliefs, opinions and ideas, in addition to
social identity conflicts; however this aspect of inter-group conflict has not yet
been explored. This dissertation addresses the inter-organizational level of
analysis and links it to the individual level.

2.4 Integrating Learning, Identity and Conflict
Conflict provides an opportunity to learn by provoking strong emotions.
Strong emotions are key to initiating both the cognitive and behavioural change
(Schwenk, 2002; K. Weick et al., 2005) necessary to instigate learning but it is
the presence of multiple identities that enable individuals to explore the new
information surfaced in the conflict (Rothman & Friedman, 2001; Schwenk, 2002).
Individual learning processes, including intuiting, experimenting, and
interpreting take place in relation to an environment. Weick (1979) argues that
people are more likely to “see something when they believe it” rather than
“believe it when they see it”. This suggests that even high quality information may
hold multiple and/or conflicting meanings for different individuals (Huber & Daft,
1987; Rodrigues & Child, 2003) depending on their identities (K. Weick et al.,
2005). These discrepant interpretations lay the foundation for conflict between
individuals and groups. However, other belief systems within the same individuals
or group may hold the key to bridging across that conflict. Conflict also activates
identity and with it the behavioural scripts that tend to protect identity.
And so we are left with the paradox between the relatively straightforward
predictions that “conflict stops learning” and “learning stops conflict”. These
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notions underlie the positive bias toward learning that predominates the existing
literature and the relatively negative predisposition toward conflict. However,
existing literatures do not provide an explanation for how some organizations are
able to learn from each other even while conflict persists. In the next section, l
draw on the conclusions of prior research to develop a model explaining how that
might happen.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, MODEL AND
PREMISE DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Rationale for Research
The paradoxical phenomenon of “learning from the enemy” cannot be
explained by any one or even two of the literatures reviewed in the previous
section. While the organizational learning literature has shown that conflict
promotes learning by calling assumptions and behaviour into question at the
individual and collective level, it has not adequately addressed how organizations
deal with the identify or value based aspects of conflict that activate defensive
routines and inhibit learning. Recently, organizational learning scholars have
begun to recognize the significance of differences in identity to organizational
learning (e.g. Nag et al., 2007), but not its implications in an inter-organizational
situation.
Identity scholars have made the link between learning and identity but have
not attempted to address the impact of identity differences on organizational
learning. Research into communities of practice has shown that identity promotes
learning within a particular community and that identity formation processes are
intimately linked to learning processes. But, as communities of practice become
insular and rigid, their common identity blocks individual and collective learning
(Hong & O, 2009; Macpherson & Clark, 2009). Research into identity, that takes
a conflict perspective, has shown that while identity reduces conflict by providing
a common basis for interaction within groups, it also promotes conflict through
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inter-personal and inter-group rivalry. Indeed it is well established that the very
act of identification with a group, ensures some level of inter-group conflict (M.
Sherif & C. Sherif, 1956). Inter-group conflict is often studied from a conflict
management or conflict resolution perspective which does not typically address
the mutual learning that must underpin any change in the relationship between
individuals, groups or organizations.
Conflict scholars have determined the types of responses that each source
of conflict provokes and have identified resource and socio-cognitive conflict as
the most potentially constructive. However they have only recently begun to
acknowledge that, in practice, without high levels of interpersonal and inter-group
integration, all conflict “feels” like identity conflict (e.g. Mooney et al., 2007), the
least constructive and least amenable to conciliation. Research on conflict has
not yet addressed how organizations shift emphasis away from identity conflict
and towards aspects of the conflict more likely to promote learning.
In summary, previous research has acknowledged the importance of conflict
to learning and the centrality of identity to conflict and to a lesser extent identity‟s
influence on learning; however the relationship between these three key concepts
has not been articulated. That is what I do in this dissertation. In this section I
describe the ontological approach that I have taken to study this phenomenon,
and the premises that form the foundation of my model linking identity, conflict
and inter-organizational learning.
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3.2 The Practice Based View
Research on organizational learning, including inter-organizational learning,
has predominantly considered knowledge as the codification of experience in
some form of cognitive structure or behaviour pattern, and of learning as the
process through which such structures change (i.e. Easterby-Smith, 1997; Fiol &
M. A. Lyles, 1985). Organizations are thought of as information processing units
that acquire knowledge through reflecting on experience. This understanding of
learning draws directly from individual psychology and is extended to firms
through the delineation of levels while still regarding knowing as primarily
cognitive (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003). Research on organizational identity
has followed a similar ontological tradition, and until recently it has been depicted
as existing in the minds of organization members with less attention given to its
behavioural aspects (Nag et al., 2007) even though basic assumptions about
“who we are” as an organization inevitably influence “what we do” and “how we
do things around here” (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In contrast, research on conflict
has to a great extent been driven from a practice perspective, but the link back to
theory, especially, as it relates to socio-cognitive conflict has been limited.
The practice based view draws on recent work in philosophy and social
science to move beyond the “prevailing notions that depict it (learning) as the
static result of thinking by disinterested and autonomous individuals” (Nicolini et
al., 2003, p. 7). In the practice based view, learning in organizations is “social,
processual, materially and historically mediated, emergent, situated, and always
open-ended and temporary in character” (Nicolini et al., 2003). It is understood
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through individual performances (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) or episodes
(Hendry & Seidl, 2003) of “situation-specific enactments by individuals working in
specific places, at specific times” (Branzei & Fredette, 2008, p. 395). Recent
research on identity suggests that organizational identity manifests in collective
practices (Nag et al., 2007). To meet my goal of multi-level theorizing, I have
employed the practice-based view.
The practice-based view seeks to overcome the split between
“individualism” which favours individual action while ignoring macro-forces, and
“societism”, a concept that focuses on the widespread societal forces while
discounting individual action (Whittington, 2006). Recently Johnson, Melin, and
Whittington (2003) proposed a relatively narrow view of practice focusing on the
activities that organizational actors conduct (micro-level), their consequences for
organizational outcomes (macro level) and the feedback loop from context and
the organization back to the actors. They argue that this approach does not
replace traditional management theories such as the resource based view or
institutional theory, but rather provides an explanation of the mechanisms that
underpin each.
There is a fundamental difference between the “content”, “process”, and
“practice” approaches in terms of the research questions asked, the theories
used and the phenomena explained (G. Johnson et al., 2003). Content theories
such as the resource based view, provide conceptual explanations of
organizational outcomes and focus mainly on firm performance. They attempt to
determine “what”. Content theories prioritize nouns over verbs (Garud & van de
Ven, 2006) and employ broad, static, and convenient constructs, resulting in
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repeated inconclusive studies (G. Johnson et al., 2003). Researchers that take
the practice based view suggest the lack of consistent findings is because the
macro processes studied do not capture the micro processes in the actual
activities (Nayyar, 1992; Zona, 2009).
Process theories address questions of “how” by examining how inputs are
transformed into outputs, such as learning or identity, in an organization as a
whole (G. Johnson et al., 2003). They also seek to explain firm level outcomes.
A typical process theory holds that similar inputs subjected to similar processes
will lead to similar outcomes; and that there are certain conditions necessary for
the outcome to be reached. Typical patterns of events, such as variation and
selective retention, are core theoretical constructs (Van de Ven & M. Poole,
1995). Conversely, the practice based view looks inside the process (J. Brown &
Duguid, 2002).
The distinctive characteristic of the practice based view, proposed by
Johnson and colleagues (2003) is the use of verbs and an inherent process
based orientation. This is because practice-based approaches focus on what
people actually do. Attention is directed toward understanding how and under
what conditions action actually occurs. The object of inquiry, the unit of analysis,
is the practice or the action; the capacity of humans to perform actions, the
temporal organization of such actions, and the resources required (Gherardi,
2009; Nicolini et al., 2003). Another feature is that in this view organizational
learning, identity maintenance, and conflict responses are conceived of as social
processes sustained by processes of participation in, socialization into, and
membership in social groups like communities. This is different than the more
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traditional individual-centred social cognition perspectives (Feldman & Pentland,
2003; Nicolini et al., 2003).
Most practice based approaches refer to the situated nature of practice (i.e.
Feldman & Pentland, 2003). This implies that learning, for example, and “its
subjects and objects must be understood as being produced together within a
temporally, geographically, or relationally situated practice” (Nicolini et al., 2003,
p. 23). Finally and perhaps most relevantly for this study, practice-based
approaches recognize uncertainty, conflict, incoherence, paradox, tension, and
inconsistency as fundamental to elements of practice.
The latest developments in practice based view research in strategy
(Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007) propose to conceptualize any
phenomenon as a situated, socially accomplished activity, which comprises
actions, interactions, and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated
practices that they draw upon in accomplishing this activity (Jarzabkowski, 2005).
Therefore, following this stream of practice research, I have conceptualized interorganizational learning as a situated activity. The practice based view studies
episodes of organizational activities (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in order to uncover
the mechanisms underlying the inter-organizational learning practice. It asks
questions such as “how is the conduct of a joint project consequential in terms of
how identity issues arise and contribute to learning?”
Whittington (2006) proposes that three elements are key to understanding
practice: praxis, practices, and practitioners each of which involves a different
analytic choice and provides a somewhat different entry into the study of interorganizational learning as practice. Praxis refers to the actual activities that make
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up the substance of, in this case, learning and may be operationalized at different
levels and through interactions between levels (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007).
Practice represents the shared routines of behaviour, norms, procedures and
artefacts such as white boards, and meeting minutes that guide collective activity
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Gherardi, 2009). Practice might be considered
institutionalized learning (Crossan et al., 1999). While practices are diverse and
variable and can be altered according to the activity in which they are used
(Seidl, 2007) they are carried out within a framework of procedures and
expectations. However the particular actions taken (praxis) are to some extent
novel (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Practitioners are the individuals who draw
upon practices to act, i.e. perform praxis. They derive agency through their use of
practice and such agency is embodied in who they are, how they are able to act
and is always connected to the situation and context in which it is derived, i.e.
their individual and organizational identities. These three elements are the
integrated parts of a whole called inter-organizational learning.
I use Jarzabkowski et al.‟s (2007) framework of a theory of practice in the
context of inter-organizational learning (See Figure 3-1: A Framework for
Analyzing Inter-Organizational Learning as Practice). As depicted in Figure 3-1
learning practitioners are organizational leaders, executive and middle managers
who contribute to organizational learning in two ways: by establishing learning
practice and receiving feedback from it (A) and by conducting learning praxis by
engaging with other organizations and making sense of the interaction (C).
Practice interacts with praxis (B) in that the practice conditions the praxis which in
turn influences practice. The interaction between the three components of the
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framework is always bi-directional and learning is accomplished by their
combination.

Inter-org Learning
Practice
(Cognitive, behavioural, procedural,
discursive, physcial insitutionalized
practices)

A

Inter-organizational
Learning
B

Inter-org Learning
Inter-org Learning

Practitioners
(Actors who shape the
construction of practice
through who they are, how
they act, the resources they
use)

Praxis
C

(Situated, socially
accomplished activities that
are consequential for
learning)

Figure 3-1: A Framework for Analyzing Inter-Organizational Learning as
Practice2

Following the recommendation of Johnson, Langley, Melin and Whittington
(2007), in this study I put the interaction between practitioners and praxis in the
foreground and focus on the activities that individuals perform and how and why
they make sense of them. I do not ignore practice, which in this case is the

2

Modeled on Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl (2007). Strategizing: The challenges of a practice
perspective. Human Relations. 60(1)
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institutionalized learning of the organizations (procedures, policies, etc.),
however, gaps between it and praxis yield important, albeit secondary, insights.
The practitioners are the point of access and the unit of analysis is the actions of
engagement between organizations whose activities are incompatible or
“enemies”. My data collection and data analysis encompass the individual,
activity, group, and organization levels. This focus on practice extends our
understanding of the processes of inter-organizational learning by giving full
consideration to the richness and depth of the phenomena by allowing us to look
inside the processes.

3.3 Model of Identity, Conflict, and Inter-organizational Learning
In this section I develop an inter-organizational learning model to address
the phenomenon of inter-organizational learning in the context of a conflict. Like a
framework, my model defines the territory and takes us a step closer to a theory
(Crossan et al., 1999). A model has several requirements, the first being to
identify the phenomenon of interest, in this case “learning between enemies”.
Next the key premises or assumptions underlying the framework need to be
explained (Sutton & Staw, 1995; K. E. Weick, 1995). Finally the relationships
between the elements in the model need to be described (Sutton & Staw, 1995;
K. E. Weick, 1995). While the individual elements have been established in prior
literature, what is unique to my model is that I am showing the interrelationships
and embeddedness across the levels. My model makes high level connections. It
is underpinned by 5 key premises or assumptions:
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1. Inter-related and Embedded: Conflict, learning, and identity are interrelated in that one influences the formation of the others and they are
embedded in activities (praxis) of individuals and in practices
(institutionalized behaviours and beliefs) at the collective level.
2. Multi-level Impacts: Conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across
the individual and collective levels via feedback and feed forward
mechanisms.
3. Individual Engagement: Praxis-Practitioners-Practice: Change in conflict,
learning, and identity resulting from inter-organizational engagement takes
place through the activities (praxis) of individuals (practitioners) and
practices of organizations or groups.
4. Repeated Engagement between Equals: Conflict, learning, and identity
continue to evolve with repeated engagement. Their movement is
determined by the nature of the engagement between individuals.
5. Conditions: Research has identified a range of conditions that favour interorganizational learning. There are conditions around the conflict itself,
conditions related to the organizations, and to the individuals involved.
I now will describe each premise in more detail.
3.3.1 Inter-Related and Embedded
Conflict, learning, and identity are related in that one influences the
formation of the others and they are embedded in the praxis (activities) of
individuals and in practices (institutionalized behaviours) at the collective level
(See Figure 3-2: Embeddedness). The relationships between conflict and both
individual and organizational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978), conflict and
identity (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 2005), and to a somewhat lesser extent identity
and organizational learning (e.g. Cook & Yanow, 1996) have been established in
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prior research. My model highlights the extent to which they are related to each
other through praxis and practice (activities and behaviour).
Conflict, as defined in this dissertation, entails incompatible activities such
that one individual‟s or organization‟s actions interfere with or obstruct another‟s
action (Deutsch, 1949; 1973). It acts as the stimulus for action. In the context of
the practice based view then the actions taken (praxis) by individuals
(practitioners) in response to conflict, based on their organization‟s routines,
procedures, and behavioural practices, instigates learning (with or without an
accompanying shift in beliefs) (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). In a similar vein,
individuals‟ identity is expressed through their actions (praxis) which are a
reflection of the practices of those individuals‟ social and role identities and their
organizations‟ identities.
Organizational identity manifests in collective practices (Nag et al., 2007).
Even within cooperative groups these practices can create conflict (Deutsch,
1949; 1973; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The practices related to any particular identity
impact what can be learned in that they represent a collective and
institutionalized learning or knowledge base that shapes the behaviour and
beliefs of individuals (practitioners) and their organization (J. Brown & Duguid,
1991; Nag et al., 2007). Conflict may interfere with or obstruct actions at the
organizational level as well as at the individual level. I proceed on the premise
that conflict, identity, and learning are inter-related and embedded in actions and
practices.
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Collective

Conflict

Practice
Identity

Learning

Conflict

Praxis
Identity

Learning

Individual

Figure 3-2: Embeddedness
3.3.2 Multi-Level Impacts
Conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across the individual and
collective levels via feedback and feed forward mechanisms. While conflict,
identity, and learning are inter-related within levels, the overall process is
inherently multi-level. Individual beliefs and behaviours regarding the practices
related to identities and conflict both influence and aggregate to higher level
practices and understandings. These higher level understandings in turn provide
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the basis for feedback to the sub-groups, and individuals in the organization
(Chreim, Williams, & Hinings, 2007; K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2003; Crossan et al.,
1999; De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Individuals' praxis
(activities) in response to feedback are shaped by and in turn modify their
understanding of the conflict, their identities and their learning. Organizational
practices in response to feedback are shaped by and in turn modify
organizational identity and learning and collective understanding of the conflict.
The context of this study is situations of conflict between organizations. My
model centers on engagement that occurs practitioner to practitioner, described
more fully in the next section. Each organization, through the practices created
by its institutionalized learning and inherent in its identity uniquely influences the
individuals‟ identity, and hence their potential for learning, as well as their
potential for conflict. The identities of work, professional and social group
memberships as well as their prior knowledge also exert an influence on
individuals (See Figure 3-3: Multilevel). I proceed on the premise that conflict,
identity and learning are inter-related across levels.
It is important to note that in my model the organization level refers to the
collective consensus of individual behaviours and beliefs. It is the collective level
as compared to the individual level. Also, this structure follows from the basic
assumption that individuals, not organizations, have insights and take action
(Crossan et al., 1999; Simons, 1991).
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Figure 3-3: Multilevel
3.3.3 Individual Engagement: Practitioners-Praxis-Practice
In the context of inter-organizational conflict, change in conflict, learning,
and identity results from practitioner engagement between organizations. Change
is anchored in feedback and feed forward cycles, through the praxis (activities) of
practitioners (individuals) and practices of organizations or groups (see Figure
3-4: Practice-Practitioner-Praxis).

66

Organization 1

Organization 2

Conflict

Conflict

Practice
Identity

Practice

Learning

Identity

feedback /
feed-forward

feedback /
feed-forward

Conflict

Conflict

Practitioner

Praxis
Identity

Learning

Learning

Engagement

Praxis
Identity

Learning

Figure 3-4: Practitioner-Praxis-Practice
However, engagement between individuals from organizations in conflict
may trigger actions, such as defensive routines and an over reliance on past
experiences, that inhibit their ability to learn (Fiol et al., 2009; D. Gioia & P. Poole,
1984). Information complexity and/or the need to preserve a positive self-concept
also tend to work against experimentation and hence learning (D. Gioia & P.
Poole, 1984). A relatively automatic enactment of existing practices by individuals
will tend to reinforce existing identities and conflict. Consequently certain
conditions may be required to allow for experimentation to occur.
Organizational learning between organizations in conflict may then depend
on individuals‟ ability to tap into a range of less salient identities and particularly
into identities based on communities of practice or roles. While an individual‟s
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behaviour is usually an expression of their more salient identities (P. Burke, 1980;
P. Burke & Reitzes, 1991), when opportunities to express that identity are
unavailable individuals will often reorder the importance of existing identities
(Serpe, 1987). Field studies have shown that contextual factors can render some
identities much more meaningful than others (R. Brown, 2000). Experiments in
psychology have demonstrated that common group membership (cross
categorization) reduces in-group bias (e.g. Deschamps & Doise, 1978). This is
important in the case of engagement between “enemies” as engagement forms a
common group and raises the possibility of new activities that result from
activation of a different identity.
Communities of practice, such as the community of scientists, provide
individuals with common vocabulary and practice with which to engage and
address each other (J. Brown & Duguid, 1991). Whereas within an organization it
is often role and social identities that differentiate individuals, in engagement
between “enemies” an otherwise less salient social or role identity may provide
an opportunity for them to connect. Also, in a relatively new inter-organizational
relationship behaviours are not entrenched, permitting more individual leeway.
Employing the practices associated with their common identity allows
practitioners to explore new activities in response to the conflict. While
engagement between individuals from organizations in conflict is likely to evoke
the strong emotions (K. Weick et al., 2005) necessary to instigate
experimentation (i.e. new activities), I propose that it is the presence of multiple
social and role identities that enable individuals to constructively engage, so that
feedback from experimentation leads to new interpretations and integration.
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While the existence of common social or role identities is necessary, given
the influence of organizational identity, it may not be sufficient to ensure
enactment of new behaviour in response to feedback. For such enactment to
occur something must loosen the hold that this collective identity places on
individual actions. Researchers have suggested that feedback from the external
environment “destabilizes” individuals‟ perception of their organization‟s identity
(e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002). Although minor
inconsistencies between external perceptions and internal beliefs regarding their
organization‟s identity are likely to trigger defensiveness, a serious discrepancy
may induce organizational members to reevaluate their understandings and alter
their actions (D. Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Consequently, in
order for the individuals to experiment with new actions that run contrary to the
dominant logic, their respective organizational identities must be in some state of
flux.
When members‟ collective understanding of organizational identity is in a
state of flux, perhaps as a result of a crisis in the industry or a merger, the
characteristics of the organization that are central, enduring and unique become
less clear. This leads to ambiguity regarding the organization‟s practices. As a
result the constraints that the organizational identity formerly placed on
individuals‟ activities may relax and their individual, social and role identities
become relatively more important. In this situation the presence of common
social or role identities can facilitate new activities based on those common
identities. In addition to supporting new activities this has the potential to shift the
relative focus of individuals away from identity differences between themselves
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and their organizations. With this shift the more socio-cognitive aspects of the
conflict may become the focus.
In addition, the extent to which an individual identifies with their
organization‟s identity influences whether they will change their behaviour in
response to feedback that is inconsistent with that identity. For behavioural
change to occur individuals must identify strongly with their organization‟s
distinctive characteristics. When individuals do so, enacting behaviour related to
the organizational identity is more likely to take relative priority over their other
identities. This is especially the case if the individual is over-identified with their
organization (McGregor & Little, 1998; Schwenk, 2002). The extent to which an
organization‟s identity aligns with institutionalized norms in its industry, also
impacts the likelihood that individuals will be bound by institutionalized norms and
logics. Hence, the level of an individual identification with their organization‟s
identity, along with the alignment of that identity with the norms in its category,
determine the potential for individuals to alter their behaviour and to shift
emphasis to aspects of the conflict other than identity differences. The interaction
of identification and organizational identity can relax the constraints on individual
praxis in the same way that they are relaxed when an organization‟s identity is in
flux.
To summarize, conflict, identity, and learning serve as filters through which
the individuals make sense of feedback. Feedback that is consistent with their
understanding will not prompt any change in praxis. Feedback that is inconsistent
with their understandings may prompt a different interpretation of the situation,
resulting in experimentation with new activities or the activation of a new identity.
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As stated above the extent to which individuals will consciously experiment with
new actions in response to conflict is a function of the interaction between their
social or role identities and their respective organizations‟ identities. I proceed on
the premise that individuals‟ subsequent praxis in response to feedback is related
not only to their understanding of the conflict but also to their identities, their
learning, and to the learning and identities of the groups and organizations with
which they identify. These are conditions for engagement between individuals.
3.3.4 Repeated Engagement
Conflict, learning, and identity evolve with repeated engagement. The
trajectory of their movement is determined by the nature of the engagement,
which occurs between individuals from the organizations in conflict.
As described above, in interactions between individuals from organizations
in conflict, the process of learning may be thought of as the capacity to activate
different, probably less salient, identities and the accompanying behaviours in
response to feedback. Once enacted, the new behaviours alter the context and
create a novel situation that requires conscious interpretation first by the
individuals themselves. Individuals must be “willing to suspend their belief
systems to try a new behaviour, and in doing so are open to new and different
interpretations of the results of the behaviour” (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995, p. 600).
This interpretation of their own new behaviour may lead to altered beliefs about
the source of the conflict (identity versus socio-cognitive or interests) and in turn
activate new beliefs and behaviours. The extent of the shared understanding of
individuals from each of the organizations forms the foundation for integration

71
and collective learning between them and for the integration and potentially the
inter-organizational learning in their respective organizations (See Figure 3-5:
Repeated Engagement).
To move from individual to collective learning shared understandings must
be developed. This is accomplished through various forms of interaction; first
between individuals within the inter-organizational group, and subsequently
between these individuals and groups within their organization (Crossan et al.,
1999; Isaacs, 1993). The nature of the interaction between the individuals and
groups, and particularly the practices such as structures and mechanisms which
connect them, strongly influence inter-organizational learning (Argote, McEvily, &
Reagans, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).
While not explicitly addressed in prior research, many of the practices of
inter-organizational learning studied to date act primarily to reduce inter-group
and inter-organizational hostility (i.e. manage the inherent identity conflict).
These practices have tended to create, to varying degrees, the conditions
outlined in the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; R. Brown, 2000). These include
prolonged engagement involving some cooperative activity (e.g. Inkpen & Currall,
2004); official and institutional support for the engagement (e.g. Mason & Leek,
2008) and engagement between relatively power balanced practitioners and
organizations (e.g. Kale & J. Anand, 2006). While originally aimed at the
reduction of inter-racial hostility these practices support the kind of inter-group
and inter-organizational exchange necessary for dialogue to occur. For example,
Mason and Leek (2008) discuss the creation of „soft‟ mechanisms, such as
individuals working together to develop a document with the expectation that they
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would learn from each other. It is through ongoing discussion and shared actions
(i.e. praxis) that shared understanding develops and mutual adjustment take
place (Crossan et al., 1999).
Dialogue as Bohm (1996) defines the term goes beyond typical notions of
conversation and information exchange, to explore deeply held assumptions
about expectations, meaning, and identity (Bohm, 1996, p. vii). Dialogue depends
on the attention of the individuals involved and it must be sustained over time in
order to surface the assumptions that are present in the group. Through
recognizing these assumptions, individuals may gain new understanding of their
thought processes and break out of the identity constraints that inhibit them. For
example, as discussed above, organizational identity can be thought of in terms
of the organization‟s position within an established set of categories that define
an industry, for example “we are an oil and gas company”. Identity change would
occur in the context of dialogue that challenges the dominant expectations,
meanings and scripts attached to identity, such as “oil companies and
environmentalists are enemies”. The questions prompted by dialogue drive
change by creating identity discrepant cues and novel interactions like, “oil
companies and environmentalists can collaborate” and generate a sense of
identity amongst dialogue participants, as in “oil companies and
environmentalists care about the natural environment” (i.e. Rao et al., 2003).
Practitioners can begin to understand the extent to which they are behaving
automatically based on their existing interpretations. With such understanding
Bohm (1996) suggests that defensive posturing can diminish and deep collective
learning is then possible, although not assured. It is through interaction with
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others that individuals are able to break out of beliefs and behaviours and Bohm
(1996) suggests that perhaps the only way to fundamentally change meanings
and expectations, such as those related to identity and conflict, is through
dialogue.
I proceed on the premise that repeated engagement between practitioners
around some cooperative activity that has institutional support forms the basis for
dialogue that will lead to inter-organizational learning.

Organization 2

Organization 2

Organization 1

Organization 1

Conf

Conf

Conf

Conf

Practice Identi

Practice Identi

Learn

ty
Learn

Ident

Ident

Conf
Conf

Conf
Conf

Praxis

Praxis
Ident

Identi
ty
Learn

Learn

ty
Learn

Learn

Repeated
Engagement

Time Period 1

Figure 3-5: Repeated Engagement

Praxis
Ident

Identi
ty
Learn

Time Period n

Learn

74
3.3.5 Conditions
Prior research has identified a range of conditions that favour interorganizational learning, problem solving processes, and moving from a
stalemate. These may also apply to an organization‟s ability to learn in situations
of conflict. There are conditions around the conflict source, conditions related to
the organizations and conditions related to the individuals involved (see Figure
3-6: Model of Identity, Conflict, & Inter-Organizational Learning).
3.3.5.1 Conditions Related to the Conflict
According to De Dreu and Gelfand (2008) and others conflict can arise from
three major sources: mixed motive interdependencies or conflicts of interest; the
need to develop and maintain a positive identity; and the need to hold socially
validated and shared understandings. Hence conflicts arise from differences in
individuals‟, groups‟, and organizations‟ interests, identity, or learning.
A common assumption is that conflict is based on identity and is
dysfunctional to inter-organizational learning because of the threat that it
represents to the ego of others (e.g. A. Brown & Starkey, 2000). However, a
more nuanced understanding of the combination of sources of conflict may have
implications for inter-organizational learning (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008).
Research has shown that socio-cognitive conflict is beneficial and increases the
quality of decisions (i.e. Amason, 1996). However, that may be the case only
when identity conflicts have been addressed or at least reduced in some way. In
a similar vein it is well established that when parties believe their goals are
competitive (Deutsch, 1949) as in conflicts of interest, they do not engage
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constructively and socio-cognitive conflict hinders team performance (Tjosvold,
1998). I proceed on the premise that redirecting emphasis towards sociocognitive conflict and away from identity conflict or conflicts of interest is
necessary for learning.
3.3.5.2 Conditions Related to the Organizations
In addition to the interactions discussed above, the capabilities of each of
the organizations, as embodied in their practices, will impact their ability to learn
from engagement. An organization‟s learning practices in general, including its
learning routines, dominant logics, knowledge bases, and structure (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; P. Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), and especially its prior experience
with inter-organizational learning, will all influence its capacity to “learn from the
enemy”. Prior experience with a particular learning partner has an influence as
well (Zollo et al., 2002). I proceed on the premise that an organization must have
well developed and effective inter-organizational learning practices to learn from
an organization with which it is in conflict.
3.3.5.3 Conditions Related to the Individuals
The capabilities of the individual practitioners involved are critical.
Relationships between individual managers will determine much of what occurs
in terms of inter-organizational interactions (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007) and in
situations of conflict those relationships are likely to be cautious and tense.
Therefore in addition to enjoying the support of an organization that is capable of
learning, individuals must have confidence that the risks of working with hitherto

76
unfamiliar, and possibly hostile, individuals and groups outweigh the costs. In
other words they must be motivated and optimistic that engaging with individuals
from the other organizations will be constructive (Pruitt, 2005). I proceed on the
premise that learning practitioners must be confident, motivated, and optimistic
regarding the potential for inter-organizational learning.
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Figure 3-6: Model of Conflict, Identity, & Inter-Organizational Learning

78
3.3.6 Summary
My model suggests that individual actions in response to conflict are based
on individual and collective identities and individual and collective learning and it
is these actions that form the basis for inter-organizational learning in the
presence of conflict. Depending on their “repertoire” of identities and the stability
of their organization‟s identity, individuals, and their counterparts in other
organizations, may be able to tap into behaviours associated with a common
social or role identity. This common identity provides common language and
practices to guide their interaction, possibly highlighting the interest or sociocognitive aspects of the conflict. The likelihood that individuals will experiment
and persist with new behaviours also depends on their organization‟s identity and
their level of identification with it. If the individuals do persist with the new
activities, they may be able to suspend their belief systems and explore new
interpretations. This shift in interpretation surfaces assumptions and facilitates
dialogue, and possibly the integration of new information, first by the individuals
and then by the group (Bohm, 1996; Crossan et al., 1999). The integration of new
information by the group makes inter-organizational learning possible, depending
on the practices (i.e. receptiveness) of the organizations involved. Therefore,
inter-organizational learning is an unusual case where individual to individual
learning can ultimately influence the learning that occurs in each individual‟s
respective organizations. It is the individuals and the social activities and
practices, such as dialogue, through which they develop shared understandings
that facilitate inter-organizational learning.
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In this dissertation, I examine whether all of the premises and conditions
described must hold for inter-organizational learning to occur. Moreover, I will
look for patterns in the data to provide a more nuanced explanation of the
activities (praxis) through which the paradoxical phenomena of “learning from the
enemy” occurs.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Strategy
To explore the phenomena of “learning from the enemy” I followed Yin‟s
(2009) methodology in selecting my research strategy and research design. Yin
(2009) suggests that the choice of a research strategy hinges on three
conditions: the type of research question, the extent of the researchers control
over the behavioural events, and whether the events are contemporary or in the
past (i.e. timing).
Investigations of inter-organizational learning are usually concerned with
contemporary events (condition three) in a setting where the researcher has no
control of the behavioural events (condition two). In my study therefore the first
condition, the type of research question, is the most important in determining the
research strategy. According to Yin (2009) there are three broad categories of
research questions: those that ask “how much or how many”, those that ask
“what” (exploratory), and those that ask “why or how” (explanatory).
The first type of question has been explored using surveys and archival
research asking, for example, how much has been learned (e. g. Cockburn &
Henderson, 1998) or how much impact learning has had on financial
performance (e.g. Zollo et al., 2002). Large scale multi-organizational surveys
rely on proxy objective measures of inter-organizational learning (i.e. patent
counts), often outside of the context where it has occurred; thus they provide only
a broad indicator of successful inter-organizational learning outcomes and
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processes. This study takes place in a high-conflict context. And while survey and
archival research have suggested that inter-organizational learning can occur in
the presence of high levels of conflict (Steensma et al., 2008), it has for the most
part failed to adequately address the complete nature of the learning or the
processes through which it has occurred. Indeed, one of the primary motivations
for this dissertation is the gap in our understanding of the social and behavioural
(the “what” and “how”) aspects of inter-organizational learning, caused by the
prior reliance on survey and archival studies.
Case studies are highly suitable for exploratory or explanatory purposes
(i.e., “what”, “how” and “why” questions) when the phenomenon is current and
situated in the organizational world, and the researcher has little control over
events, as in the case of inter-organizational learning (Yin, 2009). Additionally, in
research that explores the underlying dynamics of phenomena that play out over
time, such as inter-organizational learning, case studies provide the ability to get
closer to constructs and to illustrate relationships more directly (Siggelkow,
2007). This is in contrast to large sample work where the distance between
conceptual constructs and measurable variables is often large and the true
nature of the relationship (if one exists) unclear (Siggelkow, 2007). An equally
compelling argument for case studies is that they are well suited to understanding
dynamic, complex individual and organizational phenomena involving intense
human interaction, such as the practices related to inter-organizational learning in
a conflict laden situation (G. Johnson et al., 2007).
Case studies are conducted within a context by accessing people who are
able to recollect events pertinent to the phenomena under study relatively
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accurately, in addition to archival documents, and the researcher‟s observations.
Therefore case studies allow the retention of the meaningful characteristics of
real life events, such as individual life cycles, and organizational and managerial
processes. Flexible iterative data collection and tabulation allow one to take
advantage of emergent themes, sharpening construct definition, validity and
measurability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Comparing data to theory from the literature,
both confirming and contradictory, helps to build internal validity and raise the
theoretical level. Unlike grounded theory or ethnography, case studies demand a
prior grasp of relevant theoretical relationships to guide and delimit data
collection efforts (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009).
In summary, while the case study method is comparable to other types of
research strategies in its process of problem definition, design, data collection,
data analysis, data composition, and reporting, it is uniquely appropriate for
exploratory and explanatory studies such as this. The case study method
explains links that are too complex for surveys, describes the rich context in
which the phenomena occurred, illustrates the phenomena, and explores
situations where the phenomena do not have clear outcomes (Yin, 2009). Hence,
a case study research strategy was selected for this dissertation. In the next
section I describe the rationale for my research design.

4.2 Research Design
The research design “is the logical sequence that connects the empirical
data to a study‟s initial research questions and, ultimately, its conclusions” (Yin,
2009, p. 26). The selection of a specific research design using case study rests
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on the choice between single and multiple cases and depends on the number of
units of analysis. I discuss each in turn.
4.2.1 Single Cases
According to Yin (2009) single cases are appropriate when theory is well
formulated. While much is known about inter-organizational learning, a single
case that meets most of the conditions necessary for inter-organizational learning
has the potential to challenge or extend existing theory. Another rationale for a
single case study is the case to be studied is extreme or revelatory. Interorganizational learning “between enemies” is a sufficiently infrequent and
uncommon phenomenon that I believe a pertinent single case is worth
documenting and analyzing (Yin, 2009). While multiple case studies provide a
foundation for testing a theory, extreme single cases are particularly valuable in
enabling researchers to focus in on the conceptual relationships proposed within
an exceptional empirical setting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2009).
In addition, exceptional or unique cases hold the promise of special insights,
especially regarding behaviours or practices (G. Johnson, et.al., 2007; Yin,
2009). A final rationale for a single case study is the longitudinal case; studying
the same single case at two or more intervals. My model suggests that certain
conditions change over time therefore a longitudinal case study is necessary to
reflect the anticipated changes (Yin, 2009). I believe that a multiple case design
would be unlikely to generate additional insights sufficient to justify the added
cost in time and resources required to find and investigate comparable cases,
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when weighed against one well-chosen, unique and extreme case. Therefore I
chose a single case design for this dissertation.
4.2.2 Multiple Units of Analysis
The unit of analysis defines what a “case” is about. Case studies have been
conducted to investigate inter-organizational learning, identity, and conflict; and
focusing on individuals, work groups, organizations, nations and others. In each
study the definition of the unit of analysis and therefore the case is directly related
to the initial research questions (Yin, 2009). The research questions posed in this
dissertation focus on the behaviours associated with inter-organizational learning
between organizations in conflict – namely the behaviours exhibited in the dyadic
relationships between individuals and further, between collectives (groups or
organizations). While these behavioural interactions are the main units of
analysis, they necessarily incorporate subunits of analysis in an embedded
design. Subunits of analysis here include the organizations, relevant sub-groups,
and individuals. These subunits add opportunities for analysis across levels and
particularly at the organizational level where practice becomes evident,
enhancing the insights from this single case. The similarity to constructs
investigated in previous research on learning and identity will allow me to build on
prior literature (Yin, 2009).
4.2.3 Plan for an Embedded Single Case Design
Yin (1989) recommends the following steps for a single case design.
1. Define and design:
a. Develop theory: Chapters 2 and 3
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b. Select case: Section 4.3
c. Design data collection: Section 4.4
2. Prepare, collect, and analyze:
a. Conduct case study: Section 4.5
b. Develop case narrative: Section 4.5.2
3. Analyze and conclude:
a. Draw conclusions: Chapter 5
b. Relate conclusions to existing theory: Chapter 6
c. Relate conclusions to new theory: Chapter 6
d. Develop managerial implications: Chapter 7
This dissertation follows these steps. Chapters 2 and 3 presented the
theoretical grounding and development of my theoretical framework and what I
expected to see in the data. The remainder of the current Chapter discusses
steps 1.b. (case selection), 1.c. (data collection design), and step 2 (prepare,
collect, and analyze) of the plan.

4.3 Research Context and Case Selection
I chose to study inter-organizational learning between “enemies” in the
salmon farming industry in British Columbia. The waterways of British Columbia
are highly politicized natural resources because of their impact on a host of social
and economic phenomena, including the habitat of the culturally iconic wild
salmon and the rights of First Nations. Almost from its inception, the salmon
farming industry in British Columbia has been widely criticized for its salmon
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growing practices. Salmon farming3 began in British Columbia in the 1970‟s and
by the mid 1980s it grew rapidly. The commercial fishing industry, later joined by
environmentalists, sports fishermen and First Nations, criticized the industry and
the provincial government4 for what they viewed as the negative impact that
salmon farming in open net cages5 had on the marine habitat. In particular, they
were concerned about the possible spread of disease or parasites from farmed to
wild fish, the possible genetic pollution of wild fish due to escapes of farmed fish,
the effects of effluent from farms on the marine environment, and the effects on
marine life of pharmaceuticals used on farmed fish.
Opposition to the industry gained profile and momentum during the 1990‟s
and its reputation deteriorated rapidly, as demonstrated by two government
moratoriums and industry reviews, the passage of strict regulations, increasingly
negative media coverage, the growing enmity of several First Nations, and
increasingly sophisticated targeting by environmental groups (see Appendix A:
Detailed Chronology of Events in the BC Salmon Farming Industry 1970 – 2009
for summary).
As a result of consolidation, in 2009 the industry is dominated by two
Norwegian owned firms: Marine Harvest and Mainstream (Cermaq). For almost a
decade these firms (and their precursors) have been directly challenged in the
3

Salmon farming, as practiced in BC, consisted of placing juvenile salmon (smolts) into large net
cages in the ocean, feeding them fish meal for 18 to 24 months until they reached market weight,
then harvesting and processing them.
4
The provincial government granted the fish farming licenses and the ocean tenures to
companies. The provincial and the federal government shared regulatory responsibility for the
coastal area.
5
From the earliest days of the debate environmentalists supported growing salmon in closed
containment systems. The industry claims that technology is not economically or environmentally
viable.
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media and the marketplace by the Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform
(CAAR), originally a coalition of local environmental non-government
organizations (NGOs) and First Nations6. While there have been instances of
joint initiatives over the years, the stance of the firms, either directly or through
the BC Salmon Farmers Association, was typically to deny, dismiss or in some
way discredit CAAR‟s claims.
Recently, however, there has been a change in the nature of the interaction
between Marine Harvest and CAAR. They successfully negotiated the
Framework for Dialogue (the Framework), an agreement to undertake five joint
research projects. The two organizations have been interacting under its terms
since early 2006. The first two projects undertaken under The Framework
address the two most prominent issues: the impact of sea lice on the marine
habitat and viability of closed containment systems. By way of contrast,
Mainstream has made a distinct choice not to undertake joint initiatives with
CAAR or any other NGOS, although globally the company does joint research
with various educational and research organizations. This continued divergence
in strategies, between Marine Harvest and Mainstream, seems to indicate that
the Framework is not part of the evolution in the industry.
I chose this particular context and the organizations involved precisely
because it represents an extreme and unique case of organizations confronting
conflict over time. This research context is further enriched by contrasting
strategies adopted by different protagonists. It is very special in the sense of
allowing me to gain insights that I do not expect other situations and
6

As of 2009 the First Nations had left CAAR.
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organizations would be able to provide (G. Johnson et al., 2007; Yin, 2009).
Additionally, by selecting this context of salmon farming in BC I was able to trace
the inter-organizational dynamics and learning outcomes over time by comparing
the data that I gathered with a prior data set, which I describe in the section 4.4.2
Issues in Salmon Farming Data Set.
Beginning in 2005, I participated in a study investigating issues in the global
salmon farming industry. My exposure to the situation in BC raised a number of
questions for me that were unrelated to the original premise of that study. Since
2005 I have actively followed developments in the industry, in particular via the
headlines in the daily Intrafish American Newsletter (Norges Handels- og
Sjofartstidende, n.d.), a division of a Norwegian publishing company. Following
Siggelkow (2007). I used my knowledge of the situation to motivate my own
research questions. Then, drawing on the existing literature I developed
theoretical relationships to describe the conditions and practices of interorganizational learning in situations of conflict. I have brought my deep
understanding of this industry to bear at every stage of the design and
development of my approach to this research. For example, my real time
observations over an extended period give me an appreciation for the situation
that enables me to focus on particular sequences of events rather than on the full
narrative. The Framework is considered distinctive by all parties. This kind of
voluntary shift in inter-organizational interaction and apparent learning is rare in
protracted conflicts, and so I expected it would be an instructive case study of
inter-organizational learning. According to Yin (2009) the quality of analysis is
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enhanced if a researcher knows the subject matter from previous investigations
and uses their “own prior expert knowledge” (2009, p. 161).
In addition, the ability to compare panel data from the first year of the
Framework to data gathered almost five years later provided an excellent
opportunity to observe the dynamic evolution of the concepts under study, further
develop my ideas, adding to the attractiveness of this case as a research context.
The extended duration and depth of my involvement means my research can
respond effectively to the repeated calls from senior scholars for more
longitudinal studies.
All of these reasons suggested the salmon farming industry in BC, and
especially the negotiation and implementation of The Framework, as a good
context for case study research on inter-organizational learning between
“enemies” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).

4.4 Data Characteristics and Data Collection
4.4.1 Data Characteristics
The data collected in this research were qualitative. Qualitative data offer
several strengths, ideally suited to my research questions. The focus is on a
phenomenon that is naturally occurring, current and situated in the real world,
and featuring “local groundedness … the data were collected in close proximity to
a specific situation” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The qualitative data enable
thick descriptions and provide richness and offer potential to reveal complex
processes. Also qualitative data are usually, and in this case actually were
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collected over a sustained period, offering the opportunity to understand
processes and probable causality (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The internal validity of qualitative data is enhanced through triangulation,
using multiple sources and types of data (Jick, 1979; Yin, 2009). This research
benefited from all of these factors (See Table 4-1: Data Collection Sources). Data
included newspaper articles, interview transcripts, company documents,
websites, government and third party reports, and notes on observations. Equally
important, the validity of the data benefited from my prolonged exposure to this
industry, as I was able to triangulate against my own deep understanding of the
research context developed over five years of observing it from a social science
researcher‟s perspective. Because the salmon farming industry was and
continues to be such a controversial topic in British Columbia, and because the
issues were very intense and public, a significant amount and variety of public
data is available. Moreover, members and observers of the industry showed a
genuine interest in participating in this research, until a federal judicial inquiry was
initiated in the fall of 2009.
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Table 4-1: Data Collection Sources
Archival Data

Interviews

Newspaper articles

Individuals from the
industry and the
Websites
environmentalist
Company documents (i.e. community
annual reports)
Multiple levels within
Government and third
each key organization
party reports
Other stakeholders
impacted by the conflict
laden issues

Direct Observation
Facility and farm tours
Interaction between
parties and suppliers,
local community or other
stakeholders
Visits to retail sites and
hatcheries and salmon
rivers

Semi-structured
interviews

4.4.2 Issues in Salmon Farming Data Set
As mentioned previously, from 2005 to 2007 I actively participated in a study
of social and strategic issues in the context of the global salmon farming industry.
The data gathered for that study included a wide range of information on the
perspectives of all of the key firms and relevant stakeholder groups as they relate
to issues facing the industry. The data have not yet been analyzed for that
ongoing research project, the scope of which has recently been expanded to
include all major salmon farming jurisdictions. Given that, I have, with the
permission of the lead researcher on that study, used the portion of that data set
relating to the salmon farming industry in BC as the starting point for my analysis
and data gathering.
The data set includes 24 interviews, averaging 90 minutes in length, with a
total of 28 people, comprising: executives of salmon farming companies;
managers and members of environmental organizations and First Nations;
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government officials; industry associations; and scientists/academics. I
conducted 16 interviews, alone or with the lead researcher, speaking to 20
people. In addition, I visited the Head Offices of both major global salmon farming
companies and an international salmon farming association, and viewed salmon
farms in Norway. We conducted the interviews, which were taped and transcribed
by an independent transcription service, between December 2005 and
September 2007 (see Table 4-2: Interviewees for the final roster and additional
details of the interviewees). In all cases, we asked respondents open ended
questions that allowed them to relate their stories of how particular situations and
issues had evolved. Although we had created an interview protocol to steer the
conversation (see Appendix B: Interview Protocol 2005, 2006, 2007), often we
did not strictly follow the guide to permit us to pursue respondents‟ tangential
avenues of interest, as recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005). The openended nature of the interviews makes them amenable to analysis from a range of
perspectives and therefore appropriate for inclusion in this dissertation.
This prior data set also included a database of company, government, and
stakeholder documents, and 821 newspaper articles that deal with aquaculture
and salmon farming issues in BC, published between 1985 and 2007 in the
Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun or the Victoria Times Colonist.
4.4.3 Data Collection
Following Yin‟s (2009) recommendation, my research strategy involved
collecting and analyzing information from multiple sources, in my case interview
transcripts, notes on observations, and archival data, aimed at corroborating the

93
same phenomenon. The data were collected in two phases. In the first phase, I
collected recent media reports, government reports and archival material to
update and expand the prior data set. These materials were then summarized,
and an initial analysis was done, prior to going to the field. During the second
phase I conducted semi-structured interviews with industry participants and
observers. I spoke with key personnel within the organizations in the BC salmon
farming industry, particularly those involved with the Framework, and visited their
sites. These activities occurred from July to December 2009 following receipt of
approval by the University of Western Ontario‟s Ethics Committee (Appendix C:
Ethics Approval of Research Design). I will now describe each phase in more
detail.
Phase 1: I collected and analyzed archival data, including company
documents, annual reports, newspaper articles, government reports and scientific
research reports. I did this in order to understand the events surrounding the
industry, the organizations‟ interaction with each other, and to observe industry
participants‟ interpretations of the conflict, their learning, their identities and their
and others‟ behaviour.
I drew newspaper articles from the entire set of articles between January
2007 and November 2009 in the Vancouver Sun, the Victoria Times Colonist, and
the Globe and Mail, in order to update the existing data set. Subject search terms
included “salmon farming”, “fish farming” and “aquaculture”. There were 265
articles. Each article was thoroughly examined for information and the
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perceptions of any parties relevant to my analysis7 (salmon farming industry
members, environmentalists, First Nations, government, scientists etc.). Each
article that was deemed to contain relevant content was summarized, arranged
chronologically, and entered into the appropriate “bin” in NVivo 8 along with the
more than 800 relevant articles published by the same newspapers prior to
January 2007.
In 2007 more than 3 years work by two separate government-appointed
groups culminated in their much anticipated final reports and recommendations.
From the Province of British Columbia website I was able to obtain a copy of the
Report of the Special Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture (2007), the output
of the most recent review conducted by the Legislative assembly of British
Columbia. I obtained the British Columbia Salmon Forum Final Report and
Recommendations (“BC Salmon Forum: Final Report and Recommendations to
the Government of British Columbia,” 2009) , an independent body appointed by
the Premier of British Columbia, from its website. These were combined with the
government and third party reports in the existing data set and stored in the
project files. Annual reports and company documents were accessed via
company websites.
In this research, where only a limited number of individuals were directly
involved with the phenomena, the archival data was important because it helped
to augment and verify interviewees‟ retrospective memories. In addition, reporting
on one‟s own behaviour can be a difficult cognitive task, as one has to
7

Parties were considered relevant to the extent that they were a normal part of the organizational
field, that is they interacted regularly with other field members regarding the issue domain
(Hoffman, 1999).
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understand the question, then recall relevant behaviour, and construct an
answer, all the while editing it for social desirability, either consciously, or
unconsciously (Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001). Additionally, particularly in
situations of conflict, interviewees‟ answers can be profoundly influenced by
questions, wording, format, and context, making triangulation from a variety of
sources even more critical. My layered understanding and deep appreciation of
the issues in the industry was especially crucial in this regard.
In addition to the pre-interview archival data collection and updating of the
existing data set from organizations‟ and government websites, data were also
gathered on an opportunistic basis during the interviewing and site visit phase.
Phase 2: In the second phase of data collection I combined interviewing
with observation techniques in order to understand the behaviour, activities, and
practices related to conflict, identity, and learning. I began by identifying key
people to be interviewed. I compiled an initial list of potential interviewees using
the Briefings Witness List from the Report of the Special Committee on
Sustainable Aquaculture (2007, p. 51). I then cross referenced this with the list of
interviewees from the existing data set. I focused on individuals that had acted as
witnesses on behalf of Marine Harvest, CAAR, Mainstream and other issuerelated groups in the BC salmon farming industry, namely First Nations
communities, other environmental groups, government, local suppliers to the
industry, industry associations, and academics. A number of individuals at the
key organizations such as Marine Harvest, CAAR, and the industry association
were the same individuals that were interviewed in 2006 and 2007.
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I first approached all potential interviewees via an e-mail which contained a
short description of my research objectives, my methods, the potential benefits
for the organization and individual, and the extent of their involvement should
they agree to participate (see Appendix D: Note sent to Potential Participants). To
cover all aspects of the proposed study I carefully maintained a balance of levels
and organizational affiliations. Previous research on inter-organizational
relationships has been criticized for over reliance on single respondents (Kumar,
Stern, & J. Anderson, 1993). Hence, I held interviews with a range of people
directly involved with the conflict and also with interested observers. I asked
interviewees to provide additional references to expand the list in a network
fashion. I strove for saturation by gathering data from as wide a variety of
respondents as possible and as completely as possible to ensure that I fully
understood the behaviours related to the relevant issues (G. Johnson et al.,
2007). I followed up with a phone call to provide more information and to set up a
time to meet. In several cases the recipient of the e -mail forwarded it to a more
appropriate person in their organization or recommended another individual
during the follow-up phone call. See Table 4-2: Interviewees, below, for the final
roster and additional details of interviewees.
Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees at the beginning of
every interview or workplace observation, using a consent form according to the
University of Western Ontario‟s (2002) ethical guidelines (See Appendix E: Letter
of Introduction & Informed Consent Form). Also at the beginning of each
interview, I orally confirmed the expected time commitment and information
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requirements, that respondents could choose not to answer any specific
question, and that they could decline to participate further at any point.
While individual retrospective interviews can be influenced by memory
failure and attribution biases, they have been long established as an acceptable
case study research tool (Yin, 2009). In this study retrospective narratives and
self reports were important for determining how individuals identify themselves
and their organizations, to understand how their behaviours were affected by
their individual and organizational identities, and how identities were affected by
inter-organizational interaction, and for finding out where and how new
behaviours developed.
To mitigate memory distortions I encouraged interviewees to provide a
descriptive account focusing on the “what, when, and who” of actions to
emphasize praxis (i.e. what they did). I de-emphasized my own or possible prior
theories of “why” as I intended to extract that from the stories they told. To check
for attribution bias, I compared statements to information in the media reports and
reports from other respondents, and against my own knowledge of the situation.
The semi-structured interviews were designed to follow from my research
questions “How does an organization learn from another organization with which
it is in conflict?” and “What is the role of identity in this learning?” In order to
access information about elements in my model I grouped my questions around
the major constructs; individual identity, organizational identity, learning, conflict,
and activities related to inter-organizational interaction (see Appendix F:
Interview Protocol 2009). In order to access both the praxis and the practices
related to learning, identity and conflict, I used ethnographic interviewing
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techniques and employed a mixture of what Spradley (1979) describes as grand
tour and mini-tour questions, asking for more detail about how particular events
raised by the respondent unfolded. Also following Spradley‟s recommendation, I
asked for examples and paid particular attention to verifying the meanings
attached to words and experiences. In particular I asked for stories that illustrated
a point made by the interviewee. In all situations I was mindful to ask my
questions in a way that the person could tell me the story, without telling me what
I wanted to hear (C. Gersick, personal communication, 2010).
Table 4-2: Interviewees
Organization

Level of
Interviewee

Interviews
2005-2007

Marine Harvest

Corporate Executive

2

(includes predecessor
companies Stolt,
Nutreco, PanFish)

Corporate manager

1

Executive team
(Canada)

1

1*

Sr. Manager

2

1*, 1

Manager - site
CAAR

Organization Leader

Interviews
2009 *same
individual as
in 05-07

1
3

1*, 1

Member/Campaigner 3
Other
environmentalists

Regional Manager

1

Area Manager

1

First Nation

Manager

1

1*, 1

Government

Provincial

1

1*

Federal

2

1*

Industry Associations

Executive Director

2

1*

Academic/Scientist

Marine Biologists

2

1*

Suppliers

Service Providers

1

2
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Organization

Level of
Interviewee

Interviews
2005-2007

Interviews
2009 *same
individual as
in 05-07

Equipment Suppliers

1

1

Industry Observers

Community
Members

1

1

Mainstream

Corporate Executive

1

Corporate Manager

1

Sr. Mgr (Canada)

1

1

28

19

Total Interviewees

With the permission of the interviewees, I recorded all the interviews, with
one exception and they were all transcribed by a third party. Two interviews were
conducted and recorded by telephone, and all others in person. Transcripts were
shared with a number of interviewees for verification. My individual interviews
lasted between 50 and 150 minutes. Direct observation took place by way of
accompanying Marine Harvest personnel and external stakeholders on a 5 hour
farm tour; touring a pilot closed containment site; visiting the local BC offices of
all key organizations; visiting retail locations; and visiting two salmon hatcheries
and several salmon rivers during the fall 2009 Pink salmon and Chinook salmon
runs. I created a case data base organizing the archival data, observations and
transcripts into “bins” as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) (See
Table 4-3: High Level Data Structure).
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Table 4-3: High Level Data Structure
Time
Period

Prior to 2005

Data
sources

Late 2005early 2007

2007-2008

2009-2010

Interviews

Interviews

Observations

Observations

Documents & Newspaper Articles

All data and information has been kept strictly confidential. I have preserved
confidentiality by using codes for identities in the database and interview
transcripts, and by using pseudonyms in this dissertation as recommended by
Pettigrew (1990). I have respected all interviewee requests to keep background
information confidential and I have given due consideration to all of the
respondent commentary that I received on my interpretation of the data. This has
been particularly relevant as most of the respondents are located in the same
geographic area, are aware of each other, and were understandably curious
about each others‟ responses. This “external” control motivated me to maintain
the highest standard of research ethics at all times. At the end of the study the
results will be presented to the key respondents.

4.5 Data Analysis
4.5.1 Overview of Analytic Strategy
Data analysis consisted of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise
recombining the evidence to address the initial premises of this research (Yin,
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2009). In order to produce compelling analytical conclusions and rule out
alternative interpretations I relied on accepted techniques for qualitative research
(Corbin & A. L. Strauss, 2008; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Miles & Huberman,
1994; Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009) suggests, I used my research questions and
premises to guide my analysis. The questions and premises shaped the data
collection process and thus gave direction to the relevant analytical strategies.
Given the explanatory nature of this research, the analytical techniques that I
used are pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis (Miles
& Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009).
Pattern- matching logic compares an empirically based pattern with a
theoretically predicted one. If the pattern coincides, the results help to strengthen
the validity of the case study (Yin, 2009). In a single case study it is important to
use the same data to rule out possible alternative explanations (i.e. threats to
internal validity). Pattern matching is not a precise science and therefore I looked
for “gross matches and mismatches” as per Yin‟s suggestion (2009, p. 141).
Explanation building is another technique that I used in this study. As
explained at the outset of Chapter 3, the practice based view attempts to provide
the micro-level explanation for the macro-level assertions made by, in this case,
organization learning theory, and organizational identity theory. An explanation is
a stipulation of causal links between concepts. These stipulations were offered in
Chapter 3 in the form of premises in support of a model. Therefore the key
activity in this research is providing the data based evidence to support or reject
these premises (causal links). According to Yin (2009) the explanation building in
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a case study proceeds as a set of ideas that are revised and augmented and the
final explanation is a result of a series of iterations:
An initial theoretical statement, in this case my model, is made about the
social behaviour under study;
The findings of the case are compared against the model;
The model is revised;
The details of the case are compared against the revision; and
The theoretical statement or model is revised again; and compared to
other cases, in this circumstance, in future research.
In this sense the final explanation may not be fully stipulated at the outset of
the study, but rather case study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are
refined and the evidence is examined again from the new perspective. Thus
explanation building is a “special” iterative case of pattern matching (Yin, 2009, p.
141).
Finally, I conducted a time series analysis in order to follow the many
patterns of behaviour suggested by my model. According to Yin, the more
intricate the pattern, the more that the time series analysis will lay a “firm
foundation for the conclusion of the study” (1989, p. 115). This analysis allowed
me to examine “how” and “why” questions about the relationships of my key
constructs as described by my premises. In this dissertation I suggest that interorganizational learning begins when practices associated with individual identities
bridge across identity conflict allowing a shift in emphasis to the more functional
socio-cognitive aspects of a conflict, without resolving the underlying conflict of
interest. My time series analysis begins with the events leading to the first direct
(in-person) engagement between salmon farmers and environmentalists in
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February 2003 and traces the patterns in identity, learning outcomes, and conflict
to November 2009 when a federal judicial inquiry into the Fraser River salmon
run was announced.
4.5.2 Preliminary Analysis
As suggested by Langley (1999) and Yin (2009) and outlined below, my
research analysis proceeded in multiple iterations as my data gathering
progressed. Consistent with Langley‟s (1999) recommendations for process
research, I took multiple approaches to the analysis. In the first stage, prior to
conducting my interviews, I constructed chronological lists of key events,
activities and interpretations of them, composed of ordered raw data (quotes from
interviews, newspaper articles, documents and field notes) (See Appendix A:
Detailed Chronology of Events in the BC Salmon Farming Industry, for a
summary). I further sorted these data by organization and other meaningful
categories such as industry and environmentalists. From this I composed a 37
page narrative as the first level of abstraction from the data. This narrative
highlighted the importance of relatively recent events to my research questions,
in particular the ascent and dominance of two issues, sea lice and closed
containment farming, and the subsequent negotiation and implementation of the
Framework.
My model stipulates that individual and organizational identities are
associated with learning so I went to the existing data to verify this. Focusing on
the two largest salmon farming companies, Marine Harvest and Mainstream, and
the environmental group, CAAR, I used self referential statements to categorize
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identity at both the individual and organizational levels. This analysis yielded
descriptions of the organizational identities as well as individual identities (see
Appendix G: Preliminary Analysis of Individual and Organizational Identities in the
Industry). I then developed a narrative describing the development and
implementation of the Framework up to 2007.
I then identified organizational learning activities and outcomes that had
occurred from the late 1990s to 2007, drawing primarily on the interview
transcripts in the existing data set. Again focusing on Marine Harvest,
Mainstream, and CAAR, I used two indicators to identify learning outcomes: (1)
evidence of changes to participant‟s existing knowledge about the situation or
about the other parties; and (2) evidence of changes to participants‟ patterns of
relating to each other and to other industry participants. Using the learning
literature as a guide, learning practices were identified as activities that supported
changes to either knowledge or behaviour (See Appendix H: Preliminary Analysis
of Learning Activities and Outcomes).This analysis formed the foundation for my
second stage of data gathering and analysis.
As suggested by Glaser & Strauss (1967), I overlapped data analysis and
data collection, making the data collection itself more flexible and rigorous. I kept
field notes and a learning journal and I recorded my ongoing impressions in my
learning journal as they occurred to me (Eisenhardt, 1989). I continually asked
myself “what is happening here?‟ and “how does this differ from other
responses?”. This helped me to speculate about emerging patterns and
relationships and to identify significant topics, patterns, themes, logical
inconsistencies and areas that need further exploration with respondents (Stiles,
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1993). In particular I was looking for evidence that identity had been activated,
with comments such as “we were looking for a new approach to the problem”. I
was also looking for evidence of links between my main constructs; such as
“when I put my science hat on I ...” which links an identity to an action. Because I
took a flexible approach to collecting data I was able to add data sources and
interview questions to probe emerging themes while following an overall
theoretical framework proposed in this thesis.
4.5.3 Data Coding
At the conclusion of my data gathering all data was analyzed using an initial
list of codes reflecting the constructs of the theoretical model I proposed in
Chapter 3. All data coding was done using NVivo 8, including the initial
categorization of the existing data set discussed in the preceding section.
Organizations and respondents were coded into “cases”, components of the
theoretical model were coded into “nodes”, the predicted relationships between
the components, described by my premises, were coded into “relationships” and
secondary data were coded into separate “free nodes”. The complete list of
cases, nodes, and relationships is in Appendix I: Complete list of Final Nodes,
Cases, and Relationships.
“Nodes” represent the meta-constructs: conflict, learning, and identity. Each
meta-construct includes the sub-constructs: individual and organizational or
collective level. In addition, the conflict, learning, and identity meta-constructs
include corresponding sub-constructs drawn from the prior literature and
developed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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I began coding by reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and
listening to the recordings and comparing them with the constructs and premises
presented in Chapters 2 and 3. I was looking for patterns and recurrent themes,
as per the pattern matching technique described above. As I worked through the
transcripts I was capturing my thoughts and ideas in notes and memos in NVivo.
I coded the data into preliminary sub-categories (Corbin & A. L. Strauss,
2008) retaining all sub-categories proposed by my model. As themes emerged
that had not been specified in my theoretical model I added nodes. These
emergent nodes formed the basis for refinement and augmentation of my model,
as discussed above. After coding was complete I proceeded with data mapping
and analysis.
4.5.4 Data Mapping
I analyzed the data within “cases” and across “cases” to obtain a common
pattern seen through multiple lenses (Eisenhardt, 1989). I did the data mapping
and analysis in three stages. First, I identified and mapped the codified data for
all organizations onto the conceptual model described in Chapter 3. In particular I
looked for themes relating the major constructs of organizational identity,
individual identities, conflict sources, individual learning, organizational learning,
and inter-organizational learning. I also sought to further refine the set of
contextual factors (i.e. conditions) that were found to be important and that had
changed. I focused first on the constructs (i.e. the nouns) and then examined the
processes and activities (i.e. the verbs) identified in my premises (C. Gersick,
personal communication, 2010).
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Second, I conducted an analysis of the organizations involved with the
Framework by developing a set of narratives based on the learning constructs
that provided the background about the organizations‟ learning activities and
learning outcomes over time (See Appendix J: Learning Activities and Outcomes
over Time). The purpose was to become intimately familiar with each
organization to allow the unique patterns of each organization to emerge before
analyzing the interactions. Two overarching learning trajectories emerged from
this analysis: learning that impacted internal operations and learning that
impacted inter-organizational relationships. These learning trajectories were
further analyzed and sorted into time periods according to key strategic
responses (i.e. extent of engagement) or a discernible shift in manager behaviour
(Jarzabkowski, 2008). These narratives served as context for a higher order
analysis related to my second research question regarding “how” organizations in
conflict learn from one another.
In the third stage, I focused on answering the research questions and
refining my model by identifying conditions and activities that enabled
organizations to bridge across conflict and tracing the relationship to interorganizational learning. Subsequent to identifying the time periods, I examined
patterns in the relationships between the different constructs (Trochim, 1989).
This analysis confirmed that under certain conditions common practices can help
individuals interact despite conflict and that repeated engagement mediates the
relationship between conflict and inter-organizational learning. To access
practices and praxis and conduct this analysis required the use of analytical tools
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amenable to the theoretical lens of the practice based view. I will describe them
and my analytic process in the following two sections.
4.5.5 Mapping of Statements into Practice and Praxis
As described above, practice represents shared routines of behaviour,
norms, procedures and artifacts, and can be considered as the product of
learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Gherardi, 2009).
Practices are carried out within a framework of procedures and expectations;
however the particular actions taken (praxis) are to some extent novel (Feldman
& Pentland, 2003). Praxis refers to the actual activities that make up, in this case,
the process of learning and may be operationalized at different levels and
through interactions between levels (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007).
It is inter-organizational learning practices that are often obtained in
quantitative surveys, usually divorced from their context. This research attempted
to uncover the actual activities or praxis supporting inter-organizational learning
in a particular context (i.e. conflict) using qualitative methods. Ideally, actual interorganizational learning activities would be accessed through ethnographic
methods, such as meeting observations (Yin, 2009) and methods specific to the
practice based view (Balogun, A. S. Huff, & P. Johnson, 2003). Since the limited
scope and duration of the doctoral dissertation process and the contentious
nature of the topic prevented me from collecting large amounts of observational
data, I employed additional analytic techniques to distil practice from the
respondents‟ statements during interviews.
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As discussed, I did, to the fullest extent possible, encourage my
respondents to support their statements with “stories” as recommended in
ethnographic interviewing (Spradley, 1979). Prior research has identified several
aspects of a narrative or “story” which would serve as evidence that events did in
fact take place (Auerbach, Trask, & Said, 1953). Details such as dates and
quantities, and references to specific external events are the main signs. In
addition Auberbach et al. (1953) distinguished between a “legend” and a
“historical account”. “A historical event … runs much more variously,
contradictorily, and confusedly”, while the “legend arranges its material in a
simple straightforward way” (Auerbach et al., 1953, pp. 19-20). In this context an
organization‟s learning regarding the practices of engagement with the enemy
would be recounted as “legend” whereas actual activities will sound more like
“historical accounts” with details, dates, characters, and disrupted flows.
Therefore to separate interview statements into practice (the product of learning)
and praxis (actual behavior, i.e. the activities that make up the process of
learning) I employed the following linguistic distinction (Zona, 2009).
The practice constructs were assessed based primarily on the answers to
general, normative, or open questions such as “How would you describe your
organization‟s actions in response to conflict?” or “Describe how your
organizations work together?” The praxis constructs were assessed based
primarily in the evidential statements in response to questions such as “Can you
give me an example that illustrates what you mean by that?” or “Where does it
take place?” In addition, artifacts, including newspaper articles, government
reviews, and annual reports, were examined for evidence of both practices

110
(institutionalized behaviour) and praxis (actual events). While my field work fell
short of full length ethnography, these analysis techniques combined with the
ethnographic interview techniques enabled me to distil a proxy of praxis in
support of inter-organizational learning from the interview data.
4.5.6 Role and Assessment of Activities
According to the practice based view (Whittington, 2006) organizational
learning (practice) becomes enacted (praxis) as a result of the activities that
practitioners perform. These activities in turn have an impact on practice and on
the practitioner (See Figure 3-1: A Framework for Analyzing Inter-Organizational
Learning as Practice). I argue that understanding the activities that individuals
enact when engaged, despite their conflict, can help us ascertain those activities
that support inter-organizational learning more generally.
To assess activities through which participants enact learning practices they
were asked specifics about “How they worked together?” and “What they did in
response to conflict?” for example. Although the assessments represent
individual perceptions and not precise measures of such activities their relative
frequency may serve as an approximation of their use and its shifts over repeated
interaction.
Following my data analysis relative to my proposed model, I coded patterns
of manager and organizational behaviour related to identity or to conflict during
each of the relevant time periods (determined in stage two) using a data
reduction process (Corbin & A. L. Strauss, 2008). This process is often used by
qualitative researchers (e.g. Maitlis, 2005) to move from descriptive codes to
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more conceptually abstract codes. I generated codes describing what managers
and the organizations did during the various time periods such as defending their
position, attacking the other organization, sharing information, assessing risk,
articulating needs, gathering information, negotiating process and so on. I then
reduced these descriptive codes to interpretive clusters (Miles & Huberman,
1994) according to whether they were similar or different in nature and intention.
To do this I followed Jarzabkowski (2008) and asked myself two questions. “Is
this code similar to that code?” helped in developing internally consistent clusters.
“Are theses codes different from those codes?” helped in ensuring the clusters
were distinct. The clusters were general in that each one appeared in multiple
time periods and therefore indicated behaviour that could occur in any time
period.
I developed three main clusters which seemed to emerge sequentially. The
first one involved a detachment or separation from aspects of the conflict or of
their identities that were both problematic and fixed, such as shifting focus away
from the conflict in values between salmon farming companies and
environmentalists and toward their common knowledge gap (i.e. the impact of
sea lice). I labeled this behaviour distancing to describe what both individual
managers and organizations were doing prior and during engagement with each
other. The second cluster, involved a matching of individuals and groups based
on those aspects of their respective identities that were compatible particularly
from a work practice or skill perspective. In this case, scientists were assigned to
design and manage research projects and conflict professionals such as
consultants and negotiators were tasked with managing the day to day
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relationship as well as any non-science conflicts that emerged in the projects. I
labeled this behaviour pairing to describe how individual practitioners engage.
The third cluster dealt with setting the rules for a specific engagement, such as a
research project, and involved negotiating both the procedures and the nature of
the interaction using the language and protocols according to the compatible
identities that had been paired for the engagement. I labeled this cluster rule
setting.
Finally, I compared the patterns in the nature of the interactions and the
conflict over the same time periods. In the period under study I identified three
cycles of distancing, pairing, and rule setting culminating in an experiment,
overall reduction in targeting in the media, and an increase in the extent of
experimentation. These patterns were not anticipated by my model but rather
emerged from the data.

4.6 Validity and Reliability
To ensure quality, empirical research needs to demonstrate the requisite
standards of validity and reliability for the methodology used. In qualitative
research, the quality or threshold of acceptability is ensured by maintaining
adequate standards for the research process itself. In particular, establishing
reliability and validity in case studies requires careful attention to the stages of
design, data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009). In this case study, I have relied
on Yin‟s perspective on standards for validity and reliability (2009, p. 41). Yin‟s
standards are widely used in academic research involving case studies and are
well respected. Reliability is established by providing a data trail through a well-
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organized case database. All relevant archival material has been scanned, and
with transcripts and notes, imported into an NVivo database. The intent is to
produce a dataset that would permit another researcher to duplicate the analysis.
Internal validity is established by the pattern-matching and explanationbuilding steps of the data analysis, supported by a reflective learning journal and
memos detailing the insights and relationships as they emerge from the data.
Part of this effort is identifying and eliminating alternative explanations that might
disconfirm emerging theoretical insights. As discussed previously, construct
validity of the findings is established by using multiple sources of data wherever
possible to triangulate; and by referring back to the chain of evidence in the
database. In addition, key participants from the organizations were asked to
review and comment on whether the findings are consistent with their view of
their behaviours. In addition, I reviewed my findings with an uninvolved
experienced researcher familiar with the industry and methods used. Finally, the
analytic generalizability of the findings to inter-organizational learning, conflict,
and identity theories is articulated (Yin, 2009, p. 43).
The reflective learning journal and notes are a key element of the data trail. I
made notes and impressions to augment transcripts immediately following every
meeting or discussion, and I reviewed recordings and notes together at the end
of the day. My learning journal was kept in One Note and imported into NVivo.
As described in this section, I used multiple data-gathering approaches to
support and triangulate the findings. Interviews were the primary source of data,
while newspaper articles and government and third party documents were
important for understanding the context, issues and background of the

114
interviewees, and gaining alternative perspectives. As I analyzed the interviews, I
consulted my field notes and the documents for additional confirmation of my
findings. I was able to build the reliability and integrity of my data analysis by
combining and triangulating these sources (Jick, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Table 4-4: Study Validity and Reliability summarizes the steps that I have taken
to ensure this dissertation‟s accuracy, replicability, and generalizability.
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Table 4-4: Study Validity and Reliability
Standard

Measures to be used in Case Method

This Dissertation

Construct validity

Use multiple sources of evidence to achieve
triangulation

Used media reports, interviews,
observations, archival data and third party
reports.

Establish chain of evidence

This chapter outlines the path taken from the
initial research questions to the case study
conclusions. Sources of evidence cited in
Table 4.1.

Have key informants review draft case study
report

Preliminary findings were discussed with
some respondents and conclusions were
shared with key contacts.

Do pattern matching

Patterns were identified and matched over
subsequent time periods. From this
explanations were developed and compared
to rival explanations as described in Chapter
5.

Internal Validity

Do explanation building
Address rival explanation
Do time series analysis
External validity

Analytic generalization in single case studies Findings are generalized to broader interorganizational learning theory in Chapter 6

Reliability

Develop case study database

The database was developed and is
comprised of interview transcripts, media
reports, third party reports, and other case
study documents, summary reports.

Establish chain of evidence

See above
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS
My model suggests that under certain conditions the identities and learning
of the individuals engaged over a conflict and the identity and learning of their
respective organizations will interact, impacting their behaviour and their interorganizational learning. Previous research has independently identified
relationships between identity and conflict, conflict and learning, and learning and
identity as well as several contextual factors that promote inter-organizational
learning. In this research I examine these relationships within a context of an
ongoing conflict to determine the role that identity plays in inter-organizational
learning, across the individual and collective levels. In addition, I analyze the
dynamics of these relationships over time to explain the social processes through
which inter-organizational learning occurs and the conditions that favour its
occurrence. This chapter provides an overview of the findings of my research.
The data are presented to refine, confirm, and challenge the five premises on
which my model is based, and to illustrate its constructs and relationships with
concrete empirical examples (Lawrence, 1999). I begin with an overview of the
case study.

5.1 The Case Study
I studied the relationship between identity, conflict, and learning by
examining an extreme case of learning between “enemies” in the salmon farming
industry in British Columbia, Canada (BC). The industry was plagued with
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conflict, reflected in government industry reviews, passage of strict regulations,
increasingly negative media coverage, growing enmity of several First Nations,
and increasingly sophisticated attacks by environmentalists, especially the
Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR). The typical response of the
salmon farming companies, i.e., the industry norm, was to deny, dismiss or in
some way discredit their critics and in particular CAAR‟s claims and to position
themselves as economic saviours of coastal communities.
By 2000 the industry was dominated by larger foreign owned firms, Stolt
Sea Farms (Stolt), PanFish, Mainstream, and Marine Harvest. Marine Harvest, in
contrast to the low profile adopted by Cermaq ASA and the other major firms,
referred to itself as a socially responsible company and had publicized the extent
of its investment in BC. This was consistent with the collaborative and
environmentally responsible identity of its Dutch parent company, Nutreco. As
Heikki a Nutreco corporate manager said “Dialogue is important to build trust ...
you can only find a solution when you put different people with different
backgrounds and different views of the world together... not the different
disciplines within one company, but the NGOs and the government
representatives and the scientists”.
Stolt, a Norwegian firm and the largest salmon farming company globally,
was described by managers as an accountable, ethical, private company
engaged in “cooperative research and development on ecosystem principles” and
in its 2003 annual report committed “to follow our own conscience and set our
own high standards”. As one manager observed “Stolt was quieter … had a very
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high level of accountability, very good ethics and very profitable … but no so out
there and not so much into the social issues”.
Members of CAAR describe the organization as a cooperative, logical,
strategic organization, typified by this comment by Donna a CAAR leader, “We
got together into a group and said, ... we have to make the sum greater than the
individual parts... by having everybody pool all their information and work
collaboratively we‟re able to take it (sea lice) ... to being one of the most
prominent environmental issues in BC”. In describing how CAAR develops a
position, Harry (a senior CAAR member) said “it has to be based on science and
it has to be rational and you can use a million different tactics to deliver that
message, some people use irrational tactics but the message can still be
rational.”
These key organizations in the BC salmon farming industry all identified with
deutero-learning processes (Schon, 1986) such as scientific research and
development, and collaboration; this was evident in their public and private
statements as well as in their behaviour. All organizations, including CAAR,
participated in joint research initiatives with university and independent research
institutes. All shared the common goal of identifying ways to make salmon
farming more sustainable: the companies from a fish health and profitability
perspective and CAAR from the perspective of minimizing damage to the marine
environment.
Over time, primarily as a result of actions by CAAR members, conflict over
one issue came to dominate interactions between the salmon farming companies
and their critics – the extent to which salmon farms amplified the affects of sea
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lice on wild salmon. Each side of the debate supported their position with
“science” and all claimed to be acting in the interest of marine habitat protection
(Young & Matthews, 2010). In June 2004, under the threat of reactive and
probably punitive regulation, two senior Stolt managers in Canada, both marine
biologists by training, took action and hired a consultant to contact CAAR to
negotiate an information sharing agreement. The Stolt managers were motivated
to ensure forthcoming regulation was fair and supported by good research. This
was a significant departure from industry and company norms, for while Stolt
actively participated in collaborative research projects with universities and
research institutes, it had not worked directly with environmental groups before
anywhere in the world. Colin, one of the Stolt managers, described the intent of
the initial contact as, “let‟s learn together, let‟s share information, let‟s be as
transparent as we can be within the context of business and let‟s let the science
complete its work so that we‟re basing any policy decision on good solid science.”
Stolt‟s offer of greater transparency gave CAAR access to information
hitherto unavailable to environmentalists. While CAAR members acknowledged
Stolt‟s self interest in approaching them, they also recognized an opportunity to
gain access to proprietary knowledge of salmon farming that might be used to
advance their agenda. Harry, the head of CAAR‟s science committee, and an
ecologist by training, describes CAAR‟s motivation to “hopefully pinpoint some
common understandings around lack of information and embark on some
increased level of analysis and some pure science work that would inform the
debate.”
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Stolt and CAAR agreed to share the cost of a professional mediator to
facilitate their interactions, thus demonstrating their commitment to the process.
With discussions proceeding in private, Stolt began posting sea-lice and water
quality data on its web-site as “an educational opportunity for both researchers
and the general public”, providing further evidence of their commitment to new
behaviour. When Marine Harvest purchased Stolt in 2005, the private talks
continued, culminating in the “Framework for Dialogue” agreement in January
2006. (See Appendix K: Summary of the Framework for Dialogue)
The individuals involved in developing The Framework possessed a range
of common social and role identities, biologists predominantly, but also coastal
community residents and environmental issue consultants. Each possessed a
“repertoire of selves” but most importantly they were able to coalesce around the
identity of “scientist” interested in protecting the marine habitat for salmon in BC.
While this identity had hitherto differentiated them, the identity discrepant
feedback from escalating environmentalist attacks, threats of punitive regulation,
along with the acquisition by an organization identified with collaboration, created
the organizational identity instability necessary for the Marine Harvest/Stolt
representatives to activate different aspects of their scientist identity and
consciously enact new behaviours. Also the presence of issue consultants
allowed the “scientists” to delegate day to day administrative issues and to focus
on the science based projects. By emphasizing the scientist identity in their
interactions individuals could experiment with new cooperative behaviour without
changing their beliefs. The identity of “scientist” also appeared to offer enough
ambiguity to allow the individuals and organizations to agree on actions and

121
enough specificity to provide some guidance to the conduct of those actions i.e.
experimental protocols.
Critically, the individuals involved in the development of the agreement
identified with the learning aspects of their organizational identity. For example
Donna, described CAAR as “the best coalition I‟ve ever worked with in my life.
It‟s phenomenal. We‟ve met every two months for going on seven years, and
always consensus... I always say it‟s an honour to work with that group.” In
addition, the private development of the Framework agreement gave the
individuals the safety, the support and the time to experiment with new
behaviours, as opposed to merely complying with forced behavioural change.
Once the Framework had been developed, the individuals and organizations
held each other accountable to behave according to its stipulations, which were
built around five scientific investigations. They had thus begun the process of
moving away from using the end products of science as a weapon against each
other to using the scientific process as the mechanism through which they could
cooperatively pursue their own research agendas. “Science” continued to provide
a neutral identity with which all parties (individuals and organizations) could
identify and it facilitated the articulation of each organization‟s concerns and
goals. By focusing on the projects, individuals directed their attention, with the
help of a mediator, towards process and interaction and away from their opposing
interests and value differences. The emphasis on scientific research also
provided sufficient ambiguity to allow the group to agree on action while retaining
whatever individual beliefs that were needed to reach consensus.
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The Framework process between Marine Harvest and CAAR was
enthusiastically supported by local institutions, in particular the local and
provincial governments.
PanFish acquired Marine Harvest in February 2006, becoming the world‟s
largest salmon farming company. After several months of uncertainty with regard
to its future direction, the company publicly declared its continued support of the
Dialogue and subsequently consolidated all of its aquaculture operations under
the name Marine Harvest promising to continue the practice of “leading the way
with innovation and responsibility”.
In just over a year, the level of trust and the nature of the interaction
between the individuals involved and the organizations had changed as a result
of the Framework. Moreover, knowledge about the sea lice issue appeared to
have advanced due to the willingness of CAAR and Marine Harvest to work
together and a peer reviewed article on sea lice incorporating Marine Harvest
data was published in 2007.
Over time, the Marine Harvest and CAAR personnel that negotiated the
Framework became less directly involved in its implementation, and day to day
project activities were assumed by scientists and issue consultants/managers
from both organizations. In preparation for hiring contract researchers, scientists
from both organizations worked together on an ad hoc basis to agree on project
scope, terms of reference, timelines, selection criteria, proposal assessments and
most critically a common list of preferred researchers. Simultaneously, an issue
consultant working on behalf of Marine Harvest and a senior manager hired by
CAAR, managed day to day aspects of the relationship such as budgets,
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schedules, fee payments, miscommunications and breaches in communications
protocols.
Early in 2008, Marine Harvest representatives in the Framework, in
conjunction with other functional areas within the company such as production
and sales, developed a coordinated area management plan (CAMP) for the
Broughton Archipelago. The proposed plan would provide data to compare sea
lice infestation between a farm free corridor and a corridor with salmon farms.
This plan directly addressed a hope that Harry, the head of CAAR‟s science
committee had expressed in 2007.
While Harry and the members of the CAAR negotiating committee were
enthusiastic, several other members of CAAR were opposed to any plan that
sanctioned salmon farming anywhere in the Broughton Archipelago. Their
identities, as well as the identities of their organizations, were closely tied to the
elimination of salmon farming in open net pens in the area. Condoning it, even for
the purpose of gathering experimental data was just too inconsistent with what
they deemed to be one of the central, distinctive and enduring aspects of their
organizations. The CAAR organization fragmented and four member
organizations withdrew, including the Raincoast Conservation Society and the
First Nations.
Marine Harvest and CAAR implemented CAMP together. In July 2009, the
organizations made a joint press release, crediting their jointly managed and
monitored program with reduced sea lice levels in the Broughton Archipelago
(Lavoie, 2009). The program was characterized as a “rare” collaboration and
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Colin of Marine Harvest called the announcement historic “in that it marks the first
time that former adversaries have come forward in agreement."
In summary, Stolt viewed itself as a collaborative research organization
particularly within the aquaculture research and development community.
However, Stolt was private and focused in their approach to consultation. They
consulted directly and privately with organizations with recognized expertise, until
the sea lice issue. The extent of the feedback around the sea lice issue prompted
Stolt to behave differently and contact CAAR. Marine Harvest also viewed itself
as a collaborative research organization. However, they consistently enacted
their identity as a facilitator of dialogue, especially when confronted with a new
situation or a problem. They interacted widely and publically in the industry, with
government and with stakeholder groups. CAAR, in a similar vein, refers to itself
as a collaborative organization that is able to navigate/negotiate difficult
relationships and coordinate research. The alignment between key behavioural
aspects of the organizational identities of Stolt and later Marine Harvest and
CAAR supported and sustained experimental learning. Over time the
organizations appear to have integrated some of their learning, at least with
regard to this method of knowledge creation (peer reviewed articles, new joint
venture pursuing further research). What started out as experimental behaviour
change that was undertaken without cognitive change (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995),
appears to have prompted some cognitive change and a shift in identities.
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5.2 Premise 1: Inter-Related
The evidence from the salmon farming industry in BC shows that conflict,
learning, and identity are related, in that one influences the formation of the
others primarily through the activities of individuals (praxis) and through the
routines of organizations (practice). While conflict is inter-related to identity and
learning, it did not appear to be embedded in praxis and practice in the same
way. Conflict appears to act as a stimulus and to influence identity and learning
through praxis and practice. In other words the data showed that identity and
learning are embedded in actions and that conflict influences their formation
through the actions taken in response to conflict (see Figure 5-1: Conflict
Influences Identity & Learning through Praxis & Practice). In the following
sections I illustrate these relationships by describing an example of each in detail.

Collective /
Organization

Individual
Conflict

Practice

Identity

Learning

Praxis

Identity

Learning

Figure 5-1: Conflict Influences Identity & Learning through Praxis &
Practice
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5.2.1 Praxis
Every interviewee directly involved in the BC salmon farming industry as a
company employee, an environmentalist, or as a government regulator, provided
some evidence demonstrating how their learning and identity are reflected in their
actions in response to conflict or how their actions in turn influence the conflict as
well as their identity and learning. Their actions, when stimulated by conflict,
expressed their identities or their learning or both and their actions in turn
influenced their understanding of themselves and/or the situation.
The account of a former biologist, researcher, First Nations liaison, and
communications manager at Marine Harvest provides an example of these
relationships. Lana has experienced the catalytic character of the conflict created
by the environmental groups and First Nations on her learning (Argyris & Schon,
1978): “They make my job easier. Like if I want to do things better … it doesn‟t
hurt to have that pressure.” She recognizes that the tension created by the
conflict provides impetus for her learning.
In turn, Lana‟s learning, from her previous roles as a fish health biologist,
and in research and production development, and environmental management
within Marine Harvest, influences her actions with regard to conflict laden issues.
In particular her role identity, as a technical staff member, compels her to
categorize the aspects of the conflict that are based on misconceptions versus
the issues that have been corroborated. In doing so she is able to separate the
more identity based aspects of the conflict from the more socio-cognitive aspects:
“… coming from that scientific biology background … it has helped a lot for
me. I‟ve been able to really kind of navigate my way through a lot of the
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myths and the misconceptions … as the industry becomes more and more
sophisticated, it‟s more difficult, I need to have backup but I can speak to
most topics with some degree of certainty”
Lana‟s identity as a biologist, albeit a former biologist, is embedded in her
efforts to separate “the myths and misconceptions” from the substantiated data
related to the issues as well as her recognition that she may need back-up as
science has advanced. In this way her learning is associated with her identity.
Additionally, what Lana does not consider part of her identity influences her
learning, in particular the “filter and mold” through which she views successful
relationships, as evidenced by this comment:
“And also too – and I‟ve said this in different First Nations communities and
I‟ve said it internally, I‟m not really wedded to the white European man‟s
idea of a business model. I don‟t really have a lot of loyalty to that.”
Lana‟s broad range of work experience, and the attendant learning,
supports her identity as a boundary spanner. As she notes, “I build bridges”.
Additionally, her social identity as a community member influences how and with
whom she reaches out to. For example:
“… my son goes to school with the son of the councilor who had opposed
fish farming but when we see each other on the soccer field we can actually
talk about it because we‟re there on the soccer field together.”
Lana‟s identities as a community member and “soccer mom” are embedded
in her civil behaviour toward the local councilor. In this way the conflict that might
be associated with her other identities does not influence this interaction.
However, her courteous response to local opponents of salmon farming stands in
sharp contrast to her response to people outside of her community that are
opposed to salmon farming:
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“… sports (fishermen), commercial (fishermen), First Nations … listening to
those people or working with those people I can spend all day … But then I
tell you, where I lose patience is for the flown in environmentalists, you
know. The 20-year-old that‟s never lived outside Kitslano, coming up here
and ranting, you know. And those are the people that set the steam going
off on top of my head. But for most people it‟s complicated.”
This situation demonstrates how Lana‟s identity and learning inter-relate
and are embedded in her actions (praxis) in response to conflict. As a member of
a coastal community on Vancouver Island, she is mindful of the issues of her
neighbours and “with those people I can spend all day”. She is respectful of their
“passion” and open to addressing any issues that she can. However, as a coastal
community member she loses patience with the “flown in environmentalists”
which she stereotypes and dismisses as “the 20 year old that‟s never lived
outside of Kitslano” (a fashionable area of metro Vancouver). Her identity and
learning as a coastal community resident are expressed through her willingness
to meet with other local residents and work through the complexity of the issues
regardless of the conflict. Her identity and learning are also expressed through
her unwillingness to spend time with or to acknowledge the position of outsiders
to her community. In this way the actions through which she expresses her
identity and learning, in turn influence the extent and what she is able to learn
from others.
Lana‟ experience demonstrates that identity and learning are embedded in
praxis, and in turn influence praxis. Specifically, the actions taken in response to
conflict by an individual practitioner that express her identity and learning, such
as a community member‟s civility towards a neighbor, a biologist‟s need for
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substantiated information on an issue, or a salmon farming employee‟s enmity
toward environmentalists, influence her behaviour related to conflict.
For representative quotes from a selection of interviewees, see: Table 5-1:
Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Praxis.
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Table 5-1: Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Praxis
Individual
Identity

Identity & Learning
Embedded in Praxis

Biologist, salmon “I visited relatives that in the
farmer, Former
1970s were growing salmon
regulator
in fiords in Norway and I
realized how similar it was
to British Columbia and at
that time I had an interest in
wild salmon, wild salmon
management, wild salmon
biology and so I gravitated
when I got back to British
Columbia and I continued to
work with wild salmon, both
habitat and salmon biology.
I found myself gravitating
towards production, artificial
production both for federal
government hatcheries and
later on into this industry.”
“… my focus is on both
doing and helping to
manage the programs that
are put in place to ensure
that we are compliant with
whatever regulations are
currently in place but it‟s
much larger than that
because regulations are
never enough …”

Praxis in Response to
Conflict
“I‟m in my fifties. If we were
all starting in our twenties
today, we wouldn‟t think twice
about working with these
people. We would start
working with them, with these
groups at the outset rather
than waiting until the
animosity builds to a point.”
“… that‟s human nature that
you don‟t want to adopt and
work with the other person
who has a competing
hypothesis; it‟s almost
tantamount to saying oh, well,
I don‟t even believe my
hypothesis anymore.”
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Individual
Identity

Identity & Learning
Embedded in Praxis

Praxis in Response to
Conflict

Biologist,
communications
manager, salmon
farmer

“… worked in research and
production, salt water and
fresh water, and then I kind
of specialized into
production support, being
environmental management
and working with … and it
fell out that I had an affinity
to work with people and
also the communications
part so I just kind of
naturally started to gravitate
towards that.”

“It was so funny, you know,
my daughter in kindergarten,
her teacher asked her what
her mom did for a living, she
said my mom is a biologist.
Oh so what does she do?
She goes, “Well she builds
bridges.” Because at the
dinner table I was talking to
my husband saying, “We‟ve
got to find a way to build a
bridge between the wild and
the farmed …” Isn‟t that
funny? She thought that‟s
what I did for a living. I build
bridges.”

“… but the getting there,
the dialogue getting there
was – I thought –
refreshing. It‟s why I like
the job because it‟s more
real. You‟re not … you‟re
actually having real
interactions with people
rather than kind of putting
on … you sit down and put
this mask on, you put that
mask on, you go through
this, this and this step. And
politically correct. You
know it‟s really awkward.”

“It‟s tough but actually most of
the time I find that if you just
don‟t take it personally and
actually listen, if you actually
sit there and listen to people
it‟s not that bad… people are
upset and they‟re angry but
they‟re not upset and angry at
me as a person. There‟s very
little personal insults that …
that doesn‟t really happen....
It‟s quite respectful generally.”
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Individual
Identity

Identity & Learning
Embedded in Praxis

Praxis in Response to
Conflict

Ecologist,
Environmentalist

“I‟m an ecologist … There‟s
piece after piece after piece
that builds your case, and
your case has to be solid
and it has to be based on
science and it has to be
rational and you can use a
million different tactics to
deliver that message...”

“It‟s certainly the best
coalition I‟ve ever been in. I
mean in some of these
coalitions there tends to be a
bit of infighting in terms of
publicity and funds. But it‟s
like a sparrow at a pile of
feed. When you put all the
feed in one small pile, there
tends to be lots of fighting;
when you spread it out and
make sure there‟s enough
food for everybody, there
tends to be less fighting.”

“We rely on the Internet a
heck of a lot to get the
information out. We do
regular updates to people.
When we go to give talks
we get sign up sheets from
people and we add them to
an update list. When I
published this paper I sent
the media release out to
about 1,000 people on my
list. Then those people will
send it out. So it‟s kind of a
viral approach in getting
information out. And then
there‟s some critical mass
of information when people
just say, you know there‟s
no question anymore that
there‟s problems here and
we need to deal with these
things… But we‟re trying to
do it in a way that‟s
information-based and
accurate, and not just shrill.”

“They know that sometimes
their support is a bit tenuous
from government and they
know that the science isn‟t on
their side for a lot of these
things too … they‟re focused
on the bottom line, and when
you say you‟ve got to spend
more money to protect the
environment it‟s a tough sell. I
think genuinely a lot of these
people believe on the level …
the managers in Campbell
River, for instance, believe
these changes have to be
made but they have to
answer to their parent
offices.” (empathy for salmon
farmers)
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Individual
Identity

Identity & Learning
Embedded in Praxis

Environmentalist, “… so, that‟s one of my jobs
Strategist,
in this with the negotiating
Lawyer
committee is to step back
and say, ok, yes, that‟s a
really important issue guys.
Work it out because then
we need to come back up to
here and we need to talk
about the closed
containment funding or we
need to talk about fallow
routes for 2010. So, let‟s
stay focused on the big
picture.”
“ I don‟t really do the
monitoring. I‟m not a
scientist, right, so that‟s
where Harry from our
negotiating team would
meet with Stephanie a lot
because Stephanie‟s the
lead on that and, so, they
actually kind of go up and
do it and then we just get
reports back.”

Praxis in Response to
Conflict
“We‟ve had times where I‟ve
definitely had to lash out
when things aren‟t working…
our meetings are sometimes
small and sometimes it‟s all of
us. Like, today, I was
meeting with Colin by phone.”
“ My expertise would be more
the... I have a good
relationship with Colin... I tend
to just take a different
approach with him. So, he
and I just have a good
working relationship. You
know, one of the ways we
play off is there‟s one person
on the negotiating team who
tends to just look at the
downside of everything. So,
she can just nit-pick
everything that could go
wrong, where I‟m like, well,
here‟s all the opportunity. So,
it balances well. So, I just
have a role because when I
meet with him I don‟t say
everything that can go wrong.
I just say oh, ok...”
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5.2.2 Practice
All of the salmon farming and environmental organizations that I interviewed
provided evidence demonstrating how their organizations‟ learning and identities
are reflected in their practices: the frameworks of institutionalized procedures and
expectations. Additionally, they provided evidence of how those practices guided
the actions of individuals when they were stimulated by conflict. The data show
that these actions subsequently influenced the conflict as well as the
organization‟s identity and learning.
The experiences of Mainstream and its parent company Cermaq ASA, a self
described sustainable aquaculture company provides an example of these
relationships. Cermaq, including Mainstream, is characterized by its focus on
financial stability and its sense of responsibility to its shareholders and direct
stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, communities of operation). An
industrial and until recently private company, Cermaq prides itself on being a
leader in aquaculture operations and an innovator through the research done in
its feed division, EWOS.
Cermaq experienced the momentum that conflict can provide for learning
when in 2003 it went in breach of the terms and conditions of its bank loans. This
situation created conflict between Cermaq and its banks in that the bank‟s actions
obstructed Cermaq from acting. This situation impelled Cermaq to focus attention
on the very basics of operations and all geographic regions of the company
successfully implemented new husbandry practices and monitoring practices. As
Angus, a senior manager in BC describes:
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“We made a decision that we would completely revamp our practices,
starting with the very, very basics of husbandry and the way that we were
going to grow our product…”
“… we know it down to the penny and we could take it even further than
that … I could tell you to the half cent what it‟s costing us. And even less.
So we‟ve become very refined at our financial management. We‟ve become
very good at monitoring our costs, growing an exceptional good product…”
When confronted with a financial crisis, Cermaq took action to improve and
control its internal operations. These actions resulted in the institutionalization of
procedures and processes that support ongoing learning and renewal. This
demonstrates how Cermaq‟s learning in this situation was associated with its
identity as a sustainable company and is embedded in its actions. Cermaq
recognized that the urgency created by their financial crisis prompted them to
change their behaviour and subsequently their beliefs in order to “regain their
financial freedom”. The conflict provided both the stimulus and the momentum
for the organization‟s learning and for a concrete understanding of sustainability.
Cermaq‟s vision of sustainability is rooted in its longstanding emphasis on
financial and operational solidity (Cermaq, 2001). As Erling, the former Deputy
CEO of Cermaq, states “of course, the prominent stakeholder is the
shareholders. And if you don‟t make money you‟re not sustainable, because then
they‟ll go somewhere else”. This notion is echoed in the comments of Angus and
Karin, both senior managers in Mainstream, BC:
“We take the long-term view and act responsibly ... sustainability also
means running a profitable business, where we balance risks and
opportunities based on our recognized strengths”
“our focus, again is on the three pillars ... the environmental, the social and
the economic – because they all have to work together … but we can‟t
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forget about the economic because without that we don‟t have the other
two. So, we try and balance it … if you don‟t have the economics ... you‟re
not going to be able to support the social or the environmental.”
This central and enduring feature of the organization compels it to
emphasize financial stability and to give most attention to those that impact its
financial position. In this way Cermaq‟s identity influences its practice (actions)
with regard to conflict situations. In particular, its identity as a financially
sustainable organization means it does not expend effort on trying to persuade
critics that do not impact its financial performance directly. Having satisfied its
shareholders and direct stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers,
and the communities where it operates, that it is sustainable, Cermaq does not
feel obligated to directly engage with secondary stakeholders. As Erling
describes:
“what we‟re doing… we live by what we learn, and we communicate on what
we do... Then the NGOs … must judge themselves, where they think we
are sustainable … because we (believe) from inside that our business is
sustainable.”
This approach is echoed by Angus, when discussing Mainstream Canada‟s
ISO environmental certification:
“I haven‟t put it in a press release, I haven‟t put it on any of our letterheads,
boxes … I got asked that today at a management meeting and I said … “It‟s
for us. It‟s for you to know and be able to feel proud of the fact that you
know that you have a certification at that level … We haven‟t flaunted it or
haven‟t put it all over our boxes or anything like that.” … we‟re one step
closer to our ultimate goal and that‟s to be … 100% sustainable.”
Mainstream in BC approaches the conflict created by criticism from
environmentalists in much the same way. Angus describes:
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“… we keep a very low key, Mainstream. We don‟t put our head in the
press and we don‟t get ourselves out there and make a lot of statements.
You don‟t hear commercials in the local TV about us. That‟s not our job.
Our job is to grow fish…”
Cermaq‟s identity is embedded in its reluctance at both the corporate and
the operating division level to take action via the media to persuade NGOs and
other secondary stakeholders that they are sustainable and responsible. It is
enough that its members and its direct stakeholders know that to be the case. In
this way Cermaq‟s identity, and those it identifies as it legitimate stakeholders,
influences its practice (actions) in response to conflict.
Moreover, Cermaq‟s identity as a sustainable aquaculture company, as it
defines the term, is supported by its learning in the form of processes,
procedures, and expectations. Erling, the former Deputy CEO, explains the
learning activities that Cermaq undertook to further develop its practices beyond
financial sustainability:
“… all the managers in our company, meeting about 50 people worldwide,
to, together, establish the foundation for our agriculture business… which
ended up in something that we call our Passport for Sustainable
Aquaculture, which established our values and how we look at our
operations, as to the values for people and also for stakeholders, and how
to manage by this … This passport was … given to every employee in the
company. And you will always find this posted in every operation that we
have ... So this is what we live by.”
This situation demonstrates how Cermaq‟s identity and learning inter-relate
and are embedded in its practice (actions). As an innovative company it is
knowledgeable in planning processes and in change management techniques, as
evidenced by the way it has disseminated the Passport for Sustainable
Aquaculture through the organization. Cermaq‟s learning and identity as a
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company that is responsive to its direct stakeholders (i.e. employees) is
expressed through its practice of engaging with managers from all parts of the
organization to determine its “values” and how to manage by those values. In the
“Passport for Sustainability” Cermaq explicitly acknowledges the importance of
employees, suppliers, customers, and communities to the sustainability of its
business. Also the company specifies processes and expectations related to
these relationships. The actions through which Cermaq elaborated its identity
influenced both what it learned and the groups from which it was able to learn
(i.e. direct stakeholders).
The experience of Cermaq, including Mainstream, demonstrates that
identity and learning are embedded in practice and in turn influence practice,
when the organization responds to conflict. The actions taken by an organization,
via the behaviour of it members, that express its organizational identity and
learning, such as a financially sustainable organization‟s meticulous cost control,
a responsive organization‟s attention to shareholders, or an innovative
organizations engagement of diverse managers, in turn influence its behaviour
related to conflict.
For representative quotes from a selection of interviewees see: Table 5-2:
Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Practice.
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Table 5-2: Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Practice
Organization

Identity & Learning Embedded in Practices in Response to
Practices
Conflict

Marine
Harvest

“I think it was just a maturation
process … We just didn‟t get it.
And then when it hit us in the face
then we reacted. First we reacted
by pushing back really hard and
being outraged and indignant …
and attacking the NGOs and
attacking their credibility. And then
we saw ourselves as small
community-based businesses and
farmers and biologists, we didn‟t
see ourselves as big international
corporations… We thought you
know people would just listen to
us, they would just see. Like I
said, we‟re good people. And we
were naïve about that too.” Lana
“Stolt Sea Farm … in the past was
involved in the research and
development that went into
understanding the underpinnings
of the ecosystem principles that
were put under stress through the
various kinds of impacts. In order
to determine where the thresholds
of change would be that would
help lead to the necessary controls
in order to safeguard the
environment” Colin
“… everyone‟s got their different
perspective, not just companies,
but people within those companies
that have influence on their
communication plans or their
stakeholder engagement.
Everybody‟s got a different tactic.”
Rob

“And we have to get our act
together and make sure that we
innovate in the right way to
ensure we have a sustainable
business. And we‟re still not
there, but we are on the right
track. And whether we share
that and acknowledge our
willingness to do a better job
and innovate from year to year
to year, it is time to look for
ways to cooperate with others.
Heikki
“On the basis of the dialogue,
we moved into cooperation with
others, the more consultative
NGOs. This is also a very
important, already in 2002 …
We took this opportunity in 2002
to share with stakeholders …
we need to cooperate and work
together to innovate, for the
food security of this planet. And
the fact that fisheries has
reached also its boundaries, we
have to develop an aquaculture
industry. And we have to do it
in a responsible way, and it has
to be managed sustainably. We
need it. So let‟s now work
together, and that was a
message that was finally
appreciated by our
stakeholders. Not digging in
deeper on the issues or bringing
up other issues, or saying what
are you talking about, but just
acknowledging that there are
some issues and we have to
work together, we haven‟t
solved anything yet, but this is a
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Organization

Identity & Learning Embedded in Practices in Response to
Practices
Conflict
dynamic industry, with lots of
innovation, and every year we
get better.” Heikki

CAAR

“So we invited the organizations
that were interested in this issue,
and we sat around for a year and
worked out our plan to put in a
major proposal to the Foundations
to fund this coalition and these
activities. And it‟s become far
more sophisticated since we sat
down, I believe it was 2000 that we
sat down for the first time. And
there‟s been a lot of changeover in
terms of the membership – the
people, not the organization. But
we initially had a one-year
facilitated group of meetings to
come up with a plan and our
protocols and how we would
operate and work together and
what teams we‟d put together and
all that stuff.” Harry
“And CAAR is an incredible
coalition. I mean there‟s nine
groups. We work by consensus.
We do our strategic planning as a
unit together and we have a very
strong commitment to the goals
that we set out. So when we then
go and interact with the larger
groups we stay very focused on
those goals and on how the
interaction with the larger
international campaigns can either
better fit or undermine those
goals.” Donna
“… we have, essentially a
committee structure in CAAR …so
we had initially a negotiating
committee which was brokering the
original framework agreement with
Marine Harvest. And now that

““So CAAR as a coalition uses a
range of means. Some groups
are more involved than others,
but clearly we‟ve also used
direct advertising that has a very
hard-hitting value. Ads in the
New York Times and Los
Angeles Times, things like that.
And of course we also have a
broad list of supporters of the
David Suzuki Foundation who
we contact regularly through
email lists and our website, and
ask to take various actions,
either with their local retailers or
with their elected officials.” Gord
“And so the relationships are
collegial, most of the time.
There are occasionally conflicts.
But maintaining the open
communication, bringing in
outside facilitation when it‟s
needed, and just sticking to the
most important issues is really I
suppose what you might call our
approach. Our strategy is to
use the best information and the
most effective groups to bolster
each other rather than trip each
other up.” Gord
“Working and living in a fishing
community, we have
unbelievable support … from
this whole community. I don‟t
think you‟d see anyone in this
community want to buy farmed
salmon.” Donna
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Identity & Learning Embedded in Practices in Response to
Practices
Conflict
committee … continues to monitor
the fulfillment of the agreement.
And then there‟s a science
committee working specifically on
the sea lice issue, and then there‟s
a closed containment committee
working on the closed containment
issue.” Gord

Mainstream/

“People tend to link us with
resource industries. That‟s not the
case. We‟re farmers. We‟re
agriculture. We have more in
common with agriculture in terms
of farming cattle or the whole
husbandry issue ... I don‟t know
where that came from, but we keep
getting linked and compared.”
Karin

Cermaq

“We‟ve also identified what we call
„local community acceptance‟ and
that‟s very important – and
different from the NGOs – that‟s
the local impact. To make an
example in BC, with the First
Nations… Very different
perspectives. Because when we
look into local communities, it‟s
very much about “how does this
impact the local community?””
Erling

“I think there‟s two things we do
(to influence stakeholders), we
live by what we learn, and we
communicate on what we do...
Then the NGOs or the
stakeholders must judge
themselves, where they think
we are sustainable ... This is
how we want to do it, and we
will by communication,
demonstrate that we are
keeping to what we say.” Erling

“… gave us media exposure to
the extent that we didn‟t have,
didn‟t experience before, and
that was a good change
[laughter]. An education,
learning, it was very good for
learning. I think that meant
something to us about being
aware on the communication
side, because we came from a
“…. Another important thing is our much more silent environment
… agriculture… It was not very
R&D activities... I think in fact our
controversial at all, and we‟re
R&D company is one of the
biggest private research operations not trained to handle these
kinds of situations.” Erling
within the business. They also
have the sustainability mission as
the core value … ensuring us … to
being able to handle further growth
on sustainable premises.”Terje
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5.3 Premise 2: Multi-Level Impacts
The data on the salmon farming industry in BC shows that in addition to
being inter-related with each other within the individual level and collective level,
conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across the individual and collective
levels via feedback and feed forward mechanisms (Crossan et al., 1999). I will
define and illustrate feed forward and feedback processes next, and follow with
evidence from the data showing them in action.
5.3.1 Feed Forward Processes
Feed forward processes allow praxis (actions) and new ideas to flow from
the individual level to the collective level. Feed forward involves moving from
interpreting to integrating – that is shifting from individual action and
understanding to the collective level. Indeed the “real test of shared
understanding is coherent action” (Crossan et al, 1999) and experimenting may
aid in development of shared understanding (Zietsma et al., 2002). The salmon
companies and environmentalists employed similar mechanisms to feed actions
and ideas forward from individuals to groups both inside and outside their
organizations. These mechanisms include: formal budgeting and planning
processes, as well as less formal conversations and internal list-serves; and
flexible organizational structures that encourage sharing across boundaries, such
as the “group” of regional sustainability managers at Marine Harvest and the
science committee within CAAR.
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The major salmon farming companies and the primary environmental
organization all provided evidence of praxis (individual actions) influencing
collective understanding and practice (behaviour). See: Table 5-3: Evidence of
Praxis Influencing Practice for representative quotations.
Table 5-3: Evidence of Praxis Influencing Practice
Organization Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of
praxis on practice
Marine
Harvest

“This is more or less my story … What I try to do is get as much
documentation as possible from independent sources that will help
to share our story with our stakeholders, because no one has to
trust us as a company. We are never believed, but when the story
is told by independent reliable sources about what aquaculture has
to offer or that it is making progress in the right direction, or not,
that can be really helpful.” Heikki

CAAR

“I started Living Oceans Society in 1998 … it was not necessarily
started as an organization designed to (manage) the fish farming
campaign but because we‟re here and it‟s the people over there
like it and the people down there don‟t and we‟re sort of in the
middle, plus my husband at the time was a salmon fisherman and it
just became an issue that we couldn‟t not look at and so we got
more involved in it as an organization. “ Donna
“I do a lot of work within the coalition keeping people informed of
where things stand with our projects with Marine Harvest. I do
some work on budgets and financing and just getting people into
the field and making sure costs are covered and the money is in
place. I do a lot of back and forth between CAAR and the company
because the company will have a face to face meeting, they‟ll make
a suggestion. The negotiating team can‟t sign-off on it on behalf of
the whole coalition. So, we‟ve got to go back and talk to our
coalition partner groups and, you know, then back to the company.
So, it‟s a lot of back and forth negotiation.” Moira

Stolt

“… the vice president of Stolt then went on to be the vice president
of Marine Harvest after the first merger. ... Justin was an enigma;
I‟ll tell you that. He was a very fascinating person to deal with …
while it really, you know, often really disturbed him he realized that
this engagement was important. Like, that it was in his own best
business interest to engage. So, he was able to, sort of, get over
that stuff. Not so; he couldn‟t get over it. He was able to make
decisions that were not influenced...” Donald
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Organization Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of
praxis on practice
Mainstream

“Just a short while ago I was in a meeting with the managers for
the east coast of the island, going over with them the costs, the
need for clarity in all of their areas, that they need to clearly
understand what the focus of the company is. What our long-term
goals are. And those have not changed since last year. We must
strive in every area to look how we can better one, cost save – of
course because we‟re always interested in making money…”
Angus

Government

“… the director general for aquaculture management came into his
job it‟ll be two years at the end of October. And, he‟s really, I‟d say,
pushed the need for greater interaction with the ENGOs8. So, we
have very regular meetings whenever he‟s out with the ENGOs.
And, that‟s been a better relationship, better than adversarial. We
set up this thing where, you know, when he‟s, you know, we‟ll have
the regular meetings, but when we‟re not around for the regular
meetings, you know, if they want to phone me and ask me
questions, you know, I‟m much more conducive to that kind of
thing. So, you know, it is about relationship building more than
anything else. And, I think that there‟s a lot to be said about the
more time you spend with people and the more time you get to
know people it just becomes a lot easier to communicate. You
know, it just breaks down some barriers.” Adrian

The data from the salmon farming industry in BC shows that action taken by
individuals influence collective and organizational practices.
5.3.2 Feedback Processes
What has already been learned, in this context an organization‟s practices
related to conflict, learning, and the organization‟s identity, feeds back from the
organization to individuals. It thus affects how people act as well as how they
think (Crossan, et al, 1999). Feedback involves the influence of institutionalized
practices on individuals intuiting new patterns or possibilities. To increase

8

ENGOs are environmental non-government organizations
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productivity and exploit past learning the salmon companies shared data between
jurisdictions and developed operating standards and procedures that were then
closely monitored. They also developed worldwide positions on controversial
issues and communicated widely internally and externally. Both the salmon
farming companies and CAAR demonstrated their commitment to scientifically
validated knowledge by allocating resources to research and development.
Interestingly, the methods used by Marine Harvest and CAAR resulted in a broad
range of research partners being drawn in. These included, in the case of Marine
Harvest, suppliers such as Peruvian anchovy fishermen; and in the case of
CAAR, promising graduate students and international environmental groups.
Other salmon farming companies tended to allocate research resources to
recognized research universities and institutes.
The major salmon farming companies and CAAR provide a range of
evidence showing the ways in which institutionalized practices influence
individual actions and understanding (praxis). See: Table 5-4: Evidence of
Practice Influencing Praxis for representative quotations.
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Table 5-4: Evidence of Practice Influencing Praxis
Organization

Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of
practice on praxis

Marine
Harvest

“… I had standards that I had developed. Purchasing standards

for Wegman‟s, a big grocery store… on our Chinook, and we were
getting 25% premium …. It worked really well… I had the blessing
from our corporate to do this – they thought it was a good project,
they thought it was a good kind of cutting edge way to do things
and it was a trend we would be moving towards – certification.”
Lana
“… our ISO 14001 management systems … quite a big part of
them are stakeholder feedback in response to environmental
impacts, perceived or actual … if these systems are going to work
well you want to be responsive to the main issues of the day. “
Lana
“… they (Head Office) do care, sure. Everything we do here, my
work, the R and D that I‟m involved with, the agreement that I‟ve
explained to you, they all cost money… So it raises the unit value
of every fish that we grow so the company is constantly looking at
the cost of doing business in British Columbia…” Colin
“… if you were to open a company here and only operate here
you‟d still have to deal with the cost of the regulation and the cost
of the social licence component and then that would raise your cost
and you would have to factor that in. So it matters to Holland in
this case where the parent company is, but the other side of the
coin … we‟re not avoiding this, we‟re dealing with it and we are
dealing with it in a way that intends to solve the issues without
adding additional costs … also they‟re aware that the product we
grow in BC is some of the best product grown anywhere in the
world … that‟s not lost on them at all.” Colin

CAAR

“We got together into a group and said, “you know what - we have
to make the sum greater than the individual part,” that we had to
work together to try to deal with it because … we can‟t outspend
them so we have to outthink them so in order to do that we need to
have more people together. That‟s when we came together to form
a coalition.” Donna
“Well the dialogue agreement that we have with Marine Harvest
certainly has created some policy changes within all the
organizations, in that they have to give Marine Harvest a heads up
on whether they‟re going to issue press releases. We are far more
careful on what we say about industry. I mean we can still be
honest … but we can‟t say that Marine Harvest are a bunch of
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Organization

Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of
practice on praxis
idiots and they‟re not listening to anybody. That‟s not allowed in
the dialogue agreement.” Harry
“We have various committees. A science committee, a markets
team … we have an internal list serve that is used frequently. It‟s
not unusual to get 40 or 50 email messages from our colleagues a
day.” Harry
“… need to work within their business model … so if it‟s like, “you
need to go to closed containment, that‟s not negotiable. How
you‟re going to get there, we‟re willing to talk to you about that. OK,
you can‟t do it tomorrow, can you do it in 2 years? What do you
need to do it in 2 years? What if we go to government together to
get help for you to do it in 2 years. Now let‟s be friends, now let‟s
work together and find a way to do it.” So now when you start
talking about a business model, you‟re talking their language. You
can have a conversation with them.” Donna
“… one of the things that we always try to maintain is our
credibility. We don‟t want to make outlandish statements. We rely
on the Internet a heck of a lot to get the information out. We do
regular updates to people. When we go to give talks we get sign
up sheets from people and we add them to an update list.” Harry

Mainstream

“We need to be constantly assured that we are not polluting, we‟re
not causing environmental damage, we‟re treating our people with
respect, we have good welfare practices for our people as well as
for our product. We have a long-term vision, we‟re not here for the
short-term, we‟re here for the long-term.” Angus
“ISO then is a management tool. As a deliberate, strategic
management tool… “ Angus
“The public will learn that the government – the regulatory
agencies – do have the teeth and the authority and the willingness
to not allow this industry to take the same course as the other
industries before us. Like logging or mining went for 50 years
basically unchecked and a lot of damage was caused. Now there‟s
all kinds of reforms and rules in play...” Angus
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The data show that an organization‟s practices (i.e. its routines, procedures,
and collective understandings of identity) influence how individuals both seek and
interpret signals from the environment and subsequently respond. In the next
section I provide a detailed example of these processes.
5.3.3 Feed Forward and Feedback Processes in Action
The story of how the actions of individuals in Marine Harvest influenced
policies and were in turn influenced by the policies and practices of the
organization provides a graphic illustration of feedforward and feedback, as well
as the role of identity and conflict in driving those processes. Heikki a senior
corporate manager describes the initial shift from individual interpretation of
social responsibility at Nutreco, the predecessor company of today‟s Marine
Harvest, to the integration of those notions, and their subsequent
institutionalization into practice:
“There was a new chairman… who was, I think, much more than his
predecessor, transparent, open to dialogue, aware of what social
responsibility is… we had a fantastic meeting with the entire board, plus the
food safety director, and the research directors and the business leaders;
we had a whole day of what the issues are … of managing sustainability
issues of aquaculture, and that was fantastic, because then we could decide
upon what should be the rules for … our program for the coming years and
our communications.”
The new chairman, Woutt Dekker had come from BP, an early proponent of
social responsibility and was a self described “socially responsible manager”,
evidencing his learning and identity. As a result of his interpretations and actions,
such as initiating and sustaining discussions of social responsibility at the board
level, Marine Harvest management came to a common understanding of the
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meaning and relative importance (to them) of social responsibility, transparency,
and openness. Dekker‟s praxis (initiating and sustaining discussions) acted
through organizational practice (the board meetings) to alter learning (shared
understanding) and identity (importance of social responsibility etc.). This
marked the beginning of Marine Harvest identifying itself as “open to dialogue”
and “collaborative” and illustrates how individual interpretation of a new pattern in
the external environment, such as the emergence of social responsibility and
stakeholder activism, becomes integrated with the interpretations of others,
altering their understandings of the situation and their organization. This dynamic
is affecting collective identity and organizational learning through practices.
The senior managers at Marine Harvest demonstrated their common
understanding (learning) by using that information to set corporate policy and
establish procedures (practices) throughout the company to respond to
stakeholder raised issues (praxis). In time they provided budget support to the
regions (feedback from organizational learning). The organization took a
leadership role (identity) in setting up and leading forums to exchange ideas and
information on issues facing the aquaculture industry (practice), including a
biennial international conference of stakeholders in Stavanger, Norway and
numerous multi-party, multi-national initiatives involving participants ranging from
politicians in the Hague to Peruvian anchovy fishermen to anti-aquaculture
groups. This illustrates how learning and identity influence each other as well as
practice, which in turn influences praxis, in this case in response to conflict from
stakeholders.
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Heikki, a corporate executive, shares what he believes is central to Marine
Harvest‟s approach to the external environment:
“you can only find a solution when you put different people with different
backgrounds and different views of the world together because then you
have the creative momentum to really start making a change and come up
with the right solutions. So not any longer the different disciplines within
one company, but now the NGOs, and the government representatives, and
the scientists … We have these different hats sitting around the table, and
they‟re going to make a change.”
The organizational identity of openness and collaboration and the practices
that express that identity and the attendant learning endure and continue to be
demonstrated thorough the actions of the company, in the face of and despite of
continued conflict with stakeholders. The extent to which it endures is illustrated
by the comments of Torgeir and Henriette, corporate managers in Marine
Harvest, two years and three changes in ownership later:
“I think that first of all, it‟s important to be in a dialogue so that the world
around you can react when they think that you‟re doing something that they
perceive as being wrong. At the same time, I think it‟s very important that
we are proactive in some processes, and try to step – or to be one step
ahead in some areas.”
“We find it important. When we entered into the dialogue, we want to be
part of the solution, we want to have discussions and to try to find solutions.
It‟s challenging also to have good discussions and find solutions, when you
have such different groups and different views. That‟s of course a challenge
to do that, but we find it‟s still important to be part of it.”
Just as BP‟s practices in the 1990‟s supported Wout Dekker‟s recognition of
the emerging importance of engaging with stakeholders, Marine Harvest‟s
practices stemming from identify and learning show support for praxis that
encourages the development of new insights and the exploration of new ideas.
Lana and Colin, senior managers in Marine Harvest Canada, describe,
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respectively, how institutionalized practices within the organization have guided
and supported them in praxis relative to their roles:
“overall the company – not just me – was quite transparent, quite open …
so that was the way we were. And that helped. It helped me … That was a
corporate position. And that position came from Europe. They were big on
social accountability, big on environmental accountability … they took
leadership roles – Marine Harvest did internationally… They took leadership
on that, and it was in all their … vision statements and all that sort of stuff so
I could always hold that up when I got grief about spending money … we‟d
say, “Well look it, I‟m just following your corporate strategy, right?” And that
was pretty hard to argue. So that helped me a lot because when your head
corporate is doing that you can … I had the support”.
“So, it‟s a lot easier for me to say, well, in line with corporate thinking we‟re
working towards greater levels of sustainability. So, if these studies that we
do poke us in the eye a bit, well, that means we have to learn from that; we
have to change…. there‟s no risk to me organizationally in Canada to
undertake this. It‟s not out of synchrony with the larger company.”
In each situation the organization‟s identity of being “open to dialogue” and
“collaborative” was expressed through practices, such as stakeholder
engagement and other collaborative learning processes. These practices
allowed individuals to have intuitive insights and to take action (praxis), facilitating
learning. Indeed the open, collaborative practices that have been institutionalized
within Marine Harvest‟s structure encourage the development of new shared
understandings, as Lana describes:
“I had the opportunity – I was lucky - to go over to Europe quite a few times
… to these high level … strategic planning (conferences) where they were
looking ten years down the road and what the market would look like, and
what consumers wanted to know.”
So in this case what Marine Harvest has already learned as an organization
encourages and supports the exploration of new learning. However the tension
created when integrating new learning in the face of feedback from

152
institutionalized learning appears to remain, as evidenced by Lana‟s comment
about “getting grief about spending money”.
This leads to questions about the extent to which individuals impact
organizational learning or does practice dominate praxis? I find that while the
data show more than twice as many examples of practice influencing praxis, this
does not necessarily indicate a constraint on the exploration of new ideas or
actions. The actions that instigated significant change, such as the initial contact
of CAAR by Stolt or the acceptance of CAMP by CAAR, stemmed from praxis
that deviated from established organizational and industry practices. Consistent
with prior research, specific practices stemming from identity and learning can act
as a catalyst for exploratory actions. A comparison of the data from Marine
Harvest and Mainstream on the extent to which practice influences praxis show
that feedback can be supportive of exploratory activities not just activities that
exploit or maintain the status quo. (See Table 5-5: Evidence Showing Exploration
and Exploitation Influences). For example, the praxis of the individuals at Marine
Harvest is consistent with and supported by the organization‟s identify as being
interested in seeking solutions through collaboration and its established practice
of engaging in dialogue.
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Table 5-5: Evidence Showing Exploration and Exploitation Influences
Organization

Feedback supporting
exploration

Feedback supporting
exploitation

Marine
Harvest

“They have a bit of a hands off
way of operating with their
business units in the sense that
they recognize ... that they don‟t,
from back in Norway, they don‟t
understand all the political and
social context.” Doug

“There is an influence in terms
of budgets and things like that
for sure. You know, annual
budgets are approved by the
corporation, the parent
company.” Doug

“… you could not leave this in
the court of the CEO or the
communication department,
because actually it is not their
problem. The issues are local to
certain parts of the business.”
Heikki
“The company actually made a
decision to do that and took a
financial hit as a result. They
had more fish of a smaller size
than what they would have
ideally had for the market and
that cost them money … at the
end of the day when you rolled
them all up it cost them some
money.” Doug
“… you‟re also risking the fact
that the science that is going to
be done over the next couple of
years will identify that it‟s an
issue, it‟s a major issue with
major changes. And, we‟re
prepared to do that. It‟s a real
risk. Now, I would say they‟re
risking the same as well – the
NGO groups – that it might
identify that there‟s no difference
or the difference is so minimal
that the management
procedures you have in place
now address those risks.” Rob
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Organization

Feedback supporting
exploration

Mainstream “… we collaborate with different
parts of the world whether it be
Scotland or Chile. We learn
from each other‟s mistakes ...
we all have head offices in
different countries. So, we‟re
able to learn from those
experiences. We do a lot of
networking on a global basis.
People come from all around the
world to attend different
conferences. I was just in
Norway at a conference.” Karin

Feedback supporting
exploitation
“Our focus in this company is
sustainable aquaculture… That
drives everything. And, the key
thing that we‟ve done is our
certification. We are ISO
certified in our environmental
management systems for all
our companies… We‟re also
currently working on our
occupational health and safety
ISO certification, our quality
management systems… And
then, we‟ll move forward into
the food safety certification …
for us the value in certification
is A) being third party audited,
right and also, B) just to use it
as a management tool so that
all across our company we
have the same standards so
that nobody can say, farm A
does this; farm B does this. We
have the same policies and
procedures and high standards
in all of our operations. And,
that‟s a really good
management tool and it‟s a
good way to show people that
this is what we do. And, we
know what we do all across the
company.” Karin
“… the other stakeholder group
that we‟re working on now is
internal.... the website will be
good for that. The newsletter,
we‟re working on our second
edition. And, we will be doing
some brochures ... as we get
bigger we‟ve got to keep people
informed.” Karin
“This passport was printed and
given to every employee in the
company. And you will always
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Organization

Feedback supporting
exploration

Feedback supporting
exploitation
find this posted in every
operation that we have, and in
any office you‟ll find this poster.
So this is what we live by. To
follow-up on the promises or
directions we gave here, we
established what we called the
Cermaq (Mainstream)
Sustainability Team, which was
working to make this passport
live in the organization … Then
we formed this team and we
also formed these six areas....”
Erling

The data from the salmon farming industry in BC show that while practices
stemming from organizational identity and the organizations‟ learning do
influence praxis more frequently than the reverse, that does not necessarily
indicate that there is relatively more emphasis on exploitation of existing
knowledge. The nature of the organization‟s learning combined with the unique,
and enduring characteristics that make up its identity form and inform the
practices which may, as in the case of Marine Harvest, promote and support
experimentation and exploration.

5.4 Premise 3: Individual Engagement: Practitioners-PraxisPractice
In the previous section, I described feedback and feed forward cycles within
some of the organizations in the BC salmon farming industry. These cycles led to
changes in the behaviour of individuals - specifically, interactions and eventual
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engagement (praxis) between individual practitioners on different sides of the
conflict.
The impetus for experimentation with new behaviour came from
destabilizing feedback: external signals that contradicted practitioners‟
understandings of the situation, of themselves, and of their organizations (D.
Gioia et al., 2000). The predominant signals were ongoing criticism of the
industry, shifting priorities of philanthropic organizations and funding agencies,
and contradictory research findings on aquaculture impacts. As well as inducing
dissonance that drove individuals to action, these signals created uncertainty
within the organizations. This condition of uncertainty had the effect of freeing
individuals from the influence of established organizational practices, permitting
and encouraging action in the form of experimentation. Indeed, repeated changes
in the ownership of Marine Harvest created further uncertainty around
organizational identity and practice, providing more latitude to the initiating
individuals and sustaining ongoing experimentation.
Departing from conventional, institutionalized practice, practitioners made
direct contact across organizational boundaries. Having done so, they were able
to tap into shared identities relevant to the conflict. Amongst these were aspects
of being a scientist, a professional facilitator or negotiator, and community
membership. These shared identities sustained ongoing interaction. Moreover,
aspects of the organizational identities of CAAR and the post-merger Marine
Harvest were directly supportive of experimentation, encouraging new activities
and the exploration of new ideas as the engagement developed. Hence highly
experimental praxis of the individuals, engaging with „enemies‟ across
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organizational boundaries, was influenced by both individual and member
organizations‟ identities and learning, and permitted by conditions of uncertainty.
These practitioners subsequently became the catalysts for change and learning
within their home organizations, through feed forward and organizational
integration of their praxis and learning (see Figure 5-2: Individual Engagement:
Practitioners-Praxis-Practice). I will now outline the data that describes these
processes.

Organization 1

Organization 2

Practice

Practice
Identity

Identity

Learning

feedback /
feed-forward

Conflict

feedback /
feed-forward

Praxis
Identity

Learning

Learning

Praxis
Practitioner
Engagement

Identity

Learning

Figure 5-2: Individual Engagement: Practitioners-Praxis-Practice

158
5.4.1 First Contact: Destabilizing Feedback
In both Marine Harvest and CAAR, signals from the environment loosened
the hold that their respective organizational identities placed on individual actions.
CAAR was formed at the direction of three major US foundations, with the
primary objective of raising public awareness of the impact of salmon farming
with a view to reforming the industry. CAAR soon established itself as a vocal
critic of the industry with its active and well structured campaigns, including
provocative ads targeting consumers in the New York Times and Los Angeles
Times and its website www.farmedanddangerous.com. Donna, from CAAR,
describes with some satisfaction creating a “nightmare for the industry”:
“Well the sea lice one – I hate saying this – has benefited us in terms that it
gave us a very clear message we can take to the public, we got the public
very upset about salmon farming… When you see any fish covered in sea
lice and they‟re dying, the public just grabs on to that. And that‟s not to say
that‟s more important than some of the other issues but it … helped us
articulate our concerns better and reach our audience better, and it‟s been a
real nightmare for the industry”
After several years of successfully challenging the BC salmon farming
industry in its major markets, the direction from one of CAAR‟s major funders
shifted. There was a general directive that the issues had been sufficiently raised
and it was time to start looking for solutions. Doug confirms the funders‟ feedback
to CAAR:
“ (they) wanted to see some kind of rapprochement between the
environmental organizations they were funding and the salmon farming
industry because from the point of view of the philanthropic organizations
their goals are not going to be achieved if people aren‟t talking to each
other.”
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While CAAR had created an organizational identity of an activist, critic, and
advocate, that identity was now in conflict with the feedback from one of its major
funders. In addition all of its inter-organizational learning and experience with
salmon farmers was indirect and critical. This pressure from funders to look for
opportunities to develop solutions to the issues with salmon farming encouraged
individuals within CAAR to be open to new behaviour.
It was Justin, the general manager of Stolt in BC (later merged with Marine
Harvest) who initiated direct contact with CAAR. At that time Stolt was recognized
as the global industry leader in terms of sales, profitability and operations. In
Canada it was ISO 14001 certified. While Stolt was recognized as a superior
operator it was not as focused as Marine Harvest was on promoting its social and
environmental performance globally. It viewed environmental compliance to be
the responsibility of the company and it was accountable to the regulators not the
activists. The company‟s view of its responsibility is illustrated by this statement in
its 2003 annual report:
“There has been much in the press lately about environmental and quality
issues in aquaculture. These issues have been the focus of extensive media
coverage and public debate. Indeed, the number of lobbyists and activists
with positions on aquaculture is startling. As an aquaculture business, there
is nothing we can say or do to satisfy all of these interested parties. What
we can do, however, is to adhere rigorously to all regulations governing our
industry and to follow our own conscience and set our own high standard.
Farmed fish is an excellent source of healthy protein, and it is our
responsibility and commitment to meet high standards of husbandry and
care for the environment.” (Stolt-Neilsen SA, 2003)
This passage illustrates Stolt‟s organizational identity of a successful,
science-based, responsible producer of a sustainable food product, as well as
how that identity manifests in its behaviour. It acknowledges activists and

160
lobbyists only to say it does not believe it is responsible for responding to their
concerns directly. It responds to regulations and is committed to meeting high
standards of operation.
There was a serious discrepancy between these internal beliefs and
external perceptions of the organization in BC. A scientific board established by
the federal government to monitor BC salmon stocks suggested that sea lice from
Stolt‟s farms in the Broughton Archipelago risked doing “irreparable harm” to wild
pink salmon runs (C. Wilson, 2002). Moreover environmentalists, including
Alexandra Morton, an independent biologist and environmentalist called for “other
interested stakeholders -- fishermen, environmentalists, First Nations and the
public “to apply pressure for changes to Stolt‟s salmon farming operations in that
area” (Read, 2002). Finally, a number of well publicized negative articles from
peer reviewed science journals prompted agitation for more stringent regulation
in BC.
Science is the primary language of the conflict around salmon farming
(Young & Matthews, 2010). Aquaculture has been the subject of extensive
scientific investigation for more than 20 years in Canada and much longer in
Norway, in an effort to improve the economic and environmental performance of
the industry. This generation of knowledge has served to fuel the conflicts rather
than defuse them because of the extent of the disagreement amongst scientists
and so called experts in aquaculture. Justin, general manager of Stolt
summarized his company‟s and the industry‟s position when he said "In a perfect
world, if we had all the science … but the fact of the matter is … the science is by
no means conclusive." (Read, 2002). The disagreements between the pro-
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industry scientists and the pro-environmental scientists include the impact on
human health of consuming farmed salmon, and the impact of salmon farming on
the environment and hence on wild salmon and other marine species. While
Justin said that Stolt prefers “… a careful study of sea lice and the development
and implementation of a sea lice control plan” (Read, 2002), the persistence of
the conflict induced him to reevaluate his understandings. It was in this context
that Justin began to consider a new approach. Thus providing evidence of how
threats to organizational identity cause individuals to reconsider their actions (D.
Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002).
In addition to destabilizing feedback from the environment, a series of
changes in ownership at Stolt/Marine Harvest placed its organizational identity
and expectations in a flux. Discussions between Stolt and CAAR had been
underway for eight months when Marine Harvest purchased Stolt, and
subsequently spun it off as a separately listed company. Then in early 2006
Marine Harvest was purchased by PanFish. Throughout this period Colin and
Doug continued the discussions with the CAAR negotiating team, despite the
replacement of Justin as the head of Marine Harvest‟s operations in BC. Donna
of CAAR describes Colin‟s behaviour:
“This is our second merger in a year … we‟re getting pretty good at it. Colin
(of Marine Harvest) … basically says, “look, until they tell me otherwise, I
continue to act as if it was business as usual.” And so the only thing is we
can‟t get his time because he‟s so busy handling merger issues … – there‟s
been a few times that we‟ve been a little bit unsure if we would go ahead
with this, we didn‟t know about the merger but in no way has he threatened
us or used it over our head …”
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During the changes in ownership the acceptance and continuance of the
engagement with CAAR was not certain (See: Table 5-6: Impact of Mergers
Activity on Practice and Praxis). At the time of the last acquisition, Angus, a
senior manager at Mainstream Canada predicted that “Pan‟s (PanFish) going to
come in, they‟re going to squish that agreement … between Marine and CAAR
because they‟ll say, “It‟s got nothing to do with us. We bought the company ...
We‟re Pan not Marine.”
Despite the uncertainty created by the mergers, Colin in his role of
environmental manager at Marine Harvest and scientist, continued to discuss the
possibility of a joint research initiative with CAAR. He also continued to position
the benefits of pursuing the engagement internally. As Donald, the mediator,
observed: “I think by the time they got to PanFish there was probably already a
sense that the engagement was yielding benefits.” The uncertainty regarding
organizational practices introduced by the mergers gave Colin considerable
discretion regarding the pursuit of the Framework. That he continued to engage
with CAAR without official sanction illustrates the influence that he had gained on
the practice of the new organization. In turn, Colin strongly identified with Marine
Harvest‟s (and its predecessor companies) organizational identity as a company
that is accountable and that adheres to scientific process, as evidenced by his
comment:
“… this is why I‟m pretty proud to work for Marine Harvest is that globally
they say, guess what, we can‟t really say we‟re sustainable. Yeah, well, in
all measures, but we‟re working towards that. We‟re recognizing that we
have some problems and we‟re willing to change, but we feel we have a
high level of value to offer the public and the world I guess in terms of... If

163
you grow fish so that not all the wild fish have to be taken out ...then there‟s
an environmental value to that.”
These aspects of Marine Harvest‟s organizational identity supported Colin in
his experimentation by giving the engagement with the “enemy” a scientific
context and describing his praxis in terms of the process of scientific discovery.
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Table 5-6: Impact of Mergers Activity on Practice and Praxis
Individuals

Representative Quotes Regarding the Impact of Mergers

Donna CAAR

“I don‟t know if I could say that this Marine Harvest would have
been willing to go down this road if it hadn‟t started with the other
one. But, aside from that, because we‟ve had consistency in terms
of people being there - the issue is when there‟s a merger we lose
their attention; we totally lose them. And, really things are all up in
the air until the merger is complete because quite often they don‟t
know what their jobs are going to be…. they have no idea if the
new company‟s going to back this approach and this work that
we‟re doing. ... That‟s the biggest hurdle. And, once we get
through that it‟s usually just business as usual after that.”

Moira CAAR

“… there was initially some concern that the change of ownership
and the dynamic would really affect, you know, the limited
progress that had been made in the discussion, but Marine
Harvest when they took over seemed amenable to continuing.
And then, PanFish and Marine Harvest merged and there was still
an openness to continuing.”

Donald –
Mediator

“... when Stolt and Marine Harvest integrated … there‟s an issue
in terms of which … management team or which management
philosophy or direction was likely to prevail. And, you know, had it
been the original Marine Harvest I‟m not certain whether this
engagement would still be going.”
“I think that after the PanFish merger … once again it was … a
period of time in terms of where was the leadership going to be.
… the first question … is the leadership in the new organization
going to be supportive of the ongoing engagement? And, so,
you‟ve got a time period while that gets sorted out. But, then
there‟s also the time period where it takes for the new organization
to begin to … institutionally accept it because then you‟ve got
folks that have come from both organizations … just because the
leader thinks something‟s a good idea doesn‟t mean everybody
else thinks it‟s a good idea. So, there‟s that period of adjustment
as well.”

Angus “…We know that then CAAR is going to take up the fight again.”
Mainstream
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5.4.2 Experimentation: Altered Praxis
As the largest operator in BC, Stolt was the most vulnerable to the conflict
over sea lice. In keeping with its identity as a science based company, Stolt
Canada‟s leadership was very motivated to ensure that at the least any
forthcoming regulation was supported by good research. As mentioned in the
previous section, they began to consider ways to accomplish that. Justin, who
had a degree in Marine Biology and almost 40 years experience of working in
commercial fishing, fisheries development, and salmon farming, was instrumental
( Campbell River Salmon Foundation, 2010). Donald, the mediator, describes
Justin‟s process:
“I think he (Justin) thought that the folks in CAAR were sort of evil or
something, but he did understand ... And while it really... disturbed him he
realized that this engagement was important. Like, that it was in his own
best business interest to engage. So, he was able to, sort of, get over that
stuff. Not so; he couldn‟t get over it. He was able to make decisions that
were not influenced (by it) ...”
Despite the ongoing conflict between CAAR and Stolt, Justin was able to
intuit a new pattern emerging in the environment and interpret the need for new
behaviour. To aid his interpretation of the situation he actively sought guidance
from independent sources outside of Stolt and the salmon farming industry, Doug
and Donald. These individuals had advisory roles in other environmental conflicts
in BC, were residents of Vancouver Island and were familiar with both the
situation and the individuals involved. Doug, a consultant specializing in issues
management, gave his synopsis of Justin and Stolt‟s situation:
“… Most of the public debate over the years has been a debate
characterized by conflict and struggle… I said you really need to try and
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enter into some kind of a structured dialog with the environmental groups.
You can‟t continue the practice of the sparring press releases … And, the
company understood that. I mean, one of the reasons they came to me was
because they were at a loss.”
Justin recognized the significant threat of restrictive legislation and the state
of the knowledge around the sea lice issue. This activated his role identities of
corporate manager and scientist and prompted him to take action (i.e. contacting
Doug). So it was that Justin had Doug contact the main spokesperson for CAAR,
Donna, a lawyer and a resident of one of the islands in the Broughton
Archipelago. According to Colin, the senior Stolt manager who managed the
engagement, the intent was to “buy time” that would allow “science to do its
work.” As Colin says:
“… we need to have a time out before all that policy gets articulated in which
the rest of the research can be done to determine … the significance of the
effect of the sea lice… So let‟s learn together, let‟s share information, let‟s
be as transparent as we can be within the context of business and let‟s let
the science complete its work so that we‟re basing any policy decision on
good solid science.”
As scientists, both Justin and Colin were able to understand the significance
of direct access to fish farming data to the scientists within CAAR‟s member
organizations. They would be the first environmental group in the world to have
this access. Their identity as scientists enabled them to understand the interests
of the other party and make an offer that would be considered credible and
intriguing. This action was also consistent with their role identity as company
managers protecting the interests of the firm.
CAAR was motivated in part by the shift in the direction from their funders to
focus less on raising awareness and promoting conflict and more on working
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towards a solution. They were also motivated, as a science based organization,
by the prospect of access to operational data. Scott of CAAR explains, “… we
finally decided we‟re beating our heads against the wall, fighting against the
industry and not getting anywhere. And the initial meeting was set up… to see if
we can get over (that)”.
This action represented a significant departure from past practices in
Stolt/Marine Harvest, CAAR, and indeed the industry. Donald, the mediator,
explains:
“nobody in the salmon farming industry until that point in time had …
decided that there was value in talking with people from the environmental
community. And, I think, in fact, most people thought that … it was an
outrageous betrayal to consider doing that. And then, similarly, you get very
similar sentiments among the ENGO coalition as well. It‟s quite remarkable
… the industrial interests … the interests that are representing civil society
… their internal issues, their dynamics, they‟re mirror images of each other”
The data show that how, in the face of destabilizing feedback from the
environment, individuals‟ social and role identities and learning influence their
interpretations of the situation and their praxis, prompting experimentation.
5.4.3 Influence of Common Identities: Practitioners - Praxis
The individuals involved in the Framework had a range of social and role
identities However, there were three identities that became most relevant to the
learning between the organizations; scientist, issue manager, and coastal
community resident. CAAR‟s team was made up of a lawyer, a PhD in ecology, a
biologist/science advocate, the Executive Director of a union sponsored
foundation, and a First Nations marine/fisheries representative. Two of these
individuals lived in the Broughton Archipelago. Donna, of CAAR, says “… we
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bring a multi-talented group of people to these negotiations with industry”. The
Marine Harvest team included Justin, a marine biologist by training and the head
of the BC operation, Colin a biologist with a life time of working with salmon and
salmon issues, and Doug, an issues consultant skilled in conflict management.
All were residents of Vancouver Island.
5.4.3.1 Scientist
Despite the various controversies all of the individuals could agree on the
need for greater understanding of the impact of aquaculture on the marine
environment. As a result, the importance of the identity of “scientist” interested in
protecting the marine habitat for salmon in BC was elevated and activated and
came to permeate the activities related to the Framework (See: Table 5-7:
Evidence of Scientist Identity for representative quotes showing activations of the
identity of scientist). Even individuals whose internal roles gave them limited
exposure to science or the scientific methods talked in terms of control groups
and experimentation. The comments by Rob, the senior public relations manager
at Marine Harvest, give an example of the extent to which the language and
structure around scientific experimentation, specifically the need for a control
group, had permeated the organization:
“Now, the question is how would it be different if we didn‟t engage, if we
hadn‟t have reached out to CAAR … Well, how would it be different? We
don‟t have a control so we don‟t know … some companies might say that,
you know, not engaging and simply working with the sixty percent that are
undecided leaving the twenty percent wackos alone, you‟d never know. .
You don‟t have control. I wish I had another BC somewhere and, you know,
kind of tried out a different method.”
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Table 5-7: Evidence of Scientist Identity
Organization Representative Quotes
Marine
Harvest

“We agree that there‟s concern around this. We agree that we
can constantly change the way we grow fish. We don‟t agree that
your (CAAR‟s) concerns are necessarily valid, yet we do agree
that we‟ll probably be changing the way we grow fish because
we‟ve been changing the way we grow fish and mitigating
concerns as long as we‟ve been growing fish.” Colin
“Our contention is that it‟s never been proven that sea lice are
entirely produced by the farms because we know that they were
always there before the farms were there and they‟ll be there
after the farms leave. So, we felt a good way to test whether that
was the case or not was to set this management up and if it‟s a
benefit and it shows that the sea lice are highly reduced in those
fallow zones, then it‟s something that we would, you know,
continue to do… like the control route and then the test groups.”
Colin
“If you were talking about sea lice... pink salmon interactions with
sea lice in the Broughton Archipelago, we have a good handle on
that. If you‟re talking about are there affects on sockeye salmon,
we don‟t have a great handle on that. I personally as a biologist –
I‟ve worked with wild fish for many years – I have trouble
believing that sockeye would be at the risk that pink salmon
would be at just because of their size … but, that doesn‟t mean
that it‟s not something that should be addressed ... I‟m not
comfortable with saying that I have enough information to say I
just dismiss that. I‟m not saying I‟m dismissing other people‟s
concerns. It‟s like, ok, should this be... We should put some effort
into this. Who are the right people to address this?” Stephanie

CAAR

“…So in the broad, robust pattern of management of pathology …
These are fairly broad patterns… salmon farming is unique in
terms of some of the biological issues. But it‟s not unique in terms
of these patterns that keep repeating and the social patterns. And
how individual choice is really important in effecting you know
government and industry. And so it‟s not unique in that aspect
just in terms of the biological and ecological side I think. And
situational side and the geography and things like that.” Harry
“Then we then go and interact with the larger groups we stay very
focused on those goals and on how the interaction with the larger
international campaigns can either better fit or undermine those
goals. And because they‟re very strongly based in the scientific
issues of the day, we‟re not just going out saying, “We want it this
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Organization Representative Quotes
way because this is our campaign and you‟ve got to do it this
way,” but we‟re very clear about how the process can work better
if we coordinate and how we‟re none of us going to get what we
need out of this if we don‟t. And so the relationships are collegial,
most of the time.” Gord
“… we have such a strong science component and we have
individuals that are very hardcore scientists who have
expectations around things. And, if their needs aren‟t met, it‟s
really hard for us to get things through the coalition. So, we have
a strong demand on the scientific rigor of things…” Donna

The role of scientist also helped to establish common concerns, if not
beliefs, and helped in establishing credibility as the following comment by Scott of
CAAR about Colin of Marine Harvest illustrates:
“… there‟s still that lack of trust with Marine Harvest … but the guy that
negotiated was a marine biologist too – they were concerned … it benefited
both of us. We‟re finally getting the actual truth about things.”
It is telling that while Scott states he had a “lack of trust with Marine
Harvest” this was mitigated by the fact that a marine biologist, Colin, was
representing the organization. Colin‟s credibility and shared concern about
getting “the actual truth about things” allayed some of Scott‟s mistrust. Hence, the
contextual factors in the BC salmon farming industry rendered the identity of
scientist more meaningful to the individuals involved than other identities, such as
activists or salmon farmers.
Contextual factors also increased the importance of the practices and
protocols shared by that identity. In this case the gaps in scientific knowledge on
sea lice, the contradictory results from prior research and the need to do properly
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controlled studies all directed the individual‟s attention toward the actions they
could jointly take to address those concerns. In focusing on the socio-cognitive
aspects of the conflict the individuals not only activated the identity of scientist, in
particular biologist, they also elevated the importance of the practices and
protocols that were accepted as “good science”. Individuals from both
organizations recognized the importance of employing common practices and of
being prepared to accept the outcomes that resulted. As Gord, of CAAR, a MA in
Marine Biology said:
“The rationale for us, I‟d say, was to construct a series of research
proposals that were done jointly so that there could no longer be this sort of
„he said, she said‟ around the issues. Two areas, sea lice and closed
containment economic viability, are the main areas of research.”
Coincident with agreeing on what constituted “good science”, the individuals
in the Framework distanced themselves from the outcomes of prior research on
sea lice impacts. The apparently contradictory results cited by the industry and by
the environmentalists had played a major part in creating and sustaining identity
conflict. The individuals involved in the Framework focused instead on the
research projects they would undertake together and the practices and protocols
they would use in the work. As Stephanie, a biologist at Marine Harvest and
Harry, a PhD in ecology from CAAR said respectively:
“we saw this early on that there are these two groups of researchers.
There‟s those who the environmental movement tends to vet or stand
behind. And then, there‟s this other group - and they seem to not be
sharing information; they seem to be polarized. And, so, that was one of the
key things for our company was to say, well, can‟t we learn from each
other.”
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“… because they‟re very strongly based in the scientific issues of the day,
we‟re not just going out saying, “We want it this way because this is our
campaign and you‟ve got to do it this way,” but we‟re very clear about how
the process can work better if we coordinate and how we‟re none of us
going to get what we need out of this if we don‟t.”
This emphasis on the practices that they shared had a dramatic impact on
their ability to work together and allowed them to distance themselves from the
issues that had created conflict in the past. As Donald, the mediator, describes:
“And, what‟s absolutely remarkable is when you can actually get them
(CAAR and Marine Harvest) talking scientist to scientist it‟s like something
transforms in the room, like, in a positive sense. You know, and when it
actually comes down to things like protocols and stuff like that, that‟s a piece
of cake... if you get them down to talking about ... for example, what would
be the proper, you know, ... protocol around this particular experiment ...
they‟re really good at it.”
The individuals involved had moved away from using the end products of
science as a weapon against each other to using the scientific process as the
mechanism through which they could cooperate. Science provided a neutral and
honourable identity with which all parties could identify. It also provided sufficient
ambiguity to allow the group to reach consensus on the necessity of joint action,
while retaining differing individual beliefs (Eisenberg, 1984).
5.4.3.2 Issue manager
In addition to five scientific research projects, the Framework agreement
included communications and conflict management protocols. This context of
ongoing conflict elevated the importance of individuals that were not strongly
identified with either of the conflicting organizations and therefore were not
vulnerable to the same defensive responses to identity conflict as Marine Harvest
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or CAAR members. Also the behaviour associated with the identity of issue
consultant/manager was vital to the inter-organizational learning process. Doug
and Donald in particular played pivotal roles in helping the individuals involved
experiment with new behaviour, and then interpret and integrate new
understandings.
Doug was well known to the leaders of CAAR, and his identity as a neutral
and knowledgeable boundary spanner, coupled with his “temporary” identification
with Marine Harvest, was critical to the influence he had on the process. As
Donna, of CAAR describes:
“I‟ve known Doug for a long time … He … plays the role of advising
companies on how to work with environmental groups … he has an insight
into the environmental community that a lot of other industry folks don‟t
have... the value he plays ... is usually something along the lines of (saying)
they‟re not going to go away, so ignoring them is not a solution.”
Despite both parties‟ confidence in Doug, he reports that “from the time I
first started talking to my client and to the environmental groups it probably took
six months to get to the point where people actually decided to sit down face to
face and give this a whirl”. While both organizations were motivated to try a new
approach, they accepted that they needed help from someone outside the
situation to engage constructively. Their agreement to use Donald as a mediator
was their first act of integration. Doug explains:
“I knew it was going to take mediation to be able to make any progress. So,
they agreed to that. I also said that to the environmental groups... you`re
not going to make any headway here if you don`t have mediation. So, they
agreed to that ... Donald was a known quantity in the environmental
community. So, it wasn‟t really a big problem for them to support using him
… with Marine Harvest … I was able to explain the role of the mediator to
them and the value of using mediation you know, we weren‟t going to sit
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down at a table some day at a hotel in Port McNeill and have a kum-ba-ya
moment and everybody was going to be happy … So, they accepted the
idea of using mediation and the cost of mediation would be split between
CAAR and between Marine Harvest.”
As a result of the “shuttle diplomacy” of Doug, the individuals from Marine
Harvest and CAAR interpreted the needs of the situation in a new way, which
then prompted the development of a shared understanding of the value of
mediation. The act of hiring Donald and especially the agreement to split the cost
of his fees 50/50 between the two organizations was a coherent collective action,
the best indication of integration of new understanding (Crossan et al., 1999).
CAAR subsequently hired Moira, an activist/issue manager whose long and
varied experience included anti-war protests, as well as involvement in forestry,
mining, and marine issues. Subsequently Doug and Moira handled all of the day
to day issues and minor conflicts. This left Harry, from CAAR, and Stephanie, of
Marine Harvest, and others to focus on moving the science projects forward, and
Donna, from CAAR, and Colin, from Marine Harvest, to focus on larger
relationship issues. In this way the individuals with expertise in science worked
on the science issues and delegated all of the “conflictual” matters to those
individuals skilled in conflict and issues management. Donna describes the way
conflicts within the Framework were handled:
“If there‟s a scrimmage, it‟s usually Doug that contacts us. See, Colin
doesn‟t do that. … He will. He will if he‟s not happy with where it‟s going
and we‟ll get an email from him. But usually ... Doug does the more day to
day, here this is a problem … And, you know, Moira and Doug will talk
about it and they‟ll work it out “
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In this way the individuals whose identities are least likely to be threatened
by the other‟s perspective are tasked with developing shared understanding and
taking or recommending action.
5.4.3.3 Community Resident
The individuals involved with the Framework were able to empathize with
each other by focusing on their common residence in BC. They were also able to
separate the people from their positions, further diffusing the identity based
conflict that had been characteristic of earlier, albeit indirect, interactions. These
comments by Harry and Donna of CAAR illustrate this process:
“I can only imagine some of the things that they have to deal with … it must
be tough, and we do know its tough. You know, they‟re nice people, we go
out with people that are fish health technicians to the farms. They‟re nice
people that are community members in Campbell River and things like that.
So they‟re people for one thing…. I think genuinely a lot of these people …
the managers in Campbell River, for instance, believe these changes have
to be made but they have to answer to their parent offices.”
“one of the things that I‟ve learned so much from this whole thing is that
when you‟re arguing with your opponent, people assume you actually can‟t
sit in a room together. It‟s quite funny because people always say, “wow,
you can‟t actually have Donna and Colin from Marine Harvest in a room
together,” and I‟d be like, “I can sit in a room with them, I can have dinner
with them,” I don‟t care, they‟re very nice people they just have different
beliefs.”
They no longer viewed each other as just salmon farmers or just
environmentalists but as people with common concerns, in many cases, and with
different pressures on them.
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5.4.4 Impact of Organizational Identities: Practice - Praxis
Both CAAR and Marine Harvest, as it emerged post mergers, had
organizational identities that supported and indeed promoted exploration and
experimentation. CAAR clearly identified itself as a strategic environmental
organization focused on one issue, salmon farming. Donna, of CAAR, describes
the process of arriving at their purpose:
“... when we started the question was - are we trying to stop salmon farming
altogether, or are we trying to reform it. That was a huge question, and I
think one of the successes around our coalition is that we actually took the
time to answer that question, and to build consensus around it”
Its creation via a year of facilitated sessions resulted in firmly established
collaborative practices by which its members were able to interpret and integrate
new information. These facilitated sessions also inculcated its senior members
with the skill to collaborate across organizational boundaries and across
disciplines. Every CAAR member interviewed in 2006-2007 expressed their pride
and excitement to be part of CAAR and their strong identification with the group.
As Donna enthused “… it‟s a phenomenal group of people. I always say it‟s an
honour to work with that group.”
The combination of Stolt‟s organizational identity as an ethical, accountable,
industry leader with Marine Harvest‟s identity as a collaborative, innovative and
socially responsible company resulted in an organization well equipped to learn
from a variety of sources. The disciplined practices related to both operations and
interaction that Stolt had developed provided the structures and systems to
interpret and integrate the information brought into the organization via the
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facilitated multi-party initiatives that Marine Harvest had become known for
organizing.
Both CAAR and Marine Harvest identified themselves as collaborative, and
had long histories of joint scientific research initiatives with universities, research
institutes, and independent research organizations. Indeed while negotiating the
Framework CAAR also appealed directly to Marine Harvest‟s organizational
identity as a collaborative organization. Scott, of CAAR, describes CAAR‟s
approach:
“… a lot of people said, “Well you can be the first company. If we do this,
you‟ll be the first one and you‟ll be recognized for this.” So it was pushed
along those lines. Why not be the first not only in BC or the country but in
other areas too. To be the first ones to do this, this and this. And they are
the first company that worked with enviros in this country or even in America
too … working on science and monitoring… “
Both organizations came from a strong science base and considered
science to be the foundation of their credibility. Ironically it seems that their roots
in science helped them to realize that their longer term goals while apparently in
direct conflict were dependent on the public‟s confidence in them. In the case of
CAAR their funders also recognized and supported this notion. In Marine
Harvest‟s case, access to sites for growth and expansion depended on their
social license to operate as demonstrated by government granted site licenses.
Therefore they recognized that the “contested science” that they each had been
promoting was damaging their position and they needed to work together to reestablish and maintain their credibility. As Doug, a consultant to Marine Harvest,
noted:
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“You can‟t continue the practice of the sparring press releases and that sort
of thing … the company understood that …”
In contrast to Marine Harvest, Mainstream identified itself as a sustainable
organization, with financial sustainability the first consideration. The company had
developed highly disciplined and effective operating processes internally and had
implemented them internationally. Activities that could not be linked to financial
performance or to one of the six main areas of sustainability articulated in the
overall strategic plan were neither encouraged nor supported. This approach had
been very successful and as a result Mainstream management took great pride in
the approach they took to their business, even to the extent of considering
themselves a model for the industry. Mainstream also had a long history of joint
scientific research initiatives with universities, research institutes, independent
research organizations, and primary stakeholder groups. However, Mainstream,
characterized learning as a key contributor to its competitive advantage, and saw
knowledge as an asset to be developed and then exploited. Mainstream
appeared to be as skilled at learning across boundaries as Marine Harvest.
However the way that it identified itself (i.e. as a business first, and then as a
competitive salmon farming company) seems to have limited the organizations
from which it could learn. Colin, of Marine Harvest, describes the situation in
2009:
“… there‟s a different level of experience between different companies in
relation to the conflict laden piece of this. Everyone‟s aware of the conflict.
Different companies have approached trying to find solutions ... They‟ve
come at it from different points. So … why has Marine Harvest chosen a
different approach than other people … we laughed a little bit whether
there‟s been any learning and I think I mentioned to you that here we are
several years down the road and Marine Harvest is still the only company
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that uses the approach of meeting with and talking to and trying to engage
with some of the critics, you know, to put it in a nice way … The other
companies avoid it if at all possible. Sometimes they can‟t because
meetings are arranged between government and ourselves and sometimes
they involve the environmental groups ... That‟s about the only time I see
those folks…”
The practices of Mainstream have resulted in a very different approach to
CAAR and to environmental groups in general and as a result have limited their
opportunities to learn from them. Indeed, managers at Mainstream do not believe
that they can learn anything that is of use to their business from the NGO
community.
5.4.5 Feed Forward: Praxis-Practice
Senior managers at Stolt/Marine Harvest (Justin and Colin) actively sought
information from new sources, Doug, a consultant, and Donald, a mediator. The
managers had sufficient influence within Stolt/Marine Harvest to experiment by
having Doug contact Donna, of CAAR, with an offer to engage in collaborative
research. Donna was open to responding to this new behaviour and to jointly
developing a common interpretation with the other CAAR members to bring them
into the dialogue, engaging with Stolt/Marine Harvest directly. By activating and
emphasizing behaviours consistent with their shared identities as scientists,
facilitators, and/or community residents, individuals from Marine Harvest and
CAAR were able to experiment with new cooperative behaviour in their direct
interactions, without changing their beliefs. This experimental praxis was
consistent with some of the fundamental behaviours through which their
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respective organizational identities were expressed, especially collaboration and
the practices and protocols of scientific experimentation.
Curiously, these new behaviours were inconsistent with the primary
activities of the two organizations, which perpetuated their underlying conflict of
interest. CAAR continued to campaign against salmon farming, although CAAR
had committed to warning Marine Harvest. Donna from CAAR described the shift
in CAAR‟s activity relative to Marine Harvest:
“We are in the business of campaigning and they‟re in the business of
raising fish…. so we are continuing with the markets campaign, but we don‟t
name Marine Harvest … That‟s fine, they‟ve done something, they‟ve done
more than anyone else, so they‟ve gotten something from us...”
Similarly, Marine Harvest continued to farm salmon in open net cages as
before. This created tension and introduced caution into interaction between
individuals. Colin of Marine Harvest described his perspective and hopes for the
engagement in this way:
“It‟s about intention to replace some of the rhetoric with actual fact, it‟s about
industry doing some positive change and on the other side, the
environmental groups also changing the way they talk about industry and
agreeing that there can be some other end points beside wholesale removal
of the industry from BC.”
Both groups described themselves as cautiously optimistic about the
outcomes that were likely as a result of their engagement around specific
research projects. However, the underlying resource conflict and the residual
identity conflict were never far from the surface. Donna, of CAAR, viewed the
shift as a quid pro quo for Marine Harvest sharing data and Colin, of Marine
Harvest, wanted the environmental groups to change the way they characterize
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the industry. Their statements revealed their beliefs about both themselves and
the other organization and showed how little they had changed despite their
agreement to collaborate. The following comment from Lana, a manager at
Marine Harvest, provides a perspective on the beliefs of individuals on both sides
of the Framework:
“It‟s a marriage of convenience. We‟re both getting something out of it
because they have to demonstrate to their funders that they‟re working on
solutions… and when we get into a dialogue with them we said, “OK now
you‟ve got to tone down the rhetoric, you‟ve got to give us some breathing
space here and stop attacking our markets” and everything. So it‟s a deal
with the devil on both sides. I mean I‟m sure they think of us as the devil.”
The data show that identity and learning served as filters through which
individuals from both Marine Harvest/Stolt and CAAR made sense of feedback.
Destabilizing feedback, which consists of signals from the environment that were
inconsistent with their understandings, prompted a different interpretation of the
situation, activating different aspects of identity and learning. Individuals at
Marine Harvest experimented with new activities. While new to this situation and
interaction, these activities corresponded to practices associated with the
individuals‟ social and role identities. The interaction between the identities and
learning of the individuals involved and the organizational identities and learning
of Marine Harvest and CAAR encouraged the individual‟s experimentation. In
summary, individuals‟ praxis in response to destabilizing feedback is related not
only to their understanding of the conflict but also to their identities, their learning,
and to the learning and identities of the groups and organizations with which they
identify. These are conditions for productive engagement between individuals.
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5.5 Premise 4: Repeated Engagement: Inter-Organizational
Learning
The data from the BC salmon farming industry show how through repeated
engagement (praxis) to develop and implement collaborative research projects,
the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR, two relatively power balanced
organizations, explored and in some cases altered their assumptions about one
another and themselves and their organizations. Their repeated engagement
resulted in new interpretations of the conflict, of the nature of their identities, and
of those aspects of their own and their organizations‟ identities that are most
salient in this situation. They have also advanced scientific understanding of the
impact of sea lice. Finally, there is evidence that some of the learning by
individuals has been integrated into the practices of their respective
organizations, demonstrating inter-organizational learning.
The new interpretations by the individuals directly involved in the
Framework generated a stream of outcomes that captured the attention of both
organizations, prompting integration at the group and organization level. These
outcomes culminated in the two organizations agreeing to a number of
increasingly complex and challenging collaborative activities, i.e. experiments.
Beginning with The Framework agreement itself, followed by the negotiation of
common research terms of reference and a common roster of scientists, and
most recently with the development and implementation of CAMP, the shared
understanding of the individuals from each organization has formed the
foundation for the increasingly comprehensive integration and collective learning
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not only between them but also between their respective organizations. Table
5-8: Impact of Repeated Engagement - provides an overview of how the
elements unfolded.
Similar to research on collaborative joint learning initiatives between
organizations with compatible activities and goals (e.g. Mason & Leek, 2008),
there is evidence that inter-organizational learning became feasible once the
individuals involved in the Framework began to generate outcomes that were
apparent not only to their respective organizations, but to the regulators and
general public as well. Thus, their prolonged engagement around a series of
cooperative activities, combined with their relatively balanced power and ongoing
institutional support for their engagement created the conditions for individuals
from Marine Harvest and CAAR to engage in dialogue (Bohm, 1996).
A comparative analysis of the nature of the engagement between
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR at different times revealed similar
patterns of behaviour. In this section I use the data to define and illustrate each
element of the theoretical premise introduced in Section 3.3.4: Repeated
Engagement. I present data on the conditions for dialogue, examples of dialogue,
and the inter-organizational learning outcomes of dialogue, including altered
organizational practices and meanings.
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Table 5-8: Impact of Repeated Engagement
Repeated Engagement
2003-2006

2006 - 2007

2008 - 2009

Stages

Gathering info, assessing
risk/return, committing to
work together

Getting going, learning to
interact under the agreed
terms

Getting serious, new
behaviours and beliefs
colliding with old, jointly
managing research

Dialogue Practitioners

Two balanced teams based
on opposing organization
and role identities

Pairs of “representatives”,
based on common
identities

Pairs representing their
combined /common identities
as well as their organizations‟

General Manager (scientist)
Manager (scientist)
Consultant

Manager: Executive
Director
Scientist: Scientist
Consultant:
Manager/Activist

Manager: Executive Director
Scientist: Scientist
Consultant: Manager/Activist
PR: Manager/Activist

Executive Director (lawyer)
2 Scientists, Union
Executive
Praxis

Sought information from
new sources (consultant,
mediator) and engaged in
new behaviours
“Shuttle diplomacy”
Mediated meetings
Negotiated terms of

Scientists: External Scientists
Regular mediated
meetings

Managed projects

Interacted directly, e-mail,
phone

Changed operations - fallow
a migration route

Developed terms of
reference and criteria for
scientists

Monitored & treated sea lice

Negotiated terms for CAMP

Engaged in “Skirmishes”
“Scrimmages”
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Repeated Engagement
2003-2006
engagement, process,
protocols
Assumptions Value in working together
recognized
Organizational similarities
and
Interdependence re. public
explored
acceptance
Learning Practice

Agreement to negotiate
Shared sea lice data on-line
Framework for Dialogue
Neutral language
Hired mediator, consultant,
biologist & manager/activist

2006 - 2007

2008 - 2009

Science is neutral

Working together means
adjustment

Importance of integrity of
output

Reform vs. Eliminate
Action vs. Analysis

Support through annual
budget

CAAR members decrease

Project hierarchy &
structure

CAMP implemented quickly

Tasks assigned to
“specialists”

Sub-contract research
Policy to engage
Acknowledge sea lice risk

Roster of “acceptable”
scientists

Continued financial, social,
structural support

Joint public presentations
and submissions

Marine Harvest‟s global
Sustainability managers meet
with CAAR
Lobby jointly

Shifted
meanings

Value and information to be
gained by cooperating
We are similar
We are interdependent

Science is not neutral

“more than about sea lice”

Cooperation enhances
integrity

“it‟s the right thing to do. You
need to engage …”
“Respect costs you nothing”
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5.5.1 Conditions for Dialogue
The balance of power, the structures and mechanisms that facilitated
repeated engagement and the ongoing institutional support for their engagement
created conditions that enabled individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR to
engage in dialogue. In this section I present data to illustrate each.
5.5.1.1 Balance of Power
For practitioners to have the kind of interactions necessary for dialogue to
occur, the relative power of themselves and their organizations must be
balanced. While Marine Harvest and CAAR each claimed to be at a power
disadvantage relative to the other, by 2004 they were comparatively well
balanced. The anti-salmon farming articles in scientific journals in 2003 and 2004,
the increase in charges for regulatory violations by salmon farming companies, a
recent class action suit, and particularly the recent confirmation by an
independent research body of the impact of sea lice in the Broughton Archipelago
had raised the profile and influence of CAAR while simultaneously diminishing
that of Stolt and other salmon farmers. Stolt/Marine Harvest believed there was a
real threat of punitive legislation being rushed through in order to quell public
fear.
For CAAR‟s part they had taken deliberate action to at least partially offset
what they viewed as a power and resource imbalance. Donna describes CAAR‟s
approach:
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“because the salmon farming companies are multi- national corporations ...
we can‟t outspend them so we have to outthink them ... It was by having
everybody pool all their information and work collaboratively we‟re able to
take it (sea lice) ... to being one of the most prominent environmental
issues in BC”
This re-balancing of the power relationships set the conditions for both
parties to establish dialogue (Bohm, 1996). Consequently when Doug, the
consultant, contacted them on behalf of Stolt, with an offer to share sea lice data,
the response from Donna and the executives of the CAAR member organizations
was cautiously positive. Donna described the situation:
“They were tired of being targeted in the media all the time. They said it
affected their morale… people recognize they‟re the targets and somebody
in Stolt made a decision –... Justin the head of Stolt Canada – that: “Let‟s
try and approach these people who are criticizing us and also targeting us in
the markets.”
In addition to trusting Doug, the individuals‟ within CAAR felt they
understood the motives of the head of Stolt Canada. They believed that their
market campaigns had negatively affected the demand for BC salmon and the
morale of salmon farm employees. While power had become more balanced
between CAAR and Marine Harvest, it appeared at this time that the conflict was
well entrenched and firmly based in identity differences and resource competition.
Another significant shift in relative power occurred in 2008 as a result of the
negotiation of CAMP in 2008. Marine Harvest through its proposal of an
experiment (CAMP) addressed not only one of CAAR‟s primary concerns but also
its own commitment to adaptive management. However it challenged the salient
identity of a number of CAAR members. They could not support any form of
salmon farming in the Broughton Archipelago, even if it advanced scientific
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understanding and so four organizations left the coalition. The reduction in CAAR
members, subsequent to the negotiation of CAMP provides an example of how
power was re-balanced coincident with a shift and re-confirmation of CAAR‟s
organizational identity as a science based organization.
As a result of the CAMP negotiation, CAAR confirmed its commitment to
working with Marine Harvest to improve industry practices and in doing so
increased its power with the industry as opposed to its power over the industry
(Parker-Follett, 2003). Post 2008, CAAR members included well known, well
funded, and for the most part clearly science based organizations, such as the
David Suzuki Foundation, the Georgia Strait Alliance, the Living Oceans Society,
the T. Buck Suzuki Foundation, and the Watershed Watch Salmon Society. Their
credibility, along with their less (relative to some former CAAR member
organizations) controversial profiles served to enhance CAAR‟s power to
influence industry practices via participation in experiments. The organizations
that left CAAR, such as the First Nations, retained and confirmed their
organizational identities in opposition to salmon farming and some returned to
adversarial practices intended to increase power “over” industry (Parker-Follett,
2003).
The practitioners involved in the Framework were able to have the kind of
interactions necessary for dialogue, because the relative power of themselves
and their organizations was balanced. While the nature of their relative power
shifted over the course of their interactions, along with the salient aspects of their
organizational identities, these shifts maintained or enhanced the power balance,
enabling further and deeper dialogue.
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5.5.1.2 The Structures and Mechanisms of Repeated Engagement
Beginning in 2004, practitioners from CAAR and Marine Harvest have
engaged with one another repeatedly around an increasingly complex roster of
activities. These activities began with the negotiation of the terms of their
interaction and the research initiatives that they would undertake, and expanded
to include the development of terms of reference for specific research projects
and a common roster of contract researchers, the negotiation and implementation
of CAMP, which included the sub-contracting and ongoing project management
of research, and finally joint presentations and lobbying.
Early interactions, praxis, were structured and formal and facilitated by a
mediator. Initial discussions about the possibility of joint research took place over
a period of twelve months in a series of meetings between the issues consultant
and two senior managers from Stolt and the four to five member negotiating team
from CAAR. Doug, the consultant to Stolt/Marine Harvest, explains the basic
structure and activities of the meetings:
“There were obviously ground rules for the meetings…. they would take
place usually at a minimum for half a day and not infrequently for a full day.
I can only recall once or twice where we … required actually meeting a
couple of consecutive days ... there‟s the typical kind of tools that you bring
to it. You try to find neutral locations for meetings … We‟ve had some of
our meetings, our full group meetings at Marine Harvest‟s office in Campbell
River … other times it‟s … in a hotel … one of the key negotiations …
actually took place in Sointula in the community hall there.”
According to Doug the regular meetings provided a venue “to talk in a
structured way more frequently… because that‟s helpful; it avoids
misunderstandings and misapprehensions.” The repeated meetings provide
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strong evidence of the sustained attention of the individuals involved. The
meetings provided individuals with additional information to interpret as well as a
forum to come to a shared understanding.
As the relationship developed and particularly after the Framework
agreement had been signed late in 2005 the number of practitioners involved
from each organization increased and roles became more specialized. Donna, of
CAAR, explains:
“driving all those projects there are subcommittees and working teams …
The negotiating team members are certainly responsible for ... making sure
projects are moving forward and ensuring that the funding is in place and …
ensuring that all of the details of those projects are agreed to by both
parties,”
The core group of eight individuals held formal meetings with an agenda
and mediator at least four times a year and more often if necessary. It was in
these meetings that the majority of decisions regarding the Framework would be
made. However there were always informal conversations via e-mail and
telephone going on amongst a larger group regarding the projects. Colin, of
Marine Harvest, talks about the range of people involved in the projects:
“…there are elements of the Coastal Alliance that I never speak directly to;
that‟s true. There‟s probably two or three or four in Living Oceans I never
speak to and many more in David Suzuki … it‟s fairly concentrated, that
group of, what, eight, seven/eight people are the core of the relationship and
the Framework.”
Colin, of Marine Harvest, and Donna, of CAAR, were most active in
managing the overall relationship, while Moira, an experienced activist/issue
manager hired by CAAR, and Doug, a consultant to Marine Harvest, managed
issues that arose “day to day”. Stephanie, a registered professional biologist, with
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experience in the oil and gas industry, the tar sands, mining, and forestry, was
added to the Marine Harvest team to share responsibility with Harry of CAAR for
managing and monitoring the actual projects, which involved several other
individuals from the CAAR member organizations. This delegation of
responsibility indicates a somewhat greater level of mutual understanding and
alignment between the organizations. Stephanie‟s and Donna‟s comments,
respectively, illustrate the mutual commitment to following “good science”:
“… that‟s the philosophy here is recognizing that we don‟t understand it all,
but we are responsible to make sure that we‟re taking good management
steps to deal with issues when they arise. And, what that means to me is to
get some good science around it and data and understanding as to what the
issue is and isn‟t. “
“Within CAAR for example we do have a science team of experts. It‟s
headed up by a PhD. We have biologists on the team. And, they‟ll work
directly with Marine Harvest‟s science folks or biologists on the details, the,
you know, really specific methodology for the research or analysis. And, so,
then, you know, it kind of devolves to those teams to sort out all those
details. And then, when they‟ve reached agreement, then that comes back
to the negotiating team and the company…”
As mentioned above the responsibility for putting together the program for
joint research was delegated to Stephanie, of Marine Harvest, and Harry, of
CAAR, individuals whose identities were rooted in scientific research and
environmental protection.
Beginning with the initial contact in 2004, individuals from Marine Harvest
and CAAR repeatedly engaged with one another around increasingly complex,
increasingly cooperative, and increasingly interdependent activities. These
activities activated common identities and the practices related to those identities
and provided the individuals with opportunities to experiment with new actions
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(praxis) and subsequently with new interpretations of the results of those actions.
Over time the scope of the dialogue expanded as the number of individuals
involved in the engagement increased and the new interpretations developed
within the Framework group were introduced into the two organizations.
5.5.1.3 Institutional Support
The joint research initiatives undertaken by Marine Harvest and CAAR
received strong institutional support from the provincial and to a lesser extent
federal governments. The provincial government‟s Cabinet Minister for
aquaculture described the agreement as a “breakthrough” and stated that he was
“very, very pleased” that the salmon farming industry and the environmentalists
had agreed “to work together and develop a plan to allow for … sustainable
aquaculture” (Simpson, 2006). Although not formally part of the agreement, the
provincial government provided both financial and administrative support to it on
specific licensing and regulatory issues, and in supporting some of the research.
Subsequent provincial governments continued to publically praise the
cooperative work of Marine Harvest and CAAR and they were invited to make a
joint presentation to the Special Legislative Committee on Sustainable
Aquaculture in 2007.
While support from government regulators was strong, the announcement of
the Framework agreement in 2006 took both the salmon farming industry and the
anti-salmon farming groups by surprise and both Marine Harvest and CAAR were
criticized by their peers and accused of “consorting with the enemy”. This
criticism has continued.
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Institutional support for the Framework within Marine Harvest has survived
mergers in both 2005 and 2006. Colin confirmed that while “…some of the
personalities and names have changed … but the overall company‟s commitment
to improving sustainability and to transparency and information has remained
constant.”
Despite criticism from their peers, corporate and government support of
Marine Harvest and CAARs joint research has been public and persistent. This
official and institutional support for their engagement appears to have
encouraged its continuation and to have sustained it, financially as well as
socially, during periods of mutual adjustment.
5.5.2 Dialogue
By sustaining their attention, the development and implementation of the
Framework provided the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR with
opportunities to explore their assumptions about expectations, meaning, and
identity. Through their conversations and information exchanges, the individuals
were able to recognize assumptions and gain new understanding of the extent to
which their praxis was influenced by their and their organizations‟ learning,
identities, and their practices. Over repeated interactions, praxis influenced
practices within the Framework group and their dialogue deepened. In
subsequent interactions even deeper assumptions were explored, leading to
further shifts in praxis and ultimately practice. There is evidence that individuals‟
interpretations of the conflict and identity shifted as well, demonstrating learning.

194
In this section I provide evidence from three key episodes of individuals
exploring and recognizing the impact of their assumptions, and the resulting shifts
in behaviour and meanings related to identity, learning, and conflict. I present
data on the individual and collective learning in the next section, 5.5.3, Outcome
of Dialogue: Learning.
5.5.2.1 Exploring Assumptions Rooted in Expectations around
Conflict
By initiating direct interaction, individuals within Marine Harvest/Stolt
challenged existing practices and expectations in the BC salmon farming industry
about how to respond to conflict. This change in approach demonstrated their
recognition that while CAAR operated from a different logic that was not going to
change, it might be possible for them to work together. Colin, of Marine Harvest,
states that they had “learned that this is a very well organized, well funded,
determined group … and that they are not easily ended or dissuaded.”
Recognizing that CAAR‟s approach to the conflict appeared unlikely to change,
individuals at Marine Harvest altered their praxis.
Marine Harvest/Stolt‟s original offer of greater transparency and operational
data gave CAAR access to information hitherto unavailable to environmentalists
in any salmon farming jurisdiction in the world. This prompted members of CAAR
to question their assumptions about the value of collaborating with a salmon
farming company. While CAAR acknowledged Stolt‟s self interest in approaching
them, they also recognized an opportunity to gain access to proprietary
knowledge of salmon farming that might be used to advance both scientific
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understanding and their specific agenda. Gord, a biologist and science advocate,
from CAAR describes:
“… a lot of the data that the farms have about their operations was seen to
be confidential, so we had to try to create a forum and an agreement that
would open up the analysis, hopefully pinpoint some common
understandings around lack of information ...”
“One of the advantages that we‟ll have in this agreement is that we‟ll have
detailed information on the cost structure of the industry”
Hence, individuals from CAAR recognized an opportunity that was compelling
enough for them to reconsider some of their firmly held assumptions about
working with “the enemy”.
Perceptions between the individuals involved in the Framework continued to
shift as they continued to interact. The following comment made by Donna, of
CAAR, is illustrative, “I say we‟ve learned to mutually respect each other for the
work. My understanding of the complexity of managing salmon farms has gone
way up… it is way harder than anyone would think.” Through the ongoing
discussions prior to coming to an agreement the individuals from Marine Harvest
also continued to adjust their assumptions about CAAR‟s actions and recognize
the extent of the similarity between the expectations placed on each organization.
As Colin, of Marine Harvest, notes:
“… those groups (CAAR) are businesses and in order to attract investment
in their business they have to have a campaign; they have to loudly
proclaim what it is they‟re trying to change. If they get to the point where
they say, well, our work is done, then they don‟t attract any more
investment…”
Through their ongoing interaction in negotiating the Framework the
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR came to recognize and question
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some of their assumptions regarding their organizations‟ response to the conflict,
and in particular the similarities of the challenges facing them and the potential
value of working together. They both came to realize that there might be an
opportunity to advance their own agendas by collaborating. Marine Harvest
could, in effect, buy time for research to be conducted on sea lice. While CAAR
would have access to proprietary data to increase the integrity of its positions.
Both organizations sought to build credibility in the eyes of the broader
community. CAAR sought credibility with their funders and Marine Harvest with
the regulators and legislators. By agreeing to conduct collaborative research
projects they were able to alter praxis even while retaining many of their
assumptions about their own and the other‟s identity.
5.5.2.2 Exploring Assumptions Rooted in a Common Identity
The process of selecting independent researchers to conduct their first joint
research project surfaced assumptions rooted in individuals‟ common identity of
scientist and the meanings and expectations related to that identity. As discussed
in prior sections, the common identity of scientist allowed individuals to bridge
identity based conflict to focus on the socio-cognitive aspects of the sea lice
controversy. However, selecting the researchers to carry out the work raised
deeply held assumptions about the neutrality of science and scientists. This task
provided the Framework group with an opportunity to assess what was really
important to them in terms of both their own identity and the identity of their
contract researchers. The interaction around this task resulted in the group
reaching a common understanding of their requirements and expectations of
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research and then explicitly integrating that understanding into their group
process and into their future work.
A group of researchers from Simon Fraser University that were strongly
associated with environmental activism and advocacy responded to the first
Request for Proposal. Marine Harvest did what Doug referred to as an “emotional
gut check” as to whether or not they could work with them. Despite the preexisting conflict between these researchers and the industry, the Framework
group awarded them the project, confident that their integrity as scientists would
mitigate any personal positions. They came “within striking distance” of starting
the work before it all fell apart, ostensibly over challenges to protocols, as Doug
describes:
“I mean, there‟s people at Marine Harvest that understand this stuff pretty
well… they‟ve got good scientific credentials themselves. And, we ended
up in a negotiation with the, you know, Marine Harvest, CAAR and Rutledge
(the lead researcher)”
Following this protracted and unsuccessful attempt to initiate a project, the
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR realized that they needed to be
cognizant of, what individuals describe as, “the science versus advocacy” tension
in the scientific community. The group came to recognize how that plays out and
what it means in terms of getting to solid, reliable information. While “the science
versus advocacy” tension was not news to the individuals, it did surface
expectations around the role of science and scientists within the group. Doug, a
consultant to Marine Harvest, goes on to explain:
“... we learned quite a lesson… it is probably important to try and find people
who don‟t bring baggage with them out of the research community... And,
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we actually put together a list of criteria that you would check and see – you
know, is the person respected by their peers? Are they published? Has
their work been put into practice? Is it informed, et cetera et cetera? And,
we also realized we needed to make sure … that we‟d perhaps targeted
them more to people that we understood were the experts in the field.”
The assumptions surfaced during their first attempt at selecting researchers
led to a dialogue about the expectations of research and eventually to a shared
understanding. Stephanie of Marine Harvest described the outcome of that
process:
“So, it‟s better to structure a project such that you can collaborate, which is
a challenge … scoping it according to the objectives of the project not
necessarily the overall objective of salmon farming is inherently good or
salmon farming is inherently bad.”
They specified clear selection criteria and then based on those criteria they
jointly developed a list of scientists as possible recipients of future Requests for
Proposal.
As a result of their sustained interaction with each other individuals in the
Framework group were able to gain a deeper understanding of their expectations
and meanings related to the identity of scientist, in this case the neutrality of
science. They came to realize that the credibility of their joint research would be
irreparably damaged if it was seen to favour either industry or environmentalists.
They used this realization to articulate practices to guide future praxis. Through
this process the individuals in the Framework group from both CAAR and Marine
Harvest affirmed the meaning that they collectively attached to the identity of
scientist (i.e. neutrality) and through their praxis established practices to ensure
their expectations were understood.
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5.5.2.3 Exploring Assumptions Rooted in Individual and
Organizational Identity
Marine Harvest‟s offer to work with CAAR to develop a coordinated area
management plan (CAMP) for the Broughton Archipelago was a significant
departure from past practice and the biggest challenge to both internal and
external expectations to date. The discussions around CAMP caused individuals
to confront the meanings that they attached to certain activities, like salmon
farming in the Broughton, as well as to aspects of their individual and
organizational identities. These interactions also challenged expectations
regarding learning, and in particular what constitutes “good science” and the
extent of individuals‟ and organizational commitment to experimental learning.
The interaction between individuals in the Framework group and between
individuals within CAAR resulted in a re-configuration of CAAR and an affirmation
of its identity as an organization committed to reforming aquaculture and learning
via the scientific method (i.e. experimentation). Marine Harvest affirmed its
commitment to adaptive management and its identity as an organization based
on science, albeit a slightly more action based proactive approach to science.
By taking the fish out of a number of farms every other year, as part of
CAMP, Marine Harvest could create a farm free migration corridor for wild
salmon, which could then be compared with corridors with salmon farms – a true
experiment. This suggestion was positively received and according to Donna of
CAAR “would be a substantial breakthrough.” The negotiations on the plan took
two consecutive days of mediated meetings. Donna describes CAAR‟s intentions
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in agreeing to CAMP, “...we are trying to see what we can achieve by working
with the industry at this time. And we‟re going to stay the course for a while at
least to see whether we can achieve some significant gains.”
However to do this presented major challenges to some environmental
groups and First Nations within the CAAR organization. The specific area
suggested for the migratory corridor, the Tribune-Fife, was often referred to as
“ground zero” for the sea lice debate. Certain environmental groups and First
Nations wanted all farms taken out of this area and would not even consider any
plan that implied otherwise, such as having farms fallow every other year.
The prospect of being seen to support salmon farming in any way in the
Tribune-Fife corridor challenged and activated individual and organizational
identities within CAAR. This area represented such a key part of the identity of
individuals, such as Alexandra Morton (who had done much of her research in
that area) and several First Nations leaders, as well as the organizations they
represented that the defensiveness provoked was insurmountable. The MTTC,
which was made up of 4 First Nations in the area, and Raincoast Research,
Alexandra Morton‟s group withdrew from CAAR over the CAMP amendments. As
Donna of CAAR notes:
“We had a few hurdles where … the staff of the organizations said, no, we
can‟t ever support this. And, we‟ve had to work through that and say, well,
you kind of agreed to the strategy when you signed on … So, now it‟s
playing out and I‟m sorry you didn‟t understand this is how it‟s going to play
out.”
The sustained attention and prolonged negotiation between individuals at
multiple levels of the CAAR organizations surfaced a number of assumptions

201
about the meanings attached to places, like the Tribune-Fife corridor, to activities
like salmon farming, and to processes such as gathering experimental data. The
exploration of these assumptions and the process of developing a shared
understanding prompted some individuals to withdraw their organizations from
CAAR.
The apparently greater willingness to truly experiment represents a shift in
some individuals approach to “science”. For example, Marine Harvest had
entered into the Framework hoping to “buy time” ostensibly to allow “science to
do its work”. Colin summarizes Marine Harvest‟ research practices and the
meaning that he and the organization attached to “good science work”:
“… but it‟s getting the patience and doing the good work, which is slow...
Science is slower. Monitoring takes time. And then, you have to look at the
patterns in the data and figure out what to do. So, that‟s the challenge.
We‟re just never able to get all the information quick enough to deal with the
conflict as effectively as we could.”
Despite his acknowledgement that “science is slow” Colin and the managers
at Marine Harvest undertook some major changes to their operations via CAMP
and as Colin says, “…this was maybe done before we had all the scientific
information, which is still going on…” The decision by the organization to move
before it “had all of the information” is a significant shift in behaviour and
demonstrates a subtle shift in the meaning Colin and Marine Harvest attached to
“good science”.
Through the negotiation of CAMP the individuals from Marine Harvest and
CAAR surfaced deeply held assumptions about their identities and their
organizations‟ identities in the context of their joint research. Through their
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dialogue they gained a deeper and common understanding of the adjustments
each of them needed to make to support their ongoing collaboration.
Through the process of negotiating CAMP the individuals from both CAAR
and Marine Harvest affirmed the meaning that they collectively attached to their
relationship and through their praxis established practices to ensure their
expectations were understood. As a result of the CAMP negotiation and their
subsequent adjustments, CAAR and Marine Harvest confirmed their
organizational commitment to working together to improve industry practices.
Their actions affirmed both organizations‟ identity as science-based and focused
on solving problems, while shifting the meaning each associated with “good
science”.
5.5.3 Outcome of Dialogue: Learning
Interpreting is a social activity that affords motivated individuals the
opportunity to introduce their learning, in this case from the practices developed
in the Framework group, into the feed forward processes within their
organization. Hence the shared understandings and collective actions of the
Framework group prompted processes of interpretation and internal experiments
in the two organizations. Even as the dialogue and level of shared understanding
continued to develop between the individuals involved with the Framework,
changes in their respective organizations‟ practices, such as the signing of the
Framework agreement and later the implementation of CAMP, provide strong
evidence that individuals‟ learning has influenced their organizational learning. In
this section I provide evidence of changes to practices and to meaning, learning,
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at the individual and organizational level resulting from the praxis of individuals
from Marine Harvest and CAAR.
5.5.3.1 Individual Learning
As a result of their repeated engagement individuals from both Marine
Harvest and CAAR appear to have altered their beliefs around a number of key
aspects of their identity and the conflict (See Table 5-9: Evidence of Individual
Learning for representative quotes).
There is evidence of changes in individuals‟ conflict responses and
practices. At the beginning of their interaction individuals were reluctant to even
meet. When they did meet, after six months of communicating through a third
party, all interactions were mediated and tightly controlled and between a small
group of senior practitioners. Over time interaction has become less formal, more
varied, and involves a wider range of people from multiple levels of both
organizations.
Whereas in the beginning the emphasis was on negotiating terms to
manage their identity differences, it had shifted to understanding and closing the
gaps in knowledge around sea lice and closed containment systems i.e. to sociocognitive conflict. Individuals have come to realize that collaborating does not
mean agreeing on everything. Indeed it appears that individuals now make more
“strategic use” of conflict to achieve specific goals, such as letting people vent or
playing “good cop – bad cop” to raise awareness of an issue. While the conflict
professionals handle the inevitable day to day conflicts or “skirmishes”. In general
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engaging with “the enemy” does not represent the threat to identity that it did in
the beginning of their relationship.
While individuals‟ social and role identities have remained stable, the
behaviour by which they express their identities and the aspects of their identities
that are most salient appear to have shifted. This is most notable in the way that
key individuals express their common identity of scientist. Early in their
relationship the identity of scientist seemed to signify “expert” and resulted in
“dueling press releases” and the defense of generally adversarial positions.
Through their interaction, the identity of scientist has come to signify
responsibility for disciplined data gathering and analysis. As stated previously, it
has shifted to the process of science as opposed to the outcomes of science.
Also, through their interaction individuals have come to a common understanding
of their similarities; in terms of the constituencies they each must manage and
their mutual commitment to protecting the marine habitat.
Over repeated interactions, the dialogue within the Framework group
deepened. In subsequent interactions even deeper assumptions were explored,
leading to further shifts in praxis and ultimately to changes in individual practice
relative to the conflict and their identities, demonstrating learning.
Table 5-9: Evidence of Individual Learning
Individual level learning: Representative quotations
Conflict

“… so, we‟ve known these people for a long time…. we used to
be in greater conflict and now we just disagree, but we still meet
together. And, that gave us a completely different relationship.”
Donna
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Individual level learning: Representative quotations
“ …they were saying they‟re not facts. That‟s I think why we‟re
trying to work together because we don‟t agree on the facts. And,
so, they‟ve got their knickers in a knot … Moira and Doug will talk
about it and they‟ll work it out and they‟ll probably amend the
communications framework or something. And, so, part of it‟s an
emotional thing ... the heat‟s on and he‟s taking it out on us. And,
so, you kind of have to... ride the storm a bit … if there‟s really
huge issues like we‟re walking away from the dialogue, we bring in
our mediator and he would call a meeting.” Donna
“I think we didn‟t handle it right at the beginning either. We were
too dismissive and there was this cavalier attitude that we had a
right to farm there, we had our licenses, we were a business.
Darn it, people needed our money, didn‟t you want to see
investments? It was very paternalistic, business, the economy,
this is good for you…” Lana
Identity

“for the last year and a half every week or two I‟ve been working
with stakeholders, but really it‟s the general public. I‟ve been
visiting chamber groups, Rotary groups. And, they seem to be a
good mix of business people and what not. And, I‟ve gone up and
down the island speaking with those groups... “ Rob
“But we‟re trying to do it in a way that‟s information-based and
accurate, and not just shrill. And again it takes you a long time to
earn credibility and only an instant to lose it. And so we‟re very
careful about that as well.” Harry
“… the first thing we had to do was to acknowledge that
everybody who‟s out there doing some work has a valid piece
to...to contribute. If you‟re going to stand on a position that certain
people are simply not doing work that‟s worth recognizing, then
you‟re never going to be able to include their information ... And,
that happens.” Stephanie
“… there‟s no risk to me organizationally in Canada to undertake
this.” Colin
“I‟m out there with all the other salmon farmers looking at it
wondering if I‟m a nut, you know, because it‟s a risk. Right? And,
but, I think that you can‟t stick your head in the sand.” Stephanie

Learning
(process)

“I‟d probably let all these little things slip by. So, that‟s why to me
a team has to have all diverse people on it to make sure
everything gets picked up” Donna
“It‟s harder to convince your colleagues of a strategy than it can
be to convince your opponents…” Donna
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Individual level learning: Representative quotations
“I‟m just saying that I think it‟s the right way to go. I can‟t translate
that into money.” Stephanie
“… another one that I‟ve worked on... it‟s looking at clam beach
contamination in the Broughton Archipelago. … I do the same
process with everybody. It‟s basically, what is your issue? What‟s
your concern? Let‟s scope it effectively. Are you worried about this
and not this? Like, what‟s in? What‟s out?“ Stephanie

5.5.3.2 Organizational Learning
In July 2009, after just over 5 years of engagement, Marine Harvest and
CAAR made a joint press release, crediting their jointly managed and monitored
fish farm management program with reduced sea lice levels in the Broughton
Archipelago (Lavoie, 2009). The notion that a salmon farming company and
environmentalists could work together was novel in 2004. After years of repeated
engagement Marine Harvest and CAAR regard direct engagement as the only
way to resolve differences in understanding. This is a distinct shift in the practice
of both organizations, and appears to stem directly from the praxis of the key
individuals. Colin, of Marine Harvest, and Donna, of CAAR, give the perspective
of the two organizations:
“…the only way to affect any positive outcome is through engagement and
working with these folks…. it should be clear to everybody in this industry by
now that those groups are not going away. They are in fact part of the
fabric of our culture ... people look to environmental groups to sound the
warning bell as do I. So, they‟re not going to go away. So, trying to avoid
them or defend against them or destroy them or whatever is not going to
happen. So, can you find ways to work with them within the environment of
conflict?”
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“… I don‟t know what the alternative would be to get to a solution ... I guess
the best way to frame it is no matter what you do at some point you have to
sit down and talk with your opponent even if it‟s for them to stop doing what
they‟re doing, … So, you negotiate no matter what.”
Concurrent with this fundamental shift in their behaviour toward one another
over the period of negotiating and implementing the Framework, there is
evidence of a shift in the meanings that are attached to Marine Harvest and
CAAR‟s identities and to the conflict between them. While neither organization
has dramatically changed the characteristics that it claims are central, enduring,
and unique, i.e. its identity, the actions through which each expresses those
characteristics have shifted and the action which each takes in response to
conflict have changed.
For example, Marine Harvest and CAAR still identify themselves as
collaborative organizations; however the range of organizations they view as
legitimate collaborators has expanded. This may be as a result of the benefits
derived from their joint research. Contrary to the practice in the industry prior to
2004, everyone involved with the Framework agrees that their engagement with
“the enemy” has value. As Stephanie, of Marine Harvest, says “You know, we‟ve
learned that continuing to be engaged has value although it also puts you at risk
in that you have to share more about your company.” This statement illustrates a
fundamental shift in the belief that the organizations had – that is “the value of
engaging with “the enemy” outweighs the risks”. As Rob, of Marine Harvest
explains:
“… if a stakeholder is identified or a stakeholder approaches us, we‟re
interested in engaging …. that‟s our policy is to engage. We‟re not going to
sit back … There is one fellow in particular ... he also has the website „Save

208
our Salmon‟... It doesn‟t bring any balance to the subject whatsoever. So,
we‟re a little stunned … but, you know, just next week we‟re meeting with
him and touring him out to the farm and that‟s what we need to do,
understand him a little more. His heart‟s in the right place, but…”
Marine Harvest‟s plan to meet with the philanthropist behind “Save our
Salmon”, an especially strident activist group, to discuss funding for a project, is a
further example of how the shift in meanings attached to being a collaborative
organization has resulted in a shift in their response to conflict.
Marine Harvest and CAAR have undertaken to jointly approach both levels
of government which has had the effect of aligning their identities. Moira, of
CAAR, describes their joint efforts with regard to closed containment as “…
another area where we and Marine Harvest are going to be pushing the
government very hard… we did meet with … the provincial minister jointly with
Marine Harvest”. In addition, they have made a number of joint presentations on
their collaborative research including to the Special Legislative Committee on
Sustainable Aquaculture, and to the World Wildlife Foundations international
multi-party Salmon Aquaculture Dialogue. They have also presented their
opposing views together in the same session to regional district councils
regarding zoning changes, and to a conference of travel writers.
This public alignment has separated them to a certain extent from their
peers. Colin of Marine Harvest explains:
“My colleagues view me as a traitor if you will.... someone who‟s willing to
sit down with the enemy. And, on the other side of the coin they (CAAR)
say that they have the same kinds of problems.”
Donna of CAAR shared similar reactions from peers in the environmental
movement:
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“... I imagine if I was in Marine Harvest... I‟m sure Colin has been hit with,
you know, what the heck are you doing working with those (people)? ...
there are some other NGO‟s out there or individuals who say that we
shouldn‟t be so nice in terms of how we work with industry. We should be
more critical ...”
Aligning with each other publically and over time is distinctive in their
respective peer groups and thus their joint activity has shifted their respective
organizational identities. Over time each organization has come to see their
collaboration as part of how they do things.
Both, Marine Harvest and CAAR continue to identify themselves as
organizations rooted in science. Indeed, in both organizations the logic and
language of experimentation and the scientific method has diffused, with lawyers
and public relations people regularly talking about comparing performance to a
control group. The two organizations jointly and separately emphasize adherence
to the appropriate and valid scientific practices and protocols. Donna of CAAR
states her organization‟s requirements:
“… we have individuals that are very hardcore scientists who have
expectations around things … So, we have a strong demand on the
scientific rigor of things.”
The re-configuration of CAAR after the CAMP negotiation affirmed its
organizational commitment to the scientific method and articulated the practices
that entails. Rigorous experimental design and execution is what Marine Harvest
and CAAR collectively understand to be “good science”.
By 2009 both Marine Harvest and CAAR showed evidence of changed
beliefs as well as changed behaviours, related to their conflict. Both organizations
and indeed the broader community have learned more about the impact and
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dynamics of sea lice. Marine Harvest has changed its treatment of the parasite in
response to this information and CAAR has sponsored research based on farm
operating data and adjusted its materials according to that research. Marine
Harvest has learned that fallowing farms for a season may be “better for
business” and CAAR has learned about the complexity of salmon farming.
Marine Harvest has a better appreciation for how the environmental movement
works and does not react to every statement. Finally, both organizations have
seen value in being more transparent about their activities. Marine Harvest
recognizes that transparency decreases suspicion. Marine Harvest created the
role of Communications Manager, part of whose responsibility is to connect with
stakeholders and the general public. As Stephanie, of Marine Harvest says:
“… you can‟t stick your head in the sand. We‟re here. We want to stay on
the coast forever. And, the only way to do that is to be credible. And, if you
have issues, you have to find out what they are and deal with it.”
Marine Harvest now hosts public tours on one of its farms and regularly has
students from the University of Vancouver Island monitoring its farm operations.
CAAR recognizes that giving Marine Harvest warning of their actions generally
elevates the tone of the public debate because it allows them to give more
thoughtful answers and not “a knee jerk response”.
Both organizations continue to speak against the actions of the other in the
press. This is in breach of their agreement and in the past these kinds of
statements usually prompted defensive responses, via press release or letters to
the editor. While both organizations continue to breach their agreement, the
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responses have been much less defensive. As Rob of Marine Harvest and
Donna of CAAR explain:
“We both breach the communication protocols. I will sit here and tell you
that they breach it ten times more than we breach it, but they have multiple
members that all speak. Really we have one or two … we‟re held quite
accountable to what we say, but, you know, I‟ll have to be fair and say that
we both push it...”
“We‟ve had times where I‟ve definitely had to lash out when things aren‟t
working… Like, today, I was meeting with Colin by phone. We had some
issues we needed to talk about. We have pretty much open door access,
right. So, I can phone him … like, we just put out some information. They
say we didn‟t follow the communications protocol. They get their knickers in
a knot. We, kind of, push back. So, there‟s all these little scrimmages that
happen all the time. And, to me, the deal is you navigate through those
scrimmages while you‟re keeping on track with the overall direction…”
Rather than issue a “dueling press release” as had been the past practice,
now the individuals involved contact one another directly and hold them
accountable for their behaviour. Interestingly both Marine Harvest and CAAR
acknowledge their own culpability and recognize the risk it poses to the overall
relationship.
While both Marine Harvest and CAAR show evidence of having learned as
a result of their engagement, their fundamental conflict over the use of the marine
resources remains. They have been able to shift much of their activity to
resolving the differences in knowledge of the issues, while downplaying the
problematic practices of each other. Donna sums up CAAR‟s position after more
than six years of repeated engagement with Marine Harvest:
“We‟re willing to have a conversation with industry … even if we don‟t agree
with them and we try and play quietly, but we don‟t give up our positions.
As a friend of mine once said, you know, respect costs you nothing … you

212
can go in there and talk to your enemy with respect … it doesn‟t mean
you‟re giving up.”
In the BC salmon farming industry repeated engagement between
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR, two relatively power balanced
organizations, allowed them to explore and to alter assumptions about one
another, themselves and their organizations. Their repeated engagement
resulted in new interpretations of the conflict, of the nature of their identities, and
of those aspects of their own and their organizations‟ identities that are most
salient in this situation. They also advanced scientific understanding of the impact
of sea lice. Finally, some of the learning by individuals has been integrated into
the practices in their respective organizations, demonstrating inter-organizational
learning. See Table 5-10: Evidence of Inter-organizational Learning for
representative quotations.
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Table 5-10: Evidence of Inter-organizational Learning
Organizational learning: Representative quotations
Conflict

Marine Harvest

CAAR

“… we acknowledge that there is a
risk. We didn‟t acknowledge that
in 2003... I know internally we
knew sea lice was a risk because
we were trying to manage them in
the 90‟s.” Colin

“…. obviously, we don‟t see eye
to eye …. We know each other.
It‟s all quite civilized, but we
have quite different, you know,
diametrically opposed views on
some issues.” Moira

“… what I can see … is an
acceptance from the company...
this just isn‟t about sea lice.” Rob

“… we couldn‟t get information
from them(Mainstream)
because they didn‟t trust us.
And, it made a difference having
“…can‟t we learn from each other.
Marine Harvest there because
Can‟t we get over whatever‟s
keeping us separate, knowing that they would say, no, it‟s ok. You
that‟s kind of a bit naive because of can do this ... it still was not the
the way science works ... we have same and we never really got
persevered on trying to bring some agreement on some stuff.”
Donna
of the researchers together that
don‟t normally work together. And,
we‟re having some success in
doing that.” Stephanie
Identity

“… it‟s a lot easier for me to say,
well, in line with corporate thinking
we‟re working towards greater
levels of sustainability. So, if these
studies that we do poke us in the
eye a bit, well, that means we have
to learn from that; we have to
change…” Colin
“… that‟s the philosophy here is
recognizing that we don‟t
understand it all, but we are
responsible to make sure that
we‟re taking good management
steps to deal with issues when
they arise. And, what that means
to me is to get some good science
around it and data and
understanding as to what the issue
is and isn‟t. And then, whatever
those results show then we make

“… our fallback has always
been even if we can‟t get
government to change we do as
much as we can just with
industry...” Donna
“… some other NGO‟s out there
or individuals who say that we
shouldn‟t be so nice … We
should be more critical ... do
more legal actions. But we are
trying to see what we can
achieve by working with the
industry at this time.” Harry
“… I would say, well, it‟s not
about trust you guys. It‟s never
about trust. so, if you measure
success not by their view of the
world and what science they‟re
willing to accept, but by how the
industry is being managed or
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Organizational learning: Representative quotations
management decisions after
the environment‟s being
them.” Stephanie
impacted, then you have a
much higher chance of
success.” Donna
Learning “There have been some gains in
terms of management strategies
trying to adapt, adaptive
management strategies ...
Adaptive management is basically
incorporating experimental design
into management to try and
elucidate whether the management
action is yielding the effects that
you want.” Vince

“... it was a major breakthrough
for us to be able to go out on
their farms and count sea lice. I
don‟t want to minimize that. It
was a major breakthrough. It
was them saying, “OK we admit
that we‟re not transparent.
People need to understand
what‟s going on on our farms.”
Harry

“You have to acknowledge the fact
that this person‟s brought up and is
committed to a certain data set,
issue, et cetera. And, so, that can‟t
be denied. So, it‟s better to
structure a project such that you
can collaborate, which is a
challenge.” Stephanie

“ … a press release went out
today … They knew all about
that before it went out, they
were completely briefed on it
and prepared and everything,
and that‟s a whole different style
of working relationship for us.”
Harry

“… we became much more aware
of the sea lice dynamic. And, so,
we‟re much more aggressive in
dealing with it than we were
previously…. there‟s a different
and deeper understanding of
what‟s actually going on.” Colin

“In the old days, we‟d keep it all
very secret … we‟d catch them
off guard and so this gives them
an opportunity to think through
the information and respond.
Some people would say that
that‟s a bad thing because it
gives them a chance to give
their answers but … their
answers don‟t change that
much.” Donna

“We‟ve committed to trial a closed
containment again…. let‟s do it
collaboratively this time…. I mean
you learn so much … we showed
how the system financially
performed and how it performed
with production and we showed
how the conventional system did,
but … didn‟t do … a good job of
comparing … we‟d do it
collaboratively … then we would
have … key indicators that we
thought were important
collaboratively.” Lana

215

5.6 Premise 5: Conditions
A number of the key conditions that favour inter-organizational learning are
present in the salmon farming industry in British Columbia. There is evidence that
the combination of sources of conflict between the two organizations, the
experience and capabilities or practices of the Marine Harvest and CAAR
organizations, and the experience and capabilities of the individuals directly
involved all supported inter-organizational learning. I will now present data to
illustrate each set of conditions in the following sections.
5.6.1 Conditions Related to the Conflict
The source of conflict between salmon farming companies and
environmentalists began as a conflict of interests over how to best manage the
coastal water resources in BC and over time had degenerated into a conflict over
values and identity. This description given in 2005 by Heikki, a corporate
manager of Marine Harvest, evocatively describes salmon farmers‟ perception of
the conflict:
“The symbolism of salmon is like the swimming panda bear of Canada. For
us fish farmers, Canada is really tough … Sometimes it literally starts at the
border. The guy from Customs asks what kind of business are you in and
you say salmon farming and he says “ooooh”, as if you are an arms dealer.”
“Canada has the biggest anti salmon farming emotional sentiment … We try
to build relationships, but it is really tough. The pressure mostly comes from
the NGO community. But there is an enormous awareness among the
Canadian population and the values have spread so much, that it affects the
markets.”
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In what the press had termed “The War in the Water” (C. Wilson, 2003), the
practice of each of the opposing “sides” was to claim the moral high ground with
environmentalists emphasizing the protection of wild salmon and the marine
habitat and the companies stressing their economic contribution to coastal
communities and the provincial economy in general.
Notwithstanding its provocative statements, since its creation, CAAR had
framed its conflict with the industry in terms of differences in understanding of the
impact of raising salmon in open net cages. However their actions tended to cast
the salmon farming companies‟ actions and intentions in a negative light. Their
website www.farmedanddangerous.com is but one example of how CAAR casts
aspersions on salmon farmers‟ integrity.
The connection between collapse of the pink salmon run in the Broughton
Archipelago in 2001 and sea lice from the salmon farms shifted the conflict by
drawing attention to the gap in the scientific research on sea lice. Late in 2002
the Pacific Fisheries Resource Council concluded that sea lice from the salmon
farms contributed to the collapse and recommended fallowing farms in migration
corridors during the out migration. In February 2003 the University of British
Columbia hosted an international workshop to examine sea lice research marking
the first time industry, government, First Nations, scientists and non-government
organizations had met on a topic of scientific research (Richards, 2003). While
the industry and environmentalists, including CAAR, continued to take actions to
develop and maintain a positive identity, the recognition of the differences in the
understanding about the impact of sea lice on the marine habitat and wild salmon
(socio-cognitive conflict) appeared to have an impact on salmon farming
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companies. As this comment by Margaret of the BC Salmon Farmers Association
illustrates:
" We've always abided by the regulations that are in place now, and would
like to work collaboratively to figure out what the best approach is … a lot of
work needs to be done around the interaction of farmed and wild
salmon.”(Read, 2003)
The identity framing and the emotions it provoked are described by Lana, of
Marine Harvest:
“First we reacted by pushing back really hard and being outraged and
indignant and going for the … and attacking the NGOs and attacking their
credibility. And then we saw ourselves as small community-based
businesses and farmers and biologists, we didn‟t see ourselves as big
international corporations. And the NGOs painted us like that. And we
didn‟t see that. We thought you know people would just listen to us, they
would just see. Like I said, we‟re good people. And we were naïve about
that too.”
Managers came to realize that this approach, particularly when used to
respond to the sea lice issue, proved to be a “fatal error”, as Colin of Marine
Harvest said:
“We agree that there‟s concern around this. We agree that we can
constantly change the way we grow fish. We don‟t agree that your concerns
are necessarily valid, yet we do agree that we‟ll probably be changing the
way we grow fish because we‟ve been changing the way we grow fish in
mitigating concerns as long as we‟ve been growing fish. So let‟s learn
together...”
Subsequent to Marine Harvest and CAAR engaging with one another
directly in joint research, the socio-cognitive aspects of their conflict has become
a more important driver of behaviour. There has been vacillation between identity
conflict and conflicts in knowledge especially when either party breaks the
communication protocols of their agreement. Conflict based on identity was
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instrumental in the fragmentation of CAAR in 2008. Certain individuals and
organizations were so identified with the goal of removing salmon farms from the
Tribune-Fife area that they could not participate in the CAMP experiment.
However, it seems that by either addressing or distancing themselves from the
facets of their identities that are different and focusing on the practices of
identities that they share the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR have
been able to access the productive problem solving features of socio-cognitive
conflict. They have done this even while their beliefs about the underlying
resource conflict have remained unchanged (see Table 5-11: Sources of the
Conflict).
Table 5-11: Sources of the Conflict
Conflict
Source

Representative quotations

Resources or
Conflicts of
Interest

“I think historically the relationship generally starts out on
points of conflict around company practices, their impact
on the ecosystem and species and concerns around the
need for change among concerned citizens, environmental
groups, et cetera …” Donald
“Just because you removed the fish from the water is it
improvement if you have now increased your energy
usage to the point where you‟re taking localized impacts
and trading them for global impacts. So, yeah, you‟ve got
some poop under the ocean under conventional net pens.
Yes, there is the risk of sea lice transfer both to and from,
but if you essentially solve those local impacts, move them
up to land and create global impacts, where‟s your energy
coming from? What‟s your source of energy?” Rob

Sociocognitive
Conflict

“Unfortunately there is a lack of scientific knowledge in
some areas. We are quite concerned that there are some
research gaps here that need to be filled. That‟s also
something that you find when you have this dialogue; you
can actually better identify these research gaps and
hopefully agree where we need to do more research. We
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are taking part in local dialogues, in Canada we‟re taking
part in local dialogues, also elsewhere in the world, and
we‟re also part of the World Wildlife Fund -led salmon
aquaculture dialogue – where most of the North
American/Canadian NGOs are participating.” Torgeir
Identity
Conflict

“I think working with environmental groups that simply their
goal is to remove open net cages from BC. I struggle
because I don‟t think we have a common goal … their
messaging has not changed from the time that we met
with them originally. It was “we don‟t believe in
conventional salmon farming”. It‟s almost to the point
where they don‟t believe in salmon farming because it‟s a
carnivore … So, it was close containment‟s the answer
and that‟s where we‟re going to get to ... to the point where
if we were managing sea lice so well that we knew it was
zero impact, it still wouldn‟t appease them… So, it‟s
difficult.” Rob

5.6.2 Conditions Related to the Organizations
Each of the organizations involved in the Framework were complex
organizations with complex and highly developed learning processes and
practices. CAAR and Marine Harvest (and its predecessor companies) each had
established learning practices which, while relatively new, were robust enough to
endure despite repeated mergers in the case of Marine Harvest and personnel
changes in the case of CAAR.
Internal learning practices in both Stolt/Marine Harvest and CAAR primarily
took the form of ongoing collaborative activities between organizational groups.
Stolt was arguably the salmon farming organization most adept at learning as it
was the most profitable in the industry, was considered by its peers to have the
best run operations and the highest ethics. The firm was also adept at interorganizational learning, albeit with like minded science-based organizations, as it
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actively participated in collaborative research and development projects with
universities and research institutes. In the case of Marine Harvest, scientists and
production mangers from various regions and divisions regularly collaborate on
operational research and development, by sharing data and methods as well as
through joint initiatives. For example, in September of 2009 the Directors of
Sustainability for each of Marine Harvest‟s regions met for a week in Campbell
River to exchange best practices, assess progress to date, and plan future
sustainability initiatives. The development of Marine Harvest‟s sustainability
reporting has provided a focal point for much of this activity and has sustained it
(the activities) through the recent mergers.
In the case of CAAR, internal learning practices take the form of regular
internal meetings, committee work, and regular and systematized
communications between the member organizations focusing on strategy
development, market analysis, and consumer and community development and
outreach. As Harry, of CAAR, explains:
“We have full coalition meetings every two months. We have various
committees. A science committee, a markets team, that are in regular
contact. But we have an internal list serve that is used frequently. It‟s not
unusual to get 40 or 50 email messages from our colleagues a day….”
These disciplined learning practices are an expression of CAAR‟s organizational
identity as a strategic, issue focused ENGO.
Perhaps most significantly for inter-organizational learning, the practices of
each organization had been informed by extensive prior experience with learning
across organizational boundaries. Marine Harvest had worked extensively with
universities, independent and private research institutes and governments on
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research projects related to marine ecosystem management, fish husbandry, and
marine biology. As Colin, of Marine Harvest, describes:
“(Marine Harvest) was involved in the research and development ... And it‟s
not always that we‟re doing that independently we‟re usually doing that as a
group of companies or doing that with the federal or provincial government
or with an academic institution.”
These initiatives primarily took the form of contract or co-managed research
projects between organizations with similar logics and knowledge bases, i.e.
science-based research or commercial organizations.
In addition, the company consulted with customers, supply chain members,
regional governments, the financial community, NGOs, and other stakeholders.
For example, in 1996 Marine Harvest began a biennial international conference,
Aquavision, to build relationships and to discuss the challenges in the industry.
Heikki, of Nutreco, Marine Harvest‟s parent company at the time, explains the
intent:
“Having a dialogue to build trust is really important ... we invite our business
partners, our customers, the financial community, NGOs, media, financial
analysts, to discuss the big challenges for our industry ...”
These cross boundary initiatives had established precedents and mechanisms for
collaboration with “like minded” organizations, primarily related to Marine
Harvest‟s core business (aquaculture) and for information exchanges with a
broader range of stakeholders, including conferences, and facilitated multi-party
initiatives. However, Marine Harvest Canada‟s negotiations with the Kitasoo First
Nation prompted a greater level of commitment to working not only across
borders but also across dominant logics.
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Since 1997 the landmark Delgamuukw case, which established the rights of
First Nation consultation for activities on their traditional territories, First Nations
had significant involvement in all fish farm licensing. Two years prior to the ruling
Marine Harvest had established a cooperative relationship with the Kitasoo First
Nation in Klemtu. The BC operation had developed some collaborative skills from
consulting with other regions within Marine Harvest, however through the process
of consultation with First Nations it developed skills in working with diverse
groups and across historically adversarial organizational and cultural boundaries,
albeit toward a shared goal. Certain individuals and groups within Marine Harvest
Canada recognized the difference in these types of collaborations, Particularly
Lana who had been directly involved with First Nation consultation over the
years:
“… people talk about the three legged stool of sustainability, the social, the
environmental and all that, but I say, this is really a new way of doing
business… if we‟re going to make it work here we have to kind of embrace it
… We all want profitability. It‟s just a different path to get there”.
Through its relationship with the Kitasoo Marine Harvest also developed
internal learning practices. As a result of the significant discussions that went on
internally prior to the Delgamuukw ruling, Marine Harvest changed the way that it
managed farm licenses in First Nations‟ territory, two years prior to this change
being required by law. As Lana describes:
“… the first partnership we had – in Klemtu … I took it right to Holland - and
Norway. To explain and present what we were doing and then when the …
CEO of the international company was here and we spent a lot of energy
explaining to him why this was a good move. Why doing this agreement,
why putting tenures in their name was actually a good move, why that was a
security of operations, why this was the future in BC, why this was going to
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be a real bottleneck for us for expansion unless we found a way to work with
First Nations, right? On their terms! We were going to spend way more
energy fighting it than if we put some energy into figuring out how to make it
work.”
CAAR‟s operating procedures, and indeed its very existence was the result
of a year of negotiations between independent ENGOs (i.e. across organizational
boundaries). Donna of CAAR notes that while the people have changed, the
organization and practices of CAAR have remained:
“… it was 2000 that we sat down for the first time. And there‟s been a lot of
changeover in terms of the membership – the people, not the organization.
But we initially had a one-year facilitated group of meetings to come up with
a plan and our protocols and how we would operate and work together and
what teams we‟d put together and all that stuff.”
This experience had allowed CAAR to establish practices to coordinate and
collaborate among its member organizations as well as between the key
individuals involved in the organization.
5.6.3 Conditions Related to the Practitioners
The individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR that negotiated the
Framework were ready to experiment with new behaviours but for different
reasons. Justin and Colin from Stolt/Marine Harvest were concerned that the
government would rush in restrictive legislation in order to demonstrate to an
increasingly alarmed public that they were taking appropriate action. They had
also come to realize that CAAR was likely to persist in its quest for closed
containment and further attempts to discredit them (CAAR) would probably reflect
badly on the company. They became slightly more optimistic about engaging with
CAAR once they had sought help from Doug, a credible third party with
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experience in similar situations. Doug was able to provide them with a clear
process and established practices from other contexts which further increased
their confidence and prompted them to ask Doug to contact CAAR with an offer
to do joint research.
The response from Donna and the executives of the CAAR member
organizations to the initial contact from Stolt/Marine Harvest was optimistic. They
had confidence in Doug from other conflicts and saw the fact that Stolt/Marine
Harvest hired him and not one of several other well known consultants as a very
positive sign. In addition to trusting Doug, CAAR trusted Stolt‟s motives because
they believed that their market campaigns had negatively affected the demand for
BC salmon and the morale of salmon farm employees.
Also, for several of CAAR‟s scientist members the prospect of having
access to operational data from salmon farms far outweighed the risks and efforts
involved in collaborating with the company. Finally, Scott along with CAAR‟s
major funders recognized that while their tactics had produced lots of awareness
there had been limited change and that perhaps it was time to try a new
approach.
In summary, Justin and Colin from Marine Harvest were ready to engage
with CAAR because they were motivated by the threat of punitive legislation, and
the cost in terms of public support of continued conflict. They were optimistic
about the outcome of engaging with CAAR because of guidance they received
from Doug. Donna, Scott, Harry, and Gord of CAAR were ready to engage with
Marine Harvest because they were motivated by the suggestion of their major
funders, and by the opportunity to conduct research on actual operating salmon
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farms. They were optimistic because they perceived that Marine Harvest had
been affected by their campaigns and that by hiring Doug they were ready to truly
engage.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

6.1 Overview
In this research I focused on uncovering the role of identity in interorganizational learning between organizations in conflict and the conditions under
which such learning is more likely to occur. In addition, I explored how individuals
and organizations balance the dysfunctional processes that arise when identity
based conflict persists with the more functional problem solving processes
associated with resolving a gap in knowledge, a socio-cognitive conflict.
Managing this delicate balance is critical for firms, as they are increasingly
expected to engage with and integrate perspectives from different sectors (Hart &
Sharma, 2004; Rothman & Friedman, 2001) in order to “anticipate and respond to
impending threats, conduct experiments, (and) engage in continuing innovation”
(Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. xvii).
This research explored the relationship between identity, conflict, and interorganizational learning, using the theoretical lens of the practice-based view. The
practice-based view contains three elements, practice, praxis and practitioners
(Whittington, 2006). Practice represents the prior collective and individual
learning, including aspects of identity that guide activity, such as shared routines,
norms, and procedures, that can be altered depending on the situation in which
they are used (Orlikowski, 1996; Seidl, 2007). Praxis refers to the actual
activities and behaviour that individuals undertake in situations in response to
stimuli, in this case conflict. Practitioners are those who perform praxis, and they
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can be organizational leaders, managers, or external agents such as consultants
because what they actually do in situations of conflict affects an organization‟s
learning. These three elements combine to form inter-organizational learning.
I proposed a multi-level model of inter-organizational learning consisting of
three meta-constructs, identity, conflict, and learning, and based on five premises
each of which is rooted in existing theory. I put forward that each meta-construct
is embedded in behaviour at the individual and collective levels and each is
interrelated to the others. Change in each meta-construct is anchored in
feedback and feed forward cycles through the activities (praxis) of individuals and
the practices of organizations. In this dissertation I suggest that there are
necessary conditions related to each meta-construct for inter-organizational
learning to occur between “enemies”. Therefore, a model of inter-organizational
learning should consider all three meta-constructs.
The empirical work in this dissertation was guided by two research
questions. First, what is the role of identity in organizational learning between
organizations in conflict? Second, how does an organization learn from another
organization with which it is in conflict?
Using a single case study approach, which is appropriate to answer “how”
and “why” questions asked against a backdrop of existing theory (Yin, 2009), I
studied the salmon farming industry in BC. Historically this has been an industry
embroiled in conflict with environmentalists. The salmon farming industry in BC
represented a fruitful setting for studying inter-organizational learning given the
industry has been under intense pressure from both shareholders and
stakeholders to improve economic and environmental performance respectively.
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Recently a joint learning initiative has begun between the largest salmon farming
company and a coalition of environmental organizations and First Nations. In
contrast, the second largest salmon farming company has actively chosen not to
interact with any ENGOs. Using interviews, archival data, newspaper articles,
and observations, I collected a rich data set that allowed me to compare the
findings of the case with my model of inter-organizational learning, i.e. my initial
theoretical statement (Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009) points out the qualitative case
method enables theoretical but not statistical generalization.
Three main findings emerged from this research. First, by examining
identity, conflict, and learning together I am able to provide insight into conditions
under which learning between organizations in conflict is more likely to occur.
While previous research has acknowledged the importance of conflict to learning
and the centrality of identity to conflict and to a lesser extent identity‟s influence
on learning, in this study I articulate the relationship between these three key
concepts. This relationship extends beyond the emphasis in prior literature on
cognition and provides a more socialized and behavioural view of interorganizational learning.
Second, I identified a critical link between individual learning and interorganizational learning in situations of conflict. Individuals in my case study were
able to use conflict as a motivating point to advance learning within their
organization. Specifically, individuals from two of the organizations in my study
were able to use the practices associated with a shared identity to engage in
collective action (praxis) and consequently bridge across the conflict. Their
repeated interaction and engagement prompted new interpretations, and
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integration of their shared understanding. This in turn prompted further
experimentation both together and in their respective organizations, leading to
altered practices, and ultimately altered meanings. This outcome extends the
dominant view in the literature, that of identity as a constraint to learning and
source of conflict and revealed a more nuanced picture of identity‟s impact on
individual interaction and its (identity‟s) impact on learning.
Finally, this case study showed the role of identity in shifting behaviour and
the role of conflict and learning processes in shifting the salience of certain
aspects of identity. Change in individuals‟ and organizations‟ response to conflict,
their learning, and aspects of their identity was anchored in feedback and feed
forward cycles. Conflict, identity, and learning appeared to evolve through the
situated activities (praxis) of individuals and ensuing shifts in the practices of
organizations or groups. This finding highlights the multi-level nature of both
identity and learning and in particular the importance of behaviours or practices
associated with identity at the individual and collective levels.
In this chapter, the findings of my research are interpreted within the context
of the proposed theoretical model by first examining the relationship between
conflict, identity, and learning. Then, I address my research questions by
exploring the role of identity in inter-organizational learning via the processes
through which inter-organizational learning between enemies occurs. The penultimate section explores several new ideas related to the impact of identity on
conflict and learning processes which emerged during the research process. The
final section assesses the quality of this research.
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6.2 Understanding Identity, Conflict, and Inter-Organizational
Learning
Prior research has acknowledged that conflict can instigate learning (Argyris
& Schon, 1978), that identity is central to conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008), and
that identity has an influence on learning (Nag et al., 2007); however the nature
of the relationship between these concepts has not been articulated. In particular
prior research has been unable to explain the paradoxical phenomenon of
organizations that are able to learn from each other despite high levels of identity
based conflict, the source of conflict shown to be most dysfunctional for learning.
So while previous research has looked at these concepts in isolation my research
considers all three together to uncover the activities that underlie interorganizational learning. The relationships I uncovered, along with the processes
that shape these relationships, contribute to a richer understanding of how
organizations learn, in general and in situations of conflict in particular.
The first two of the five premises underpinning my theoretical model
describe fundamental connections between identity, conflict and learning. First,
that identity, conflict and learning are inter-related, in that one influences the
formation of the others. As expected, my data show that identity and learning are
embedded in the activities (praxis) of individuals and in practices at the collective
level. However, conflict appears to act as a stimulus to activity and is not
embedded in it in the same way as is identity and learning. Second, identity,
conflict and learning are inter-related across individual and collective levels via
feedback and feed forward mechanisms. Again as expected, my data provide
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multiple examples of the existence and importance of links between levels for
each of identity, conflict and learning.
Prior literature has focused on one of two somewhat simplistic views of
conflict: the information processing view in which conflict is seen as promoting
learning and the social identity view where conflict negatively affects learning. In
the latter perspective, identity is characterized as a constraint to learning by virtue
of the organizational and individual defensiveness it can trigger (Argyris, 1991; A.
Brown & Starkey, 2000; Nag et al., 2007). By considering conflict, identify, and
learning together in this research I found that under certain conditions identity
can enable learning despite identity differences. This is an important insight into
the learning literature because it brings together two hitherto separate
explanations of the relationship between conflict and learning and specifically
addresses the conflict based on identity difference, considered by some
researchers to be both the most prevalent and dysfunctional form of conflict
(Mannix & Neale, 2005; Mooney et al., 2007).
The third and fourth premises in my model describe change in identity,
conflict and learning and how change results from the activities (praxis) of
individuals and the practices of groups when they engage inter-organizationally.
My data show how the practices associated with individual and organizational
identity can support shifts in behaviour. Over repeated engagement identity,
conflict and learning continued to evolve as a result of individuals recognising and
exploring their assumptions, developing shared understandings, and introducing
those understandings to their respective organizations. My case study provides
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strong evidence of the importance of actions and practices at the individual level
and the implications for practice and learning at the collective level over time.
The final premise underpinning my model deals with certain pre-existing
conditions identified in prior literature that appear to be particularly relevant to
inter-organizational learning in situations of conflict. They relate to the conflict
itself, the organizations and the individuals involved. Previous research has
tended to treat these as discrete situations, for example examining the level of
inter-organizational learning experience but not considering the root of the conflict
that created the learning opportunity or the positions of the individuals directly
engaged with one another. In my research, in addition to the organizational
learning capability and inter-organizational learning experience, I drew insight
from social psychology and considered the relative importance of the sociocognitive aspects of the conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008), and the motivation
and confidence of individuals in the possibility for change (Pruitt, 2005). In
explaining the conditions required for exploring assumptions I drew on social
psychology and sociology, to consider the impact of power, institutions, and
prolonged engagement on learning (Allport, 1954; R. Brown, 2000; Parker-Follett,
2003). Most importantly, my research demonstrated the importance of individual
and organizational identities to learning which I discuss in detail in the following
section.
This dissertation was guided by two research questions. First, what is the
role of identity in organizational learning between organizations in conflict?
Second, how does an organization learn from another organization with which it
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is in conflict (the process of learning)? In the next sections I answer these
questions.

6.3 The Role of Identity in Inter-Organizational Learning in
Conflict
I focus on identity because research and practice have shown that all
conflicts are at least in part rooted in the identities of the individuals, groups, or
organizations involved (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). Specifically I explored the
conditions that allowed organizations and individuals to overcome the constraints
that prior research suggests that social, role, and organization identities imposed
on learning. Whereas previous research has focused on how the practices
associated with identity deterred learning, especially across organizational
boundaries (Hong & O, 2009; Macpherson & Clark, 2009; Nag et al., 2007) my
case study shows how practices associated with specific individual and
organizational identities can support learning even across significant boundaries.
6.3.1 Organizational Identity
Organizational identity has been defined as the “central and enduring
attributes of an organization that distinguish it from other organizations …
reflected in its unique pattern of binding commitments” (Whetten, 2006, p. 220).
Similar to institutionalized learning, organizational identity is often described as a
"cognitive map" that filters and molds an organization‟s interpretation of stimuli
and activates a set of familiar routines in response (Albert & Whetten, 1985;
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Organizational identity has
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been shown to delineate what are considered acceptable or legitimate solutions
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and it is one of the vehicles
through which "preconceptions determine appropriate action" (K. Weick, 1988, p.
306). My research reinforced the notion that interpretations shaped by the
organization‟s identity can shift individuals‟ behaviour in particular directions and
thereby direct and shape organizational actions (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). In
particular, it demonstrated that an organizational identity defined by learning
processes, such as the scientific method, can direct individual behaviour (praxis)
toward exploration (Barney et al., 1998; Schon, 1986), especially when
individuals strongly identify with their organization (Schwenk, 2002). For example,
Marine Harvest‟s emphasis on dialogue and openness encourages individual
managers, several of whom openly expressed their pride in the organization‟s
approach to sustainability, to undertake projects outside the boundaries of the
industry without fear of reprisal. This demonstrates the role of organizational
identity in directing behaviour as well as illustrating the behavioural impact of an
identity defined by deutero-learning processes. In contrast, Mainstream‟s
emphasis on financial sustainability encourages individual managers, who are
equally proud of their organization‟s approach to sustainability, to devote time
and resources to improving internal operations and exploiting existing knowledge.
In my case study, the way in which key organizational players expressed
their organizational identities had an impact on the learning processes they
undertook. Stolt described itself as a collaborative research organization
particularly within the aquaculture research and development community.
However, Stolt was private and focused on “like minded” organizations in their
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consultation. Stolt consulted directly and privately with research organizations
with recognized expertise, until the sea lice issue. They were more like
Mainstream in that regard. CAAR, in a similar vein, described itself as a
collaborative organization that is able to navigate/negotiate difficult relationships
and coordinate research in support of protecting the marine habitat also with “like
minded” organizations.
In my case study conflict motivated a relaxation of the constraints that
organizational identity places on individual behaviour. Consistent with prior
findings, my study confirmed that the interaction between external stimuli and
internal feedback and feed forward processes drive organizational identity
dynamics (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004) and that feedback from the external
environment destabilized organizational members‟ self-perceptions (e.g. D. Gioia
et al., 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002). Until 2004 inconsistencies between external
perceptions and internal beliefs regarding their organization‟s identity triggered
defensiveness. By 2004 the serious discrepancies activated by the sea lice
debate, induced individuals at Marine Harvest/Stolt to reevaluate their
understandings (D. Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). With the “filter
and mold” of their organization‟s interpretations in flux individuals within Marine
Harvest and CAAR were able to suspend their belief systems and thus be open
to new interpretations (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). My research suggests that the
influence of organizational identity on individual behaviour depends on its degree
of stability.
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6.3.2 Individual Identity
While key behavioural aspects of the organizational identities of Stolt and
CAAR were aligned this was not sufficient to overcome the dysfunctional
responses prompted by what Stolt viewed as illegitimate targeting by CAAR. That
initiative came from individual action prompted by external feedback and
sustained through a period of multiple mergers that introduced ambiguity to the
organization‟s identity. Contrary to the predictions of my original model, in my
case study identity and learning are embedded in praxis and practice. Conflict,
identity, and learning are inter-related through action. Conflict stimulates praxis
which is an expression of identity and learning.
Identity ambiguity implies multiple possible interpretations about which core
features should define the organization (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004). The
ambiguity introduced by merger activity appears to have increased the
opportunities to ask the question “who are we” and the positive feedback from the
environment may have provided guidance as to a desired identity and the
behaviours associated with that identity for the company created by the merger of
Stolt, Marine Harvest and PanFish.
The extent of the feedback around the sea lice issue seemed to shift the
root of conflict to the apparent gaps in knowledge about sea lice as well as
highlight to managers within Stolt the ineffectiveness of its approach to
addressing the issue. This prompted the senior manager in Canada to seek
information from new sources, albeit one with recognized expertise in managing
stakeholder conflicts and to eventually engage that well regarded third party to
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contact CAAR. The key individual in CAAR believed that Stolt had been harmed
by their (CAAR‟s) aggressive anti-farmed salmon campaign. She believed that
they were ready to consider a new approach and that made her interpret, albeit
cautiously, the offer as a sincere request to explore possibilities. Both of the key
individuals involved thought the other party had much to gain from the interaction
and used what they interpreted as an opportunity to potentially advance their own
agenda. Their change in behaviours created the opportunity for experimental
learning as they entered into the interaction with openness to behavioural
change.
In my case study, inter-organizational learning appeared to begin with
actions that minimized, to the extent possible, identity differences between
individuals and emphasized joint problem solving. Initial contact was made via an
individual that was not strongly or personally identified with either “side”. Over an
extended period of first indirect and then direct interaction individuals‟ from both
Stolt/Marine Harvest and CAAR were able to tap into practices related to their
common social and role identities. The individuals involved in the salmon farming
industry had a range of relevant social and role identities including, scientists,
issue consultants/managers, and coastal community residents. Most importantly
they were able to coalesce around the identity of “scientist” interested in
understanding the impact of sea lice. Also, as in this case, an identity such as
scientist may connect individuals, whereas within an organization it is often a role
identity that differentiates them. By matching individuals who shared the identities
of scientist or issue manager, individuals were able to use the common protocols
and practices associated with those communities of practice, as well as the
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language to experiment with collective action without changing their beliefs. In
particular the matching of scientists supported their focus on joint research while
allowing them to “delegate” the controversial relationship issues to the issue
managers.
Contrary to my original expectations the conflict in my case study did not
appear to activate different individual identities but rather different aspects of
individuals‟ salient identities. For example, the most important aspect of the
identity of “scientist” shifted from being the “expert” and to being the guardian of
the scientific method.
Once the Framework for Dialogue had been developed and integrated
within each of their respective organizations the individuals could suspend their
beliefs, and behave according to the agreement, which was built around five
scientific investigations and well established scientific (and conflict management)
protocols. They had begun to move from using the end products of science as a
weapon against each other to using the practices associated with the scientific
process as the mechanism through which they could cooperate. Science
continued to provide a neutral and honourable identity with which all parties
(individuals and organizations) could identify. It also provided sufficient ambiguity
to allow the group to agree on action while retaining whatever individual beliefs
that were needed to reach consensus (Eisenberg, 1984). This shared action and
experience created sufficient shared understanding for CAAR and Marine
Harvest to enter into an agreement and to subsequently undertake a major
experiment and to jointly lobby government.
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6.3.3 Shifting Aspects of Identity
The collaboration process between Marine Harvest and CAAR was
enthusiastically supported by local institutions, in particular government. The
behavioural change was so strongly supported that Marine Harvest and CAAR
came to share an identity as leaders in resource company/environmentalist
collaboration. In a sense their response to the feedback from the environment put
them in the “iron cage” together (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Given that the
institutional (regulatory) support for the new practices after five years of repeated
engagement, they appear to have altered some of the meanings attached to
identity (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2003). Most dramatically, CAAR decreased its
membership primarily as the result of asking the questions “who are we” and
“what activities will we undertake” during their decision to support the CAMP. The
changes to CAAR‟s membership and Marine Harvest‟s operations demonstrate
their respective integration of new common understanding of “who we are” and
“what we do” and hence inter-organizational learning.
Building on the work of Nag and colleagues (2007), my research
demonstrates that the possibility for inter-organizational learning can occur at the
intersection of identity (who we are), learning (what we know), and practice (what
we do) both within and between organizations in conflict. By attending to the
socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict individuals from each organization begin to
distance themselves from their identity based differences. Consequently, these
individuals, within the context of their unique social, role and organizational
identities, interpret the stimulus provided by the conflict differently. Their
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interpretation and therefore their responses are enormously affected by their
repertoire of individual identities, the nature and stability of their respective
organizational identities, and by their level of identification with their organization.
If the hold of their organizational identity is sufficiently loosened or supportive of
exploration, then the practices associated with a common social or role identity
may provide the common language and protocols to undertake collective action.
It is the identities of the individuals representing each organization and the
practices and actions through which they express their identities that initially
facilitates or constrains interpretation and integration and hence organizational
learning (Crossan et al, 1999).

6.4 The Process of Inter-Organizational Learning
At the heart of the process of “learning between enemies” lies the concept
of dialogue (Bohm, 1996). Dialogue goes beyond typical notions of conversation
and exchange to explore “the manner in which thought … is generated and
sustained at the collective level” (Bohm, 1996, p. vii) and as such it requires that
individuals and their respective organizations have both the ability and the
willingness to engage, to explore assumptions, and to collectively learn. Whereas
prior research has tended to deal with the issues of willingness and ability
separately, my research considers the conditions necessary at the individual and
collective levels for “enemies” to engage and to sustain that engagement such
that they learn from each other.
Prior research has tended to focus on one of three broadly defined sources
of conflict; resources, identity, or socio-cognitive differences. There has been
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limited recognition that all sources can be present in any situation of conflict and
no consideration of the implications that has for progression of the conflict (for an
exception see DeDreu & Gelfand, 2008). My research showed that by managing
the identity aspects of their conflict and focusing on its socio-cognitive aspects
individuals were able to undertake and sustain collective action, which resulted in
individual and collective learning, even while their resource based conflict
persisted. Through addressing or distancing themselves from the facets of their
identities that were different and focusing on the practices of identities that they
shared, individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR were able to access the
productive problem solving features of socio-cognitive conflict and avoid, for the
most part, the dysfunctional defensiveness of identity conflict.
My case study reinforced the importance of an organization‟s internal
learning practices and its prior experience with inter-organizational learning. My
data demonstrated how well developed organizational learning capabilities and
established practices to manage inter-organizational interactions help to facilitate
the challenging interactions typical of “learning between enemies”. CAAR and
Marine Harvest each had established learning practices which, while relatively
new, were robust enough to endure despite repeated mergers in the case of
Marine Harvest and personnel changes in the case of CAAR. Each had had
experience of learning across organizational boundaries. Most recently, Marine
Harvest had incorporated learning from its interactions with a First Nation,
demonstrating an ability to learn from an organization that operated under a
different logic.
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The willingness and abilities of the individuals directly involved are critical to
inter-organizational learning outcomes. Whereas previous research on interorganizational learning has hinted at the importance of individuals (i.e. Inkpen &
Tsang, 2007), my research draws a direct link between individual learning and
inter-organizational learning. My data demonstrates that individuals can be
motivated and optimistic about engaging with the “enemy” for different reasons.
However, in order to initiate contact individuals must be confident that the
potential benefits of working with unfamiliar and possibly hostile individuals
outweigh the personal cost.
Previous empirical research on inter-organizational learning has given
limited attention to power shifts in inter-organizational collaborations (EasterbySmith et al., 2008; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). In my case study the relative balance
of power between the individuals involved has been maintained, while the power
between their organizations has vacillated. My data shows that a shift in first the
balance of power and then in the nature of the power between the two key
organizations was critical to maintaining their engagement and to supporting the
exploration of assumptions underlying their behaviour and expectations. The
apparent shift from a “power over” paradigm to a more interdependent “power
with” approach has supported continued and productive engagement (ParkerFollett, 2003). Further to notions of power and consistent with the predictions of
institutional theory and organizational learning theory, in my case study,
institutional support from the relevant levels of government as well as in Marine
Harvest‟s case the corporate head office was critical to sustaining the
engagement.
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My case study reinforces and elaborates on previous research on interorganizational learning that describes the structures and mechanisms necessary
for learning. My data show a gradual shift from very structured formal
interactions between a few senior people to less formal more social interactions
between people at various levels of the organization and even external to the
organization. Early in their engagement formal, structured interaction was
conducted through a consultant and then with the help of a mediator. These third
parties focused the information exchanged, thus helping the parties to focus on
certain aspects of the conflict and on common aspects of their identities. From
this common base the individuals were able to negotiate an agreement that
included behavioural protocols as well five specific research projects. Over time
there was a de facto separation of duties with the scientists managing the various
research projects and the consultant and manager/activist managing the day-today conflicts. Individuals‟ responsibilities became aligned with their identities and
abilities. Thus, these structures and mechanisms of engagement sustained the
interaction enabling dialogue.
My data show clear instances of individuals engaging in dialogue, that is
exploring deeply held assumptions about their expectations, the meanings they
attach to their own and to others identities‟. By recognizing these assumptions,
individuals appear to have gained new understanding of themselves and others.
In this context they began to understand the extent to which they were
automatically responding based on their interpretation of the situation. With such
understanding, Bohm (1996) suggests that defensive posturing will diminish and
deep collective learning is then possible, although not assured. For example, the
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negotiation of CAMP resulted in a new interpretation of the identity of CAAR, as
evidenced by its binding commitment to support CAMP. It also resulted in an
affirmation of the identities of those organizations that left CAAR. The more that
the balance of power, the relevant institutions, and the structures and
mechanisms of engagement between the organizations are able to support and
sustain dialogue, the more likely inter-organizational learning will occur.

6.5 Beyond the Model: Sub-Process of Inter-Organizational
Learning
The focus of this dissertation has been on understanding the relationship
between identity, conflict, and inter-organizational learning using an extreme case
study of a single industry. This research was grounded in a process model of
inter-organizational learning developed from an eclectic review of the literature
and the recent theoretical lens of the practice based view. However during the
course of the field work, data analysis and consolidation, several patterns outside
the scope of the proposed model have surfaced. I discuss these in this section.
The primary evidence of inter-organizational learning between the two
“enemies” in my case study was their willingness to jointly undertake increasingly
bold experiments even while continuing to target and respond to each other
negatively in the media. The repeated engagement via experiments between
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR seemed to mediate the relationship
between conflict and learning, prompting a three step learning process that I have
labeled as distancing, pairing, and rule setting. In the period under study I
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identified two cycles of distancing, pairing, and rule setting each culminating in an
experiment, overall reduction in targeting in the media, and an increase in the
extent of experimentation. See Figure 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational
Learning in Conflict.

Rule Setting
Pairing

Distancing
• Detach from
identity that is
in conflict

• Match &
leverage
common
identities

• Negotiate
procedures and
relationship, not
outcomes

Figure 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict

The first sub-process that I uncovered involved a detachment or separation
by individuals from aspects of the conflict or of their identities that were both
problematic and fixed, such as shifting focus away from the conflict in values
between salmon farming companies and environmentalists and toward their
common knowledge gap (i.e. the impact of sea lice). Individual activities (praxis)
that comprise this include seeking information from new sources, communicating
via a neutral third party, and talking privately. By consulting new sources, both
parties displayed a willingness to consider new approaches to the issue of sea
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lice. Their subsequent communication via a neutral third party and in private talks
further demonstrated their motivation to distance themselves from the behaviour
that had been ineffective in resolving the sea lice issue. Organizationally, there is
also evidence of actively detaching from past practices, such as when Stolt
began posting sea lice data on the internet. By sharing information publically Stolt
was distancing itself from its “private” and less than transparent identity and
showcasing its accountability and operationally superior aspects. Also, hiring a
well regarded neutral consultant to represent the company with CAAR minimized
the risk of identity conflict rooted in that individual‟s identification with Stolt.
Similarly, CAAR hired an experienced issue manager/activist with no prior
connection to the sea lice issue to manage day to day interaction with Marine
Harvest once the Framework was in place. I summarized these behaviours as
distancing to describe what both individual managers and organizations were
doing to shift attention away from the identity conflict and toward socio-cognitive
conflict both prior to and during engagement with each other.
The second sub-process that emerged, involved a matching of individuals
and groups based on those aspects of their respective identities that were
compatible particularly from a work practice or skill perspective. In my case study,
scientists were assigned to design and manage research projects and over time
communicated directly. Perhaps most importantly, conflict professionals such as
the consultant and the experienced manager/activist were hired by Marine
Harvest and CAAR respectively and tasked with managing the day to day
relationship as well as any non-science conflicts that emerged in the projects.
This ensured that the individuals that were most skilled in handling conflict were
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responsible to do so. These individuals were relatively less identified with the
issue or their organizations than others interviewed; however they were very
identified with making the Framework a success. Organizationally, Marine
Harvest and CAAR carefully matched the individuals they initially put forward to
negotiate. Tellingly, CAAR did not include the individual most closely associated
with sea lice and arguably the most knowledgeable, even though she was part of
the coalition. The CAAR team included two individuals trained in negotiation and
two scientists, while the core Stolt team included a consultant/negotiator and a
scientist who had spent a multi-faceted career in salmon related issues. By
matching the identities of the individuals they put forward the two organizations
helped to provide common skills and language. Additionally, over time the
organizations that had compatible aspects in their identities continue to work
together (i.e. Living Oceans Society, David Suzuki Foundation, the Watershed
Watch Salmon Society), while those that could not distance themselves from the
problematic aspects of their organizational identity, left the coalition (i.e.
Raincoast Research). I summarized these behaviours as pairing to describe how
common aspects of identity and especially role identities form the basis for
individual practitioners to engage and how organizations undertook to match the
common aspects of their organizational identities.
The third sub-process that emerged dealt with setting the rules for ongoing
interaction between the paired individuals and organizations, such as the
agreement to discuss a joint initiative, agreeing to the terms contained in the
Framework, and agreeing to the process for specific research projects. This subprocess involved negotiating both the procedures and the nature of the
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interaction using the language and protocols of the common identities that had
been paired for the engagement. Importantly, it did not include negotiating
outcomes. I labeled this sub-process rule setting. The rule setting process
evolved from highly focused, controlled and mediated face to face interactions in
the beginning to less formal, and less centralized direct and indirect interactions
across a range of activities such as project management, and project initiation.
At the individual level rule setting activities (praxis) included meetings, phone
calls, emails, and modeling acceptable behaviour. At the collective level rule
setting was demonstrated by the agreement and subsequent adherence to the
communication protocols, the roster of scientists, the project hierarchy and
structure and respectful interaction.
For some examples of these sub-processes at the praxis (individual) and
practice (collective) levels, see Table 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational
Learning in Conflict.
Table 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict
Sub -Process

Praxis

Distancing

Sought information from new Shared sea lice data on-line
sources
Hired neutral consultant (MH) and
Contact via 3rd party

Practice

a manager/activist (CAAR)

Private talks
Pairing

Scientists- ConsultantLawyer

Hired mediator

Scientists –Scientist

Delegated tasks to “specialists”

Consultant – Experienced
Activist

Built an extended team
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Rule setting

E-mail, phone calls,
meetings

Communication protocols

Teaching respectful
interaction

List of “acceptable” scientists

Negotiate list of scientists

“Respect costs you nothing”
Project hierarchy & structure

Project management
activities
Bold
Experiment

Negotiating process &
prohibitions

Agreement to negotiate
Framework for Dialogue

Monitoring sea lice together Sub-contract research
Developing terms of
CAMP
reference
Joint lobbying

In my case study each cycle of distancing, pairing, and rule setting
culminated in collective action which I termed a bold experiment. The negotiation
and implementation of each bold experiment increased the shared understanding
between Marine Harvest and CAAR and thus created an ever firmer foundation
for the next cycle of learning and experimentation. I define a bold experiment as a
collective behavioural change undertaken with no apparent cognitive change,
which is described as surprising by participants and/or other individuals or
organizations in the industry. The bold experiments include the original
agreement to negotiate, the Framework for Dialogue, the joint sub-contracting of
research, and CAMP. My research revealed a general increase in both the
“boldness” of the experiments undertaken by Marine Harvest and CAAR as well
as the level of shared understanding between the two organizations. While this
increase in shared understanding was accompanied by a decrease in
expressions of identity based conflict, the underlying identity and resource conflict
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between the two organizations persists (See Figure 6-2: Inter-organizational
Learning in Conflict).

Bolder
Experiment

Rule
Setting

Rule
Setting

Distancing

Pairing

Pairing

Persistent Underlying Conflict

Distancing

Repeated
Engagement

Bold
Experiment

Shared
Understanding

Expressions of
Identity Conflict

Figure 6-2: Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict
These sub-processes begin to provide a deeper understanding of the
practitioner- praxis- practice relationships that I describe in my conceptual model
of inter-organizational learning (see Figure 3.5) and the relationships between
conflict, identity, and learning that comprise the primary contribution of this
research.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Summary of Contributions
This research makes four primary contributions. The main contribution of
this dissertation is highlighting the importance of the relationship between
identity, conflict and learning at the individual and collective levels. The relatively
narrower focus of prior research has neglected the important connections
between these three crucial areas. The presence of conflict brings behaviour to
the foreground in learning theories, while at the same time emphasizing the
processes of identity protection and maintenance. This case showed the
importance of identity in shifting behaviour and the role of conflict and learning
processes in shifting aspects of identity. Examining these concepts together
provides insight into the conditions under which inter-organizational learning is
more likely to occur.
My research highlights the role played by the practices associated with
social, role, and organizational identity in shaping individual praxis in response to
conflict. Hence, it extends current understanding of the implications of individual
behaviour for organizational learning, particularly in situations of conflict. This
work explicitly addresses the identity-based conflict inherent in inter-group
interactions and, by suggesting that learning depends on the aspects of identity
that organizations and individuals activate in response to a situation, I provide
direction for realizing the benefit of diverse perspectives. The common practices
either prescribed by communities or co-created by individuals engaged in a
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common task may hold the key to sustained behavioural change which may
generate cognitive change. Individuals can use conflict as a motivating point to
advance learning within their organization, via the practices of their common
identities. Unless we understand how individual and organizational identities are
connected to behaviour it is hard to understand their impact on learning. In
addition, in a case of conflict, learning may depend on the ability of individuals to
come together through behaviours or activities related to common identities.
My process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a
more socialized theoretical background for understanding the challenges of interorganizational learning. It highlights the importance of considering all of the
components of learning and suggests that it is the nexus of practitioners,
practice, and praxis that delivers inter-organizational learning. Instead of
conceptualizing inter-organizational learning as an outcome, my research
explores how individuals and organizations tend to respond to each other and
how behavioural practices, such as engagement and dialogue, play a critical role
in shaping their organizations‟ learning.
Finally, I contribute to the understanding of the implications of different
sources or roots of conflict to inter-organizational interaction. A shift in emphasis
from identity based conflict to the socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict,
preceded mutual problem solving behaviour, even while the underlying conflict of
interest persisted between the parties. The individuals and their respective
organizations were able to undertake collaborative action once they reached
consensus on the gaps in their collective knowledge. This research underscores
the importance of understanding that at some level all conflicts are identity based,
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and the need to understand how organizations come to work together despite
and in the presence of their identity differences.

7.2 Practical Implications
There has been much discussion recently of the possibilities inherent in
conflict and in interaction with diverse organizations (Hart & Sharma, 2004). If
through these interactions organizations are more attuned to social trends and
sensitivities, managers may be alerted to risks and opportunities they might not
otherwise have spotted, and organizations will likely develop or augment their
capabilities (“A Survey,” 2008). Yet few organizations readily embrace those
learning opportunities, and managers appear skeptical about the power of conflict
to invigorate problem solving (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Tjosvold, 2008). Although
organizations increasingly participate, voluntarily or in some cases by mandate,
in cross sector initiatives with diverse organizations, they struggle with how to
simultaneously manage the conflict and make use of the learning opportunities.
My research shows that by focusing on their mutual knowledge gaps and the
practices associated with common identities, managers and organizations may
be able to defuse the more dysfunctional aspects of their conflict to permit mutual
problem solving.
My insights from this research are an important step in understanding ways
in which organizations can create mutual strategic advantage out of apparently
intractable conflicts. This work has demonstrated that engagement over a well
known, albeit poorly understood conflict, can also confer social legitimacy, a key
component to competitive advantage in highly regulated industries and likewise
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crucial to non-government organizations. Organizations that confront the diversity
amongst economic, social, and environmental views in their decision making may
be better able to shift their thinking toward an integrated view. This in turn may
engender more innovative responses. While the conflict may never be resolvedindeed it may be “unresolvable”- much can be learned through carefully delimited
cooperation on specific tasks.
This research demonstrates that strategic advantage can be derived from
engagement in situations of intractable conflict. It also emphasizes the range of
conditions that are necessary before organizations can realize the “promise” of
conflict, extending from intractable to more mundane forms of conflict and
situations. Learning in the presence of identity differences, for instance during
mergers or acquisitions, requires well established internal and interorganizational learning processes. If senior managers consider the extent and
nature of the learning and inter-organizational learning capabilities of both
organizations, they will be better able to assess the synergies possible from the
merger or acquisition.
This research highlights the importance and influence of an organization‟s
current strategy and goals on individual behaviour. Marine Harvest‟s and CAAR‟s
mutual emphases on dialogue and science provided their members with both the
motivation and the “permission” to experiment with new behaviour and to learn. In
this way, both organizations‟ current strategies supported adaptive behaviour,
and ultimately strategic renewal. Strategies that acknowledge and support
deutero-learning processes play an important part in strategic adaptation and
renewal.
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My research demonstrates the importance of deliberately emphasizing
certain aspects of the conflict between organizations. By actively highlighting the
socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict, which may not be readily apparent to
participants, managers may increase the likelihood of them engaging in problem
solving. In addition, by framing responses around the socio-cognitive aspects of
the conflict that are significant to both the managers and organizations involved,
senior managers may increase the likelihood of repeated engagement. This facet
of the research illustrates the role senior managers and other organizational
leaders can play in creating the conditions conducive to learning in the face of
identity difference.
My research provides important guidelines for managers when structuring
and staffing inter-organizational initiatives, such as joint ventures, research
consortiums, and stakeholder engagement processes. Individuals in boundary
spanning roles may be more effective if they are less identified with the more
contentious aspects of their organization‟s identity. This raises the issue of how
managers might weaken or transform existing aspects of an individual‟s
identification with their organization. Conversely, if the boundary spanning
individuals are strongly identified with an established process or set of protocols
they may be relatively more effective in bridging across conflict. The key lesson
for external advisers is that their focus should be instigating and maintaining
learning processes in situations of conflict – not working to resolve the conflict, as
is typically the case.
Finally, my research demonstrates the significance of clearly articulating the
behaviour expected in the inter-organizational relationship. In the same way that
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“good fences make good neighbours”, enacting rules and sanctions for breaking
the rules is important to cooperation. By developing protocols for communication,
with each other and with the public, the focal organizations in this study were able
to create common practices. Established rules and holding each other
accountable for adhering to those rules reduced the ambiguity associated with
different identities. Over time, repercussions for breaching the agreement
became consistent, helping to decrease uncertainty in the relationship and
ultimately to increase cooperation. These practices are generalizable and
beneficial whatever the organizational interaction.
The connections identified in this study will be relevant to a range of
situations where learning must overcome differences in identity. While I studied
an extreme case of identity difference, my findings will be useful to organizations
in a range of situations, as they come to grips with increased interaction, across
sectors and across organizational and national boundaries.

7.3 Limitations and Future Research
As with any research this study has limitations. First, I realize that focusing
on one situation, in this case a protracted resource conflict, will limit the
generalizability of my conclusions. However, as Yin (1994) and Johnson et al.
(2007) suggest, the case study method provides an opportunity for analytic
generalization from the case study to theory which is achieved by the proper
selection of the case study. Also many industries are increasingly faced with
conflicts of interest with stakeholders and while they may not be as targeted as
the salmon farming industry, they nevertheless face the challenge of adapting to
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changes in their environment. Future research should investigate whether the
practices associated with identity relate to the reduction of identity conflict and a
shift to socio-cognitive conflict and learning in other industries and other perhaps
less extreme contexts. Furthermore, this research could be used to develop
measurable items to test the relative mix of the sources of conflict and the
relationship between for example socio-cognitive conflict and learning.
Second, using the case method means the researcher begins with a
proposed theory (Yin, 2009) which may constrain them from seeing new patterns.
However, the iterative nature of my design allowed me to modify my model
because the data were repeatedly compared with theory.
Third, interview data may suffer from biases, including social desirability
bias. However, careful construction of interview questions, along with
triangulation with other data sources, helped mitigate this problem. Additionally,
participants‟ answers can be influenced by question wording, format, and context.
To avoid such biases, I pilot tested the interview questions on individuals
associated with but not directly involved with the BC salmon farming industry.
Fourth, access was a problem in the second phase of my data gathering. A
number of external events, in addition to the contentious nature of the topic,
limited individuals‟ willingness to have meetings observed. However, given their
vivid recollections of particular events and meetings I was able to employ analytic
techniques (described in Section 4.5.5, Mapping of Statements into Practice and
Praxis) to distinguish practice and praxis from respondents‟ statements during
interviews.
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Despite the above limitations, I believe this research provides a first step in
understanding the relationship between identity, conflict, and learning in
organizations.
Finally, past findings have found a relationship between innovation,
especially complex and radical innovation and engagement with a range of
partners, allowing for the “integration of different knowledge bases, behaviours,
and habits of thought” (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & Neely, 2004, p.
150). Indeed, in a group situation, scientists have been identified as being
particularly adept at using diversity to their advantage (Pelz, 1956). However, my
research suggests there are significant challenges to engaging with diverse
individuals and organizations, even scientists, and success depends on a number
of conditions. Future research should re-examine the relationship between
innovation and engagement between diverse organizations, in light of the more
socialized explanation of inter-organizational learning processes presented by my
research findings.

7.4 Final Thoughts
The impetus for strategic renewal often comes from a misalignment of an
organization‟s current strategy with its environment. Increased interorganizational conflict can be a signal of such misalignment. There is evidence
that accessing diverse or hitherto unavailable sources of ideas may increase an
organization's ability to adapt to its environment and learn. Accessing those
sources however is likely to be fraught with conflict because the focal
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organizations almost certainly have different perspectives, making interaction
problematic and potentially costly in both financial and reputational terms.
Increasingly complex issues, such as sustainability and globalization, have
increased pressure on organizations to integrate disparate perspectives. Yet
relatively few firms embrace the learning opportunities inherent in diverse or
adversarial situations. Responding to conflict provides an opportunity to learn.
The ability to learn from disparate and diverse organizations perhaps even
“enemies” has the potential to produce positive variations in firms‟ capabilities.
This is the promise of conflict.
This research speaks to that promise by examining inter-organizational
learning and the role of identity in such learning. The behaviours associated with
identity are important to inter-organizational learning because in practice, identitybased conflict often inhibits learning. However, under certain conditions the
practices related to common identities may act as a bridge across conflict and
allow the development of shared understanding through collective action. In this
way individuals and their organizations are able to realize the promise of conflict
and successfully adapt to changes in their environment.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE
BC SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 1970 – 2009
Year

Event

Early
1970s

Salmon farming begins on the Sunshine Coast in BC with small
locally owned operations and limited regulation.

Early
1980s

Norwegian salmon farming companies enter BC, buying and
consolidating small operations. They also introduce the Atlantic
salmon species to the region.

Mid
1980s

Toxic algae blooms devastate fish inventories and salmon farming
moves to Vancouver Island, primarily around Nanaimo, Tofino and
the Broughton Archipelago.

1986

Demand for salmon farming licenses explodes and conflicts with
other coastal users escalate. The government declares a moratorium
on new licenses and organizes an inquiry into the industry.

1987

Moratorium on new licenses lifted after inquiry calls for increased
regulation and monitoring of the industry, increased First Nation
consultation and formal conflict resolution processes.
The United Fisherman‟s and Allied Workers Union becomes salmon
farming‟s most vocal critic and calls for a moratorium on fish farms
until strict regulations are in place.

1988

Simon Fraser University creates an aquaculture research institute
and later the University of British Columbia creates a Chair of
Aquaculture Research.
Department of Fisheries & Oceans (DFO) assigns legal authority to
regulate aquaculture to the province of BC via a Memorandum of
Agreement

1989

BC has its strongest sockeye salmon run in 76 years. Increased
supply results in a drop in price and many salmon farms go bankrupt.
Federal and provincial officials reiterate their support of salmon
farming and announce funding for a research program to investigate
its impact on wild salmon.
Concerns are raised in the media about escaped Atlantic salmon and
their impact on the native wild salmon. Concerns regarding disease
and effluent are ongoing.

Early
1990s

The concerns raised by the Fisherman‟s Union are now shared by
the provincial New Democratic Party, the BC Liberal party, the Green
party, the Alaskan government, the Native Brotherhood of BC, the
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Year

Event
Ocean Resource Conservation Alliance, the David Suzuki
Foundation, and various local environmental groups.
Environmentalists increasingly use the media to raise public
awareness of the potential harmful impact of salmon farming caused
by the drugs used in the feeding and disease treatment of farmed
fish, the waste produced by the farms, and the escape of non-native
species into the wild. The industry minimizes or ignores these
concerns.

1991

The US levies an anti-dumping tariff on Norwegian salmon effectively
shutting them out of the market and providing a significant market
opportunity for the emerging Chilean and the Canadian industries.

1994

Sea lice from salmon farms are identified as the sole cause of the
Irish sea trout collapse, prompting calls in the BC media for a federal
or provincial review of the environmental impact of salmon farming.

1995

The BC government in consultation with the federal Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) places a moratorium on new farm
licenses and announces the creation of the Salmon Aquaculture
Review Panel to review the current methods and processes used in
regulating and managing salmon aquaculture operations.

1997

The report of the Salmon Aquaculture Review Panel concluded that
salmon farming could be managed to prevent or mitigate adverse
impacts and avoid conflicts, leading to a sustainable industry in BC's
coastal communities. The moratorium remains in effect.
The landmark Delgamuukw case is decided in favor of First Nation
consultation or compensation for activities on territory that they claim,
thus ensuring significant First Nation involvement in all fish farm
licensing in traditional territories.

1998

The first evidence of successful Atlantic salmon spawning was
discovered in the Tsitika River on Vancouver Island, reigniting public
debate about the risks of salmon farming and in particular the risks
related to escaped Atlantic salmon.

1999

The Alaskan government publishes a white paper on its concerns
about BC salmon farming and begins to lobby the BC and Canadian
governments to continue the moratorium on salmon farming.

2000

The Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR) is formed,
made up environmental groups and First Nations including the Living
Oceans Society, The David Suzuki Foundation, The T. Buck Suzuki
Foundation, The Georgia Strait Alliance, Raincoast Conservation and
others.

2001

The federal Auditor General announces that the federal government
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Year

Event
is failing to protect wild BC salmon stocks from farmed salmon.
A Senate Committee finds that escaped Atlantic salmon are
aclimatizing and spawning and the Atlantic Salmon Watch, a joint
federal and provincial program to research escaped salmon is set up.
The David Suzuki Foundation hires a former BC Supreme Court
Judge to conduct an independent inquiry into salmon farming. He
concludes that closed containment farming is the only
environmentally acceptable alternative.
CAAR coordinates 140 conservation groups, First Nations, and
businesses in Canada and the US, 20 scientists and 31 members of
the Alaska State Legislature, to petition Prime Minister Jean Chretien
and President George Bush not to lift the moratorium until a
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act Review was conducted.
The pink salmon run in the Broughton Archipelago collapses and
Local First Nations and the David Suzuki Foundation blame it on an
infestation of sea lice in the adjacent salmon farms.

2002

The moratorium placed on new site licenses in 1995 is lifted.
Two salmon farming companies are charged for violating
environmental regulations.
Grieg Seafoods is granted a new farming license in the Broughton.
CAAR launches an international boycott of BC farmed salmon.
The Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (a federally
funded independent conservation Council) concludes that sea lice
“amplified” by the salmon farms is the likely cause of the collapse of
the pink salmon run.
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Year

Event

2003

An international workshop examining sea lice research is organized
by UBC and includes First Nations, government, industry, scientists
and non-government organizations. The scientists encourage the
province to act quickly to monitor and control sea lice.
Class action suit filed in Washington state against three major
supermarket chains, Safeway, Krogers and Albertsons, for allegedly
deceiving their customers about the origins of their salmon.
The BC Salmon Farmers Association hires the public relations firm,
Hill & Knowlton to “revamp the way it presents itself to the public”.
The Heiltsuk First Nation initiates a lawsuit against the BC
government and PanFish over a new hatchery PanFish is building on
Heiltsuk territory, without proper consultation.
The federal Minister of Fisheries and the provincial Ministers
responsible for Treaty Negotiations and Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries appoints an independent two-person task group to review
the approaches to fisheries settlements in treaties.
The federal government announces administrative reforms giving
environmentalists, aboriginals and the provincial government more
control over managing Pacific salmon. These reforms had been
developed with the consensus of stakeholders including commercial,
aboriginal and sport fishers.

2004

“Science” (one of the foremost scientific journals) publishes an article
by Hites examining the links between farmed Atlantic salmon and
toxins, PCBs in particular that are hazardous to human health.
Marine Harvest, Stolt Sea Farm Group and 48 other US and
Canadian salmon farms, fish processors and grocery chains
(including Safeway, Albertson‟s and Costco) were quickly named as
defendants in a legal action in California for failing to warn consumers
that salmon may contain potentially dangerous levels of PCB‟s
Stolt Sea Farms, BC‟s largest salmon farming operation, begins
posting sea-lice and water quality data on the company web-site
seeing it as “an educational opportunity for both researchers and the
general public” and to “demonstrate we are serious about our
commitment to having sustainable salmon farm operations”.
Provincial government creates the Pacific Salmon Forum to study the
health of wild salmon.

2005

Members of the BC Wilderness Tourism Association demand the
fallowing of fish farms in the Broughton Archipelago because of their
impact on wild salmon.
The newly re-elected provincial government makes the
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unprecedented move of setting up a Special Committee on
Sustainable Aquaculture led by someone from the opposition party
with the majority of its members drawn from the opposition (6 from
opposition, 4 from government).

2006

CAAR and Marine Harvest (newly merged with Stolt Sea Farms)
announce an agreement to conduct joint research. Titled the
Framework for Dialogue, the agreement outlines 5 areas of mutual
interest with the initial research to be on sea lice.
The Special Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture conducts public
hearings on salmon farming and hears testimony from the industry,
the environmentalists and scientists.
Sea lice research published by Simon Fraser University scientists
linking farms to reductions in wild salmon. DFO and industry refutes.
DFO research suggesting that farmed and wild salmon can co-exist is
released. Environmentalists refute.
Grieg Seafoods is granted the second new farm license in the
Broughton since 2002. It is done with the consultation and agreement
of the Tlowitsis First Nation.
First Nations, along with Don Saniford from the Pure Salmon, protest
at the AGM of Cermaq in Stavanger, Norway.
BC Salmon Farmers Association begins giving salmon farm and
processing plant tours.
Alexandra Morton unsuccessful in suing salmon farms for “releasing”
sea lice. However, her methods and “science” are commended be a
world renowned expert.
A study, published on-line by Marty Krkosek using 40 years of DFO
data suggests that sea lice from salmon farms killed 95% of wild
juvenile smolts swimming by.

2007

BC Supreme Court upholds Creative Salmon of Tofino‟s successful
libel/defamation suit against Don Saniford, a former employee of
Friends of Clayoquot Sound.
A CAAR member publishes a peer reviewed journal article linking sea
lice from salmon farms to wild salmon decline, based on sea lice data
shared through the Framework for Dialogue.
Friends of Wild Salmon run ads in major newspapers in BC to stop
fish farms in the North.
The Special Legislative Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture
recommends a move to closed containment within 5 years, supported
by government funded development of technology, a moratorium on
new licenses in the North, moving regulation from Agriculture to the
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Environment Ministry.
One week after the report is tabled Greig Seafoods is granted a new
farming license in Nootka Sound. The Mowachaht/Muchalaht First
Nation agreed.
CAAR runs ad in NY Times targeting Safeway‟s sale of farmed
salmon.
“Confidential” report authored by Watershed Watch‟s Craig Orr, for
the Pacific Salmon Forum is “obtained” by the CanWest News
Service. It did not meet their test for scientific rigour and they asked
that he not speak about it.
The Pacific Salmon Forum, in its interim report, called on the
government to develop a new way of managing watersheds to better
protect wild salmon, including federal, provincial, regional and
aboriginal governments. They also called for proper analysis of what
is known about closed containment before either investing
government funds in it or requiring industry to move to it.
Two new farm licenses are approved for sites near Klemtu on the
Central Coast.
Middle Bay Sustainable Aquaculture Institute (Agri-marine) gets $2.4
million in federal funding, in addition to $1.2M from the Moore
Foundation. Another $1.2M and $2M are expected from the Moore
Foundation and the province‟s Island Coastal Economic Trust
respectively.
Grieg Seafood B.C. Ltd. of Campbell River was granted approval for
a new farm site in Nootka Sound, the 4th since the report of the
Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture in May. It has the support of
the Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nation.
18 respected scientists and researchers send an open letter to the
PM and the Premier calling for immediate barriers between wild and
farmed salmon.
A group of British Columbia business owners took a full-page ad in
the first section of The Globe and Mail. The ad, addressed to Premier
Gordon Campbell and the provincial and federal ministers of
fisheries, was entitled "The Future of B.C. Salmon Is In Your Hands"
and ran in the national edition of The Globe.
An article in Science (one of the foremost scientific journals), based
on 37 years' worth of fish- survival data collected by DFO, asserts
that some wild pink salmon populations are in a mortal decline as a
direct result of lice infestations from farms. Martin Krkosek and B.C.'s
Alexandra Morton, looked at DFO data for 71 central coast rivers.
DFO and others allege it is shoddy science. The Pacific Salmon
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Forum later agrees, in part, with its conclusions. An earlier version of
the paper had been published on-line at the end of 2006.

2008

Research by Dalhousie scientists Ford and Myers reports that fish
farms are associated with plummeting populations of salmon and
trout in all jurisdictions that farm fish.
A group of ecotourism businesses, native organizations and
environmentalists announce a plan to “medi-evac” smolts past
salmon farms in the Broughton.
Grieg Seafood B.C. was issued a farm license in Nootka Sound on
Muchalat Inlet. It is the sixth site granted in a settlement with the
Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nations.
A finfish license went to Creative Salmon Company Ltd. to raise
chinook salmon at the entrance of Tofino Inlet.
A major story in the New York Times outlining the difficulties plaguing
Chile's salmon farms.
The provincial government declared a moratorium on fish farms on
B.C.'s North Coast.
The Scottish government's Fisheries Research Services found
"strong evidence that sea lice from caged salmon contaminate wild
fish -- and the problem seems to be getting worse."
Marine Harvest runs full page ads in major newspapers describing its
success in minimizing sea lice on its farms during the out-migration of
juvenile wild salmon.
BC Salmon Farmers Association reports that demand for BC salmon
is outstripping supply and has been for 3-4 years
Canada's department of fisheries and oceans confirms that Canada,
Ireland, Scotland and Norway plan to coordinate field experiments
and hold meetings where scientists share knowledge, methods and
experimental results. Environmental organization Pure Salmon
obtained this information from Scotland's government using freedom
of information laws.
Taras Grescoe‟s book Bottom feeder: A seafood lovers journey to the
end of the food chain is published in Canada. It claims that sea lice
are wiping out wild salmon
Vancouver‟s sustainable seafood guru executive chef Robert Clark
announced he was taking wild Pacific salmon off the menus of C
Restaurant, Raincity Grill and Nu
The legal authority of the provincial government to regulate fish farms
on the West Coast is challenged in the Supreme Court of British

294

Year

Event
Columbia. Alexandra Morton, the Wilderness Tourism Association,
the Southern Gillnetters Association, the Fishing Vessel Owners'
Association of B.C. and the Pacific Coast Wild Salmon Society
petition to have the province's right to regulate ruled constitutionally
invalid and to strike down all the aquaculture regulations B.C. has put
in place over the past 20 years. Representing the petitioners is a
highly skilled environmental lawyer. Gregory McDade, former head of
the Sierra Legal Defence Fund.
A request for an emergency debate in the House of Commons on the
dwindling number of Pacific salmon was denied.
First nations in British Columbia have added their voice to a call from
The B.C. Wildlife Federation, Fraser Valley Salmon Society,
Sportfishing Defence Alliance and others for the Auditor-General of
Canada to investigate the actions of the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans on the West Coast. The petition by the B.C. organizations
followed an earlier petition filed by several prominent individuals including broadcaster and author David Suzuki, and Daniel Pauly, a
leading fisheries scientist - that called on the Auditor-General to
examine DFO's policy decisions on the West Coast.
Marine Harvest announces a Coordinated Area Management Plan
(CAMP) to create safe corridors for migrating pink salmon in the
Broughton Archipelago by emptying salmon farms during the spring
out-migration of wild juvenile fish from March 1 to June 30 each year.
The company is ready to move forward with the plan pending
government approvals. Marine Harvest had briefed the government,
first nations, and environmental groups.
30,000 salmon escape from a Marine Harvest farm near Campbell
River, BCs largest escape in 8 years.
BC Supreme Court hears petition to have the province's right to
regulate ruled constitutionally invalid.
Applications for amendments to license at specific existing Marine
Harvest and Mainstream fish farms are “happened upon” by CAAR
members and reported as applications to increase production in the
media.
Sea lice genomics project, funded by DFO, University of Victoria,
Vancouver Island University, four fish farm companies and the
province, has discovered Pacific sea lice are very different from their
Atlantic and European cousins – sufficiently so that they could be
another species.
2,500 salmon escape from a Mainstream farm in Clayoquot Sound.
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2009

First Nations in the Broughton Archipelago announce they will file a
class-action lawsuit against the B.C. government for damages
caused to wild stocks by salmon farming.
The Pacific Salmon Forum report concluded that wild salmon require
the protection of a new agency dedicated to taking an ecological
approach to all watershed activities that might threaten fish habitat. It
also concluded that farmed and wild salmon can co-exist, but
recommended limits on salmon farming, including a cap on
production in the Broughton Archipelago at current levels and
managing farms to meet sea-lice limits on young wild salmon. The
forum also recommended a science secretariat to co-ordinate salmon
research and urged the province to lead a pilot program to see if
salmon farming can be economically viable using closed-containment
systems.
The B.C. Supreme Court (Justice Chris Hinkson) ruled that the
federal government -- not the province -- has exclusive jurisdiction
over the management of salmon farming.
Alexandra Morton sends letter and petition to federal Fisheries
Minister Gail Shea asking her to apply the Fisheries Act to the
“salmon feedlot fishery”.
Marine Harvest announces it is appealing the B.C. Supreme Court
ruling that the federal government, not the province, has jurisdiction
over fish farms, claiming that "Domesticated creatures, like farmraised salmon, are private property, and are not part of the fishery as
a public resource."
The provincial government will not appeal the B.C. Supreme Court
ruling that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over fish
farms.
Alexandra Morton re-sends letter and petition to federal Fisheries
Minister Gail Shea and BC Premier Campbell weekly with more
names. By the end of March there are 8,400 signatures on the
petition.
A team led by a professor at the University of Guelph, has used DNA
barcoding techniques to trace the path of transmission of lice to and
from wild fish
Greenpeace rates the sustainability of the seafood offerings at
Canada‟s major supermarket chains. The report gave highest marks
to Loblaw, because it announced that by 2013, it would sell only
sustainable seafood. Second place went to Sobeys.
Federal Fisheries Minister Gail Shea announces 6 BC aquaculture
companies will get more than $930,000 to pursue innovative ideas.
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An additional $848,000 will go to the six projects from the province,
industry and universities.
Sea-lice levels dropped between 2008 and 2009 on young pink and
chum salmon migrating through the Broughton Archipelago. The
Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform and Marine Harvest Canada
both credit a fish farm management program. "This is a historic
release in that it marks the first time that former adversaries have
come forward in agreement."
While some parts of the province have strong sockeye runs, the
Fraser River sockeye run collapses.
Record runs of pink salmon.
Federal government calls for Judicial Inquiry in to the collapse of the
Fraser River Sockeye run. The Cohen Inquiry will investigate reasons
for the decline of the sockeye salmon in the Fraser River.
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 2005, 2006, 2007
CONFIDENTIAL
Respondent:_________________________Organization: _________________
Years with Org: _____ Years in Position: _____ Title: _____________________
Interviewers: ____________________________Date: ___________________
Thank you for taking the time to meet with us(me) today. Your expertise
and perspective is very important to our research. The PURPOSE of multi-year
Research Project is to better understand the global salmon farming industry, what
important strategic issues the industry is faced with and how it deals with them.
Our research team is made up of several business strategy professors from both
Canada and Australia.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Re: Strategic Issues
What are the most pressing issues facing YOUR INDUSTRY at this time? (What
is your industry? Domestic issues? International issues?)
What are the most pressing issues facing YOUR ORGANIZATION at this time?
(Domestic? International? Competitive? Regulatory? Stakeholder issues?) [for
diversified bus]
Re: Issues (e.g., regulatory, trade, certification, health, environment, safety)
What are the most pressing issues facing the salmon farming industry at this
time? And facing your organization at this time? Specify via list below:
Competitive issues for INDUSTRY; for YOUR ORG
International trade-related issues for INDUSTRY; for YOUR ORG
What are the major regulatory or political issues the INDUSTRY / YOUR ORG
has to deal with? (domestic and international)
What certification issues does salmon farming face?
What environmental issues does salming farming face? does YOUR ORG face?
What health-related issues does salmon farming face? Does YOUR ORG face?
What other issues are on the radar? Add q on cc impacts / on the radar screen?
RE: Issue Salience
How do these issues become issues for your organization?
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Of all these issues, which do you consider the three most critical ones for THE
INDUSTRY?
Of all these issues, which do you consider the three most critical ones for YOUR
ORG?
Re: Industry & Supply Chain
Do actions of firms in other parts of the salmon farming supply chain affect your
business? In what way?
How do you manage this? (i.e., work with them, pressure them, develop
standards, etc.)
In what ways do you work with/talk with other industry members (associations
belonged to, conferences attended, alliances, etc. Specify names and
approximate dates of joining, belonging to, etc.)?
What‟s the role of organic salmon? Possible? Emerging product?
Is land based aquaculture going to become more important? Why or why not?
Re: Critical Events
What were the major events impacting the INDUSTRY in the last 5 years?
What were the major events impacting YOUR ORG in the last 5 years?
What are the critical events you anticipate to happen in the INDUSTRY in the
next 5-10 years?
What are the critical events you anticipate to happen in YOUR ORG in the next 510 years?
Re: Crises
Considering all business issues, have you felt that the industry was in a crisis
during the last 3-4 years? (“Crisis is an event that hits unexpectedly and changes
things dramatically in the organization”).
How was the crisis perceived inside the organization? Was there
agreement within the organization about what the crisis was and how to
handle it?
Re: Organization‟s Objectives
Over the last few years, what have been the major strategic decisions and
strategic shifts in YOUR ORG?
What, in your opinion, are the primary objectives of YOUR ORG today? Of your
SBU?
Re: Important Stakeholders
What stakeholders do you consider as important to your firm?
Who are they and how important are they? (Scale I)
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Are there primary objectives of your main stakeholders that are in conflict with the
objectives of the company today? (How did you derive your stakeholders‟
objectives? What, if any, kind of communication do you have with different
groups?)
What means do your stakeholders use to try to influence you? How do you try to
influence your stakeholders?
Do you hear much from activist groups? How do they attempt to influence your
organization?
What kind of an impact are your critics having on your market? How?
Has your own perspective changed regarding environmental issues? How did
that happen?
Re: Leadership
What is the position of the board on specific strategic, social and environmental
issues?
(Is the board generally in agreement regarding environmental issues? Can you
give examples?)

What is the position of Top Management on specific strategic, social and
environmental issues?
Re: Wrap up:
What have we missed?
Any comments on our interview?
What‟s ahead for Your Organization?
Can you suggest anyone else we should interview about the salmon farming
industry?
May we contact you in the future for clarification questions?
Thank you for your time!
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In general, what stakeholders do you consider as important to your
organization?
Please rate the importance of each of the following stakeholder groups:
Most important…… least important
1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

local communities
industry & trade associations
provincial government agencies
federal government agencies
environmental regulators
non-regulatory gov. pressure
financial institutions
environmental groups
international groups
other NGOs
the media
consumers/customers
shareholders/BOD
employees / unions
top management
suppliers
First Nations / aboriginals
other: ______________
other: ______________
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APPENDIX C: ETHICS APPROVAL OF RESEARCH DESIGN
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APPENDIX D: NOTE SENT TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS
Dear
My name is Patricia MacDonald and I am a doctoral candidate at the Ivey
Business School at the University of Western Ontario. I am inviting you to take
part in a research study on Inter-Organizational Learning in the Salmon
Farming Industry. The purpose of this research is to study the conditions under
which inter-organizational learning occurs between companies and their
stakeholders, particularly with respect to conflict laden issues. I am conducting
this research within the context of the BC salmon farming industry, its issues, and
its stakeholders. This research builds on prior work that I did with Dr. Monika
Winn, University of Victoria, Business. The information that I am currently
collecting will be used in my thesis. The purpose of this letter is to provide you
with the information you require to make an informed decision on participating in
this research.
You are being asked to participate in this study because you were identified
as an expert on aspects of salmon farming, through for example public sources
or by other persons knowledgeable in this field. Salmon farming is multi-faceted
and generates many diverse viewpoints; it is important for this study to fully
understand your perspective.
I will be conducting interviews on Vancouver Island and in the Vancouver
area between September 15 and 29. I would very much like to interview you
about the issues faced by your organization and other stakeholders and
members of the industry, and the impact they have had on companies.
If you agree to voluntarily participate in this research, your participation will
include an interview of about 60 to 90 minutes, at a time and location of your
choosing. There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this
research. You and your organization‟s anonymity and confidentiality of data will
be assured. If you agree to a meeting, we will provide you with a formal consent
form which spells out the information provided above in more detail. You will also
receive a signed copy of this consent form for your records.
The potential benefits of your participation in this research include your
contribution to an enhanced understanding of how companies learn from conflict
laden issues and how to better manage this process. I would be happy to share
results with you at the conclusion of the research project.
Thank you for considering this request. I will contact you shortly to discuss
further details.

Sincerely, Pat MacDonald
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APPENDIX E: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION & INFORMED
CONSENT FORM
Research Project: Inter-organizational Learning in the BC Salmon Farming
Industry
Dear
My name is Patricia MacDonald and I am a doctoral student at the Ivey
Business School at the University of Western Ontario and the information I am
collecting will be used in my thesis.
You are being invited to take part in a research study looking at how
organizations learn from one another in the salmon farming industry in British
Columbia. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you
require to make an informed decision on participating in this research.
The study is expected to add to our collective knowledge about
organizations‟ interactions with their stakeholders and the conditions under which
inter-organizational learning occurs. Approximately 25 other representatives of
salmon farming companies and their stakeholder groups are being contacted. If
you like, you may receive summaries of the findings of this research, which may
benefit you in your own organization. The results of this research are expected to
be published in academic journals.
I will contact you to set up an interview at your office location that will
consist of a number of open-ended questions designed to capture your
recollections of events and actions regarding stakeholder interactions around
conflict laden issues affecting your industry. It should take approximately 60
minutes to complete and there are no known risks to your involvement in this
study. Please note that your responses are strictly confidential, that your
participation is completely voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to
answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on
your future. Should the results of the study be published, your name will not be
used. With your permission, the interview will be audio taped and transcribed
and will be labeled and identified with a code, not your name.
Should you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact
Dr. Mary Crossan at XXXXXXXX. If you have any questions about the conduct of
this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office of
Research Ethics, the University of Western Ontario (519-661-3036 or email at:
ethics@uwo.ca). Signing the consent form indicates consent to participate in the
study.
I look forward to talking to you, and wish to thank you again for your time
and participation.
Yours sincerely,
Patricia MacDonald,
PhD Candidate, Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario
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Consent Form
Research Project: Inter-organizational Learning in the BC Salmon Farming
Industry
I have read the letter of information, have had the nature of the study explained to
me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my
satisfaction.
Name (please print)___________________________
Signature_______________________
Date_____________________

Person Obtaining Consent______________________
Signature_____________________
Date_______________________

Please indicate if you would like to receive summaries of the research
findings.
Yes______ No________.
These will be sent to you at your work address unless you indicate
otherwise.
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APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 2009
Research area

Preliminary interview questions

Background/context Describe what has been happening in the BC salmon
farming industry between the companies and their
stakeholders since the most recent government review
was begun? (possible prompts – behaviour around
issues, Behaviour between companies and stakeholders)
What has been your involvement with stakeholders?
Individual Identity

Describe your role in the organization? In the industry?
When did you first get involved? What were you doing
before?
How long have you been with (organization) and in what
roles?
How much of your time do you spend on conflict issues
related to salmon farming?
Someone said it takes a certain kind of person to be
involved with these issues – what are your thoughts on
that? What kind of person would you say has been
involved?
You mentioned that you see yourself as ----- could you tell
me what that entails?

Organization
Identity

How would you describe your organization‟s response to
the issues related to salmon farming?
How have you felt about your organization‟s responses?
Are there different types of salmon farming companies?
What makes you say that?
Can you give me an example of something that
demonstrates that?
Are there any other things that your consider central to
your organization?
Are there different types of ENGOs?
What makes you say that? Can you give me some
examples?
Has (organization) always been like that?
When did it change (if at all)?
Have the mergers in the salmon farming industry affected
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relationships within the industry? In what ways?
You mentioned that you see your organization as a ----could you tell me what that entails?
Learning

Do you conduct joint initiatives with other organizations?
Who is involved? What is your role in those initiatives?
Describe how the organizations work together?
Has that changed over time?
Describe how decisions are made and actions taken?
Has that changed over time?
Describe how conflicts are resolved within the initiative?
Has that changed over time?
What have been the results/ output from the research
done with other organizations? For you personally? For
your organization? For the industry?

Conflict

How would you describe the situation in the salmon
farming industry in BC?
How would you describe your organization‟s actions in
response to conflict? Have they changed over time?
Can you give me an example that illustrates what you
mean by that?
Is your organization similar or different (in its actions in
response to conflict) from other organizations involved in
the BC salmon farming industry?

Engagement
practices

Who do you deal with on these issues? Is you contact
director indirect?
Tell me about your interaction? Where does it take place?
How does it unfold?
Describe your formal versus informal interaction?
Has your interaction changed over time?
What have you observed in terms of the activities of
others involved?
Can you think of any other ways that you interact with
stakeholders?
Are you familiar/involved with the Framework for
Dialogue?
Could you describe it to me?
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APPENDIX G: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITIES IN THE INDUSTRY
Individual and Organizational Identities in the Salmon Farming Industry in
BC
Company
Level

Identity
Description

Representative Quotations

Marine
Harvest

Open

Individual

Broadly
knowledgeable on
salmon farming

“I started out as a fish biologist... then worked in
research and production ...production support...
environmental management... I had an affinity to
work with people so I just kind of naturally started to
gravitate towards that”

Facilitator

Community
member

“I build bridges”
“I was always very big on just open up your books,
we‟ve got nothing to hide, let‟s show people ... show
constant improvement”
“… my son goes to school with the son of the
councillor who had opposed fish farming but when
we see each other on the soccer field we can
actually talk about it because we‟re there on the
soccer field together.”

Marine
Harvest

Socially
responsible

“... you can only find a solution when you put
different people with different backgrounds and
different views of the world together... not the
different disciplines within one company, but now
the NGOs and the government representatives and
the scientists”

Industry leader in
collaboration

“Dialogue is important to build trust ... transparency
builds trust ... we are a very open company”

Transparent
Collaborative

Organization Innovative

“... we were very out there, we were very
transparent and I made sure our story got told a lot
... I really broadcast our successes in order to shore
up the ability to do more work”
“this is a dynamic industry with lots of innovation
and every year we get better”
“... big on social accountability, big on
environmental accountability, even though they
didn‟t have First Nations issues, they took
leadership roles – Marine Harvest did
internationally.”
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Stolt

Scientist

Individual

Data driven
Facilitator
Knowledgeable on
salmon issues
(wild and farmed)

“I am a marine biologist ... a scientist that supports
the scientific process”
“I am just someone who has spent their lives
working with salmon habitat and conservation
issues”
“I ... focus on doing and helping”
“I am a facilitator”

Stolt

Private

Organization Accountable
(pre-merger) Ethical
Industry leader
size and
profitability

“we undertake cooperative research and
development on ecosystem principles that were put
under stress through various impacts”
“Stolt was quieter … were also working on a very
high level of compliance, a very high level of
accountability. Very good ethics. And very
profitable … but no so out there and not so much
into the ... social issues ... kind of stayed back a bit
... not as transparent”
“... the number of lobbyists and activists with
positions on aquaculture is startling ... there is
nothing we can say or do to satisfy all of these
interested parties. What we can do is adhere
rigorously to all regulations ... and to follow our own
conscience and set our own high standard”
“... it is our responsibility and commitment to meet
high standards of husbandry and care for the
environment”

Mainstream

Business person

Individual

Rational
Knowledgeable on
business issues
(running a salmon
farming operation)

“I don‟t necessarily believe we are the best at what
we do but I‟d say we do it definitely better than the
rest of the group ... we run our business better”
“... make sure that you educate yourself as to what
sustainability means. It‟s a tough one to quantify.”
“if you don‟t make money you are not sustainable”
“... we have more revenue than the largest
company” in Canada”
“You‟ve got to be continually looking for innovation
and development”
“I believe it is the future ...we‟re going to focus ... on
the bigger picture ... it‟s just not one little industry
causing an issue”
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Mainstream

Sustainable

Organization Rational
Innovative
Risk balancer

“we ... have set a goal for ISO ... we will be able to
hold our heads up high and say we are sustainable”
“We had to emphasize the financial sustainability of
everything we did. We had to regain our financial
freedom by focusing on operations, cautious
stewardship of our assets ...”

Focused on the
business of salmon “We take the long-term view and act responsibly
farming
with respect to nature and society. We place great
emphasis on environmental sustainability ...
However, sustainability also means running a
profitable business, where we balance risks and
opportunities based on our recognized strengths”

“Cermaq has established a strong international
network both within and outside the industry…. the
company participates in various research projects
with public and industrial research establishments
around the world”
“As an industrial R and D institution we have a
highly commercial focus. Our slogan “Knowledge
makes the difference” ... results in actual
competitive advantages for our customers... we are
increasingly collaborating on the basis of the
licensing of exclusive rights, which enables unique
product advantages”
CAAR

Scientist

Individual

Data driven
Logical
Strategic
Knowledgeable on
environmental and
social issues
Community
member

“I‟m an ecologist. We have a fisheries biologist on
staff, we have another staff member who has an
oceanography degree, so we have a strong science
background”
“There‟s piece after piece after piece that builds
your case, and your case has to be solid and it has
to be based on science and it has to be rational and
you can use a million different tactics to deliver that
message, some people use irrational tactics but the
message can still be rational. “
“my husband ... was a salmon fisherman and it just
became an issue that we couldn‟t not look at”
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CAAR

Cooperative

Organization Logical
Strategic
Focussed
Skilled in
coordinating interorganizational
activity

“We got together into a group and said, “you know
what we have to make the sum greater than the
individual part,” that we had to work together to try
to deal with it because the salmon farming
companies are multi-national corporations ... we
can‟t outspend them so we have to outthink them ...
It was by having everybody pool all their information
and work collaboratively we‟re able to take it ... to
being one of the most prominent environmental
issues in BC”
“... when we started the question was - are we
trying to stop salmon farming altogether, or are we
trying to reform it. That was a huge question, and I
think one of the successes around our coalition is
that we actually took the time to answer that
question, and to build consensus around it”
“The science is pretty clear on this, but science
alone is not a driver in social change. It‟s just the
underpinning ... You have to get the public really
behind all this stuff.”
“CAAR is the best coalition I‟ve ever worked with in
my life. It‟s phenomenal. We‟ve met every two
months for going on seven years, and always
consensus, it‟s a phenomenal group of people. I
always say it‟s an honour to work with that group.”
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APPENDIX H: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF LEARNING ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOMES
Company

Organizational Identity

Learning Activities

Learning Outcomes (postmerger)

Marine Harvest

Transparent

Internal consultation

Collaborative

ISO certification

Articles in peer reviewed
science and ecology journals

Innovative

External consultation with customers,
supply chain members, regional
governments, financial community,
NGOs, other stakeholders

Awareness of issues

International, Regional and National
Conferences

Other niche conferences (i.e.
salmon farming jurisdictions)

Research consortiums with supply
chain participants

Revised operational practices

Socially responsible
Industry leader in
collaboration
“Learning is collaborative
process. We can all learn
from each other. Knowledge
must be shared so everyone
can benefit.”

Collaborative research with
universities, NGOs, independent
and/or
Private research institutes
Public-private partnerships with
governments

Stolt

Private

Internal research and development

Accountable

Internal consultation

Ethical

Collaborative research with
universities and independent private
research institutes

Industry leader in size,

Programs to manage social,
environmental, and animal
welfare issues

Approaches to stakeholder
management and
engagement
Cooperation and collaboration
with suppliers, customers,
stakeholders
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profitability

Collaborative research with CAAR

“Learning and knowledge
support achieving and
maintaining our high
operating standards.”
CAAR

Cooperative
Logical
Strategic
Focused

Partnering on research with experts
on specific issues
Partnering with international
environmental groups on campaigns
and research
Partnering with corporations

“Learning and knowledge
support our advocacy work.”

Position on aquaculture in
general and open net farming
in particular
Articles in peer reviewed
science and ecology journals

Funding graduate students

Approaches to target firm
engagement

Attending International industry
conferences

Access to proprietary
corporate data

Accessing information via the
Freedom of Information Act
Participating in international
government sponsored research
symposiums
Workshops in conjunction with
universities
Community science outreach
through brochures and speaches
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Mainstream

Sustainable

Internal research and development

Rational

ISO certification

Innovative

Internal consultation with senior
managers

Risk balancer
“A Business”
“Learning supports us
achieving a competitive
advantage. Knowledge is an
asset to be developed and
exploited.”

Local community consultation
Collaborative research projects with
public and industrial research
establishments around the world
Participate in international networks
within and outside the fish feed and
fish farming industry

Revised operational practices
– greater efficiency, reduction
in violations
Revised management
practices
Mechanisms for monitoring
performance
Lower costs
Employee training
requirements
Employment standards and
expectations
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APPENDIX I: COMPLETE LIST OF FINAL NODES, CASES,
AND RELATIONSHIPS
Tree Nodes
Identity

Individual Identity

Roles
Social
Tapping other identities

Group Identity
Organizational Identity

Organization identity in flux
Shift in organization identity

Relations between levels
Conflict

Conflict dynamic

Individual
Group
Organizational

Conflict source

Identity
Socio-cognitive
Interests

Learning

Outcomes

Individual Learning
Collective learning
Inter-organizational learning

Processes

Individual
Organizational

Practice

Identity
Conflict
Learning

Practitioners
Praxis

Identity
Conflict
Learning

Repeated engagement

Individual interactions

Dialogue
External
Internal

Inter-organizational dynamics
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Free Nodes
Distancing
Pairing
Rule Setting
Experiments - Bold
Ongoing conflict
Relationships
From Name

Type

To Name

Identity - individual

Associated

Learning – individual

Conflict - individual

Associated

Identity - individual

Learning - individual

Associated

Conflict - individual

Identity - organizational

Associated

Learning - - organizational

Conflict- organizational

Associated

Identity - organizational

Learning - organizational

Associated

Conflict - organizational

Practitioners

Associated

Inter-organizational learning

Practitioners

Influences

Organizational learning

Practice

Influences

Praxis

Praxis

Influences

Practice

Cases
CAAR
Marine Harvest
Mainstream
Industry Associations
Media
Observers-academics
Regulators-government
Suppliers
Other ENGOs
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APPENDIX J: LEARNING ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOMES OVER TIME
Relationship
of Learning
and
Identity

Learning
Learning
Activities/Prac Outcomes
tice
prior to 2003
prior to 2003

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
2004-2006

Learning
Outcomes
2004-2006

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
after 2006

Learning
Outcomes
2009

Marine
Harvest

Internal
consultation
across regions
(MH and Stolt)

Direct
interaction Facilitated
direct
negotiation of
a joint
research
agreement
with CAAR
(Stolt)

Recognition at
the BC level of
the need to
engage with a
broader range
of
stakeholders
(albeit for
different
reasons)

Collecting data to
address broader
marine
environment
questions and
compiling
databases

Proactive
environmental
management
has value =
good
management

Collaboration
with the
Monterey
Bay
Aquarium
(MH)

Recognition of
a different
logic

Learning is
collaborative
process. We
can all learn
from each
other.
Knowledge
must be shared
so everyone
can benefit.
(more at the
corporate level
and more
superficial)

Internal
research and
development
(MH and Stolt)
Collaborative
research with
universities,
research
institutes,
governments
(MH and Stolt)

Stolt

ISO
Certification
(MH and Stolt)

Learning and
knowledge

External
consultation

Programs to
manage social,
environmental,
and animal
welfare issues
(MH)
Recognize
value in
collaborating
across a range
of stakeholders
(MH)
High standards
and first-rate
operations
(Stolt)
Ongoing
understanding
of the eco
system impacts
of farms (Stolt)

Developing
research
questions
collaboratively
with CAAR

Engagement
with
stakeholders
has value,
despite the
risks

Listening to both
Recognition
camps of
that the conflict researchers and
was escalating acknowledging
and was costly there are 2 camps

Have to deal
with the issues
(one way or
another) to
remain credible

Recognition of
the importance
of noneconomic

No risk from
corporate from
engaging in
this process

Contracting with
neutral scientists
and bringing pro
and anti salmon
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Relationship
of Learning
and
Identity

Learning
Learning
Activities/Prac Outcomes
tice
prior to 2003
prior to 2003

support
achieving and
maintaining our
high operating
standards

with customers,
suppliers,gover
nments,
financial
community,
NGOs, other
stakeholders
(MH)
Participation in
the WWF
Salmon
Dialogue (MH)
Negotiation
with First
Nations re.
leases (MH
prior to it
becoming law,
Stolt when it
was legally
required)

Good
management =
good science
(Stolt)

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
2004-2006

Learning
Outcomes
2004-2006

metrics
Engaging
does not mean
agreeing or
even changing
that much
Ongoing
revised
operational
practices
based on
feedback
Recognition of
similarities
(CAAR is a
business)

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
after 2006
farming scientists
together
Monitoring the
farms and
identifying
patterns in the
data in
collaboration with
stakeholder
personnel

Learning
Outcomes
2009

Different and
deeper
understanding
of sea lice
Revised
understanding
of the nature of
the
relationship.

Weekly contact –
across a number
of individuals – in
a variety of ways

Revised
understanding
of their
responsibility in
the relationship

Engaging directly
with communities
alone and with
CAAR

Understanding
the conflict
trade offs
(speed vs.
completeness)

Engaging with
new critics

Revised
approach to
structuring
engagement
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Relationship
of Learning
and
Identity

Learning
Learning
Activities/Prac Outcomes
tice
prior to 2003
prior to 2003

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
2004-2006

Learning
Outcomes
2004-2006

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
after 2006

Learning
Outcomes
2009

(structure,
openness,
acknowledgem
ent of different
perspectives –
of
responsibility)
CAAR

Facilitated
development of
Learning and
the coalition,
knowledge of
over a year
science
funded by
support
advocacy work. foundations
Funding
research
internally and
at universities
Conducting
independent
research
Conflictual
interaction
mediated by
third parties

Focus on
science and on
specific long
term goals –
sea lice –
closed
containment
Positioning to
maximize
effectiveness –
credibility –
good science –
rational
arguments
Value in
collaborating
with other like

Direct
interaction
with industry
– negotiation
of a joint
research
agreement
with MH

Access to data
and funding for
staff provides
immediate
value in
engaging with
Marine
Harvest

Monitoring the
farms and
identifying
patterns in the
data in
collaboration with
company
personnel

An article in
peer reviewed
science/
ecology journal
– major
breakthrough in
terms of data
access

Ongoing
research
using MH
data

Potential value
in collaborating
with industry
despite the
risks

Increased
specialization of
function (within
CAAR and
between MH)

There is value
in engaging
with industry
despite the
risks

Strategic use
of interest
based
approach

Developing and
implementing
projects
collaboratively –

Value is viewed
differently by
different people
“Respect costs
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Relationship
of Learning
and
Identity

Learning
Learning
Activities/Prac Outcomes
tice
prior to 2003
prior to 2003
Ongoing
collaborative
activities of the
coalition –
regular
meetings –
committees –
communication
s - facilitation
Market analysis
and
understanding
of business
models
Consumer and
community
development/o
utreach

minded
researchers
and
organizations
Collaborative
skills, conflict
management
skills internally
Importance of
“semantics” –
speaking the
language of
business
Strategic use of
conflict/power –
new targets –
new methods

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
2004-2006

Learning
Outcomes
2004-2006

Empathy for
salmon
farmers –
separating the
people from
the issue –
seeing them
as members of
the same
community
Initial
recognition of
their
similarities

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
after 2006
meeting
constantly – on
the phone etc.
Direct interaction
between more
people interorganizationally –
delegation of
relationship and
task responsibility
– open door
Managing
interpretation and
integration
internally- two
layers of
negotiations

Learning
Outcomes
2009
you nothing”
Interest base
approaches
worth a try –
can always go
back to power
and rights
based
Third parties
decrease the
perceived risk
of engagement
and of identity
conflict
Engaging does
not necessarily
mean agreeing
(high on
relationship,
high on goal)

Contracting and
collaborating with
independent
scientists together Recognition of
– choosing one
similarities
that understood
Strategic use of
the conflict and
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Relationship
of Learning
and
Identity

Learning
Learning
Activities/Prac Outcomes
tice
prior to 2003
prior to 2003

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
2004-2006

Learning
Outcomes
2004-2006

Additional
Learning
Activities/
Practice
after 2006
was able to
manage it

Learning
Outcomes
2009

Ongoing day to
day conflict
managed by
external
consultant Really big issues
mediated by the
mediator

Focus on
interim goals

Joint
presentations to
government,
community
groups, WWF‟s
Salmon
Aquaculture
Dialog
Collaboration with
other companies

conflict to
achieve goals

Trust is not as
important as
behaviour
change
Science can
bridge
internally and
externally
Greater
empathy/appre
ciation of the
other
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APPENDIX K: SUMMARY OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR
DIALOGUE
COASTAL ALLIANCE FOR AQUACULTURE REFORM (“CAAR”) AND
MARINE HARVEST CANADA (“MHC”)
FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE – SUMMARY
JANUARY 12, 2006
BACKGROUND
The Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR) is a coalition of First
Nations and conservation groups working to stop the negative impacts of salmon
farming on wild salmon and the marine ecosystem in British Columbia. The
member organizations of CAAR are theDavid Suzuki Foundation, Friends of
Clayoquot Sound, Georgia Strait Alliance, Living OceansSociety, Musgamagw
Tsawataineuk Tribal Council, Raincoast Conservation Society, Raincoast
Research, T. Buck Suzuki Environmental Foundation, and Watershed Watch
Salmon Society Marine Harvest is the world's leading producer and supplier of
farmed salmon and is committed to continual improvement with respect to its
products and environmental practices.
In British Columbia, Marine Harvest Canada (MHC) operates ISO 14000 and
9000 certified salmon farms on Vancouver Island and the mid coast. In the spring
of 2004, CAAR and MHC each, independent of the other, recognizes the salmon
farming debate in British Columbia is highly polarized and not likely to produce
positive results in its current format. The chronology of the ensuing dialogue is as
follows:
a) June 2004 - CAAR and MHC initiate exploratory discussions to determine if
there is potential value and mutual interest in engaging in some direct discussion
around aquaculture issues.
b) October 2004 - based on these exploratory discussions, CAAR and MHC
agree there is value in engaging in such direct discussion and begin to meet
periodically – discussion initially focuses on identifying the scope of issues that
would benefit from direct discussion, relative priorities, principles to govern
dialogue such that the likelihood of success within a polarized climate was
maximized, identifying research priorities required to support effective
discussion/resolution of the issues, and identifying precautionary measures that
could be undertaken relative to each party‟s interests while research and
discussion takes place.
c) December 2005 – CAAR and MHC reach agreement on the substantive
elements of a framework for Dialogue – (see below for a summary of the
Framework).
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d) The Province was advised early on that these discussions were taking place
but not briefed as to specifics/details until November 2005. The Province
supported the successful conclusion of the Framework by agreeing to fund
certain interim measures identified in the Framework.
SUMMARY OF THE “FRAMEWORK”
The Framework is a comprehensive document. Following is a summary of those
matters addressed within the Framework – this is intended for illustrative
purposes only and, by its summary nature, does not address every detail.
Purpose
The Framework is intended to
a) Support constructive, efficient, interest-based results that address the needs of
both MHC and CAAR;
b) Increase knowledge with respect to environmental, social and economic
factors associated with salmon farming;
c) Reduce conflict associated with MHC‟s salmon farming; and
d) Direct change to current practices where best available information
demonstrates there are impacts to the environment and wild salmon as a result of
current practices;
2. The Framework is not intended to fulfill and constitute duties of consultation or
accommodation owed to First Nations.
3. The Framework is not intended to create legal rights or obligations.
Background/Context
4. The Framework sets out a number of background/contextual matters
acknowledged and/or agreed to by both MHC and CAAR including the ecological,
cultural, and economic importance of wild salmon, salmon farming is part of the
economy of coastal communities, there are environmental impacts associated
with salmon farming that need to be reduced, mitigated or eliminated, both CAAR
and MHC have invested in research however some further research is required.
5. The Framework states that MHC maintains the right to exercise their business
operations as required on a day-to-day basis and to publicly respond to criticism
or third party assessment of their business or effects of their business on the
environment, especially wild salmon.
6. The Framework states that CAAR maintains the right to exercise its campaigns
and public education initiatives related to aquaculture and marine conservation;
Guiding Principles for Dialogue
7. The Framework sets out a number of principles CAAR and MHC agree will
govern their ongoing dialogue (e.g. interest based dialogue, respectful dialogue,
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both parties having access to information in a timely and transparent manner,
willingness to change perspectives based on new information etc)
Salmon Farming Issues
8. The Framework describes the broad range of issues associated with salmon
farming in BC (these are summarized in Appendix A), acknowledges that some
are most appropriately addressed bilaterally while others are best addressed in
multi-lateral public policy forums, commits the parties to:
a) periodically reviewing this list of issues; and
b) periodically identifying priorities for research and dialogue based on these
issues
9. The Framework identifies the short term priorities for research being
a) the interaction between wild salmon, farmed salmon, and sea lice
b) the economic feasibility of commercial scale closed containment
c) wild salmon migratory routes
10. The Framework provides that discussion, dialogue and decisions need to be
informed by
best available information (i.e. information that is peer reviewed, research that is
undertaken collaboratively, and documented local knowledge).
Sea Lice Research
179. The Framework provides that research is best undertaken collaboratively
and in a manner that seeks to reduce the polarity that has existed within the
scientific community regarding aquaculture issues
18. The Framework describes an agreed upon list of priority questions that need
to be addressed through research relative to the sea lice issue in the Broughton,
a process to annually review these questions, the research priorities based on
these questions, and certain specific research projects that need to be
undertaken collaboratively in 2006 including,:
a) Morbidity/mortality/behavioral effects on juvenile pink and chum salmon
associated with sea lice infections;
b) The source of sea lice (i.e., from farms or other sources) infecting out
migrating juvenile salmon;
c) The migration pathways of out-migrating juvenile wild salmon in the Broughton;
d) The relationship between the age of farmed fish (time in salt water) and sea
lice i.e. after what period in salt water do farmed fish develop the capacity to
contribute a significant amount of sea lice to the surrounding environment;
9

Non-sequential numbering appeared in the original
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e) What date within the period January 18 and March 1 constitutes a reasonably
precautionary commencement date for a migration corridor in each year.
19. The Framework provides that in some circumstances research will be
undertaken by MHC and CAAR directly and in other circumstances they will
jointly advocate that such research be undertaken by others on the basis of
agreed upon Terms of Reference (e.g. the Pacific Salmon Forum)
Closed Containment Research
20. The Framework establishes as a priority collaborative research into the
economic feasibility of commercial scale closed containment to be completed by
August 31, 2006 and includes agreed upon Terms of Reference for such
research
21. The Framework provides that MHC and CAAR will mutually agree upon a
researcher to complete this analysis and to jointly advocate for funding from the
BC Pacific Salmon Forum or other appropriate bodies.
22. The Framework provides that upon completion of the closed containment
research, both parties will seek to identify ways to overcome the economic
obstacles to adapting closed containment as identified in that research
23. The Framework provides that upon economic viability of commercial scale
closed containment being demonstrated, MHC will work to incorporate closed
containment into its operations
Communications
24. The Framework establishes a communications protocol that will govern how
CAAR and MHC will communicate both internally and externally regarding those
matters addressed in the document.
25. The Framework provides that CAAR will not directly target MHC or its
products in the local, national and international market campaigns and that MHC
will communicate with CAAR on an ongoing basis regarding any new tenure
applications, relocations, or siting requests.
Process
26. The Framework provides that the parties will meet as required on an ongoing
basis to implement the Framework
27. The Framework provides for parties other than CAAR and MHC becoming
involved in discussions under the Framework subject to mutual agreement
28. The Framework provides for dispute resolution.
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Appendix A (to FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE – SUMMARY)
: General Summary of Issues Related to Salmon Farming As Identified in
the Framework
• farmed salmon /wild salmon interactions (e.g., sea lice, disease transfer)
• escapes of farmed fish and non-native species
• use and application of chemicals and medication
• overall wellbeing of seafood industry (e.g., competition, integration)
• jobs and economic development, wellbeing of coastal communities
• reputation (e.g., credibility of claims, public perception)
• application of technology (e.g., closed containment, management systems, fish
husbandry)
• tenure allocation including siting impacts and First Nations interests
• fish husbandry (composition of fish feed, antibiotics etc.)
• the impacts of waste from salmon farms on the water column, benthic
environment, and
marine ecosystem in general
• sustainable fisheries at the global and local levels (e.g., fish meal/fish oil)
• human health and safety (e.g., nutrition, contamination)
• business viability (e.g., investments, cost control, markets)
• aboriginal rights, traditional use and land claims
• communications (e.g., information sharing, public claims, marketing)
• research and development
• regulatory environment
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